On 15 September Qatari Emir Tamīm ibn Ḥamad Āl Tānī gave a lengthy interview to the French journal Le Point. Overall it was mostly a general talk in which the monarch skillfully promoted his country – which Qatar overall does beautifully -, but also talked about regional matters, the state of the Middle East these days, and his country’s links with the infamous Muslim Brotherhood. What was strange, however, was that in the context of the region’s desperate situation the global challenges he warned against yet another “Arab Spring”.
It is a rather interesting notion, as, after more than a decade of the infamous wave of destructive changes in the region, in which Qatar was a very active promoter, it was suggested by Western academics a number of times that setting another wave might just be unavoidable. That never materialized in the same magnitude. And recently a number of signs from the new Tunisian constitution to the Syrian gradual return to the Arab fold show that in fact the region is slowly but coping with the legacy of the first wave.
The Qatari Emir’s remark, however, turned out to be almost prophetical, as only a day later a tragic incident in Tehran lit up flames strangely similar to the scenes of 2011 from Tunisia, Egypt and Syria. The disputed death of an Iranian lady, Mahsā Amīnī while being in police custody sparked protests all over Iran. Mostly in Tehran, but also in Shiraz, Qazvīn, Tabriz, Mashhad, and a number of rural areas. By 23 September according to the Iranian authorities, more than 700 protesters were arrested in the northern Gīlān Province alone. But there were other violent protests all over the country, and while some sources put the death toll of these as high as 35 people, it is rarely mentioned that at least 5 police officers were also killed.
U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has already warned Iran not to use force, just like U.S State Secretary Blinken. While this one incident caused already huge waves of rage and unrest, much of the story is hidden or looked over suspiciously. And the goodwill of the worrying foreign voices also came into question, about very similar events.
The tragic event of Mahsā Amīnī
It must be pointed out immediately that much of what happened is still heavily debated and there are many unclear circumstances about how the whole case eventually developed.
What is known is that on 16 September Mahsā Amīnī was arrested by the controversial “Moral Police” in Tehran for being dressed indecent. She was escorted to the local authority, where after a short while she collapsed, fell into a coma, and thought rushed into a local hospital to get treatment, tragically passed away three days later. Practically that much is what every side seems to agree on. But the explanations vary fundamentally.
The version that most Western and Gulf Arab sources passed on was that she was arrested for “not wearing a hijab”, and brutally beaten either in the car or in the police station until she became unconscious and thus got killed. She is generally portrayed as an innocent victim of a brutal male-dominated radical dictatorship with no sense of human rights, and a massive campaign was pumped up on social media to act against this behavior. Not much later the matter was further twisted – mostly just for the regional audience -, as she was a Kurd, who only traveled to the capital on a journey thus ending so tragically. So it is not only a woman, or human rights issue, but also an ethnic tension as well.
So far the government while blocking the protests and restricting telecommunications to end the violence, has already temporarily limited the authority of the “Moral Police”, launched an investigation and even President Ra’īsī promised justice. Yet authorities also harshly rejected Western interference in this internal matter.
Is that only about the headscarf?
Before going into the details, three key points should be pointed out to see the picture clearly: What is the core of this women’s issue, and what is the significance of the headscarf? What is a Moral Police? And was Amīnī “breaking the law”?
Iran with its more than 80 million population and an area of more than 1,64 million square kilometers area is home to a large number of ethnicities, traditions, and mentalities. There are massively different attitudes in the different parts of the country from the very conservative and zealously religious areas of Qom, or Mashhad, and the traditional ones in the countryside mostly in the eastern part to the more very modern, almost Western mindsets in most parts of the capital or the big cities. Before the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the nation was pushed towards a specifically Americanized lifestyle, which had much effect in the cities but left the more conservative classes resentful. After 1979 eventually the conservative elements renouncing America and its lifestyle won and this attitude was even more solidified by the long war with Iraq, which was seen as a “Holy Defense”. That view of a moral, conservative, and an openly theocratic state was vigilantly kept up under the Islamic Republic’s first Supreme Leader Rūḥollah Hōmeīnī. The state was built on conservative Shia theocratical principles and strict rules were introduced in all parts of life from alcohol to social conduct with women, all the way to the enforcement of an Islamic veil. That latter was seen by many as the symbol of the new era, turning away from the perceived immortality of the West.
With his death in 1989 and the ascendence of the Supreme Leader ‘Alī Hāmeneī, these rather harsh measures were gradually eased, though there is an eternal “give some take some” policy from cabinet to the next, depending on whether the actual president is coming from the conservative camp, or from the reform movement. Times change and by the 2000s the vast majority of the population was too young to remember to times before the Revolution. As only natural, the younger generations see more of an obstacle in these measures and there is a large craving to put them aside completely.
While the tenure of Hāmeneī since 1989 seems to be more receptive to listening to these voices, there is a very careful balance here. Because not only do the social groups remembering the Revolution positively want these measures to be kept but also there is still a strong conservative class, which sees these measures as appropriate. That is why it is extremely difficult for any Iranian government to take large steps in altering these rules, as its own legitimacy built around the Revolution and Hōmeīnī comes into question.
Nonetheless, the overall atmosphere changed very significantly since 1989. While before a very strict dress code was imposed upon women mandating them to wear a full headscarf covering their hair – hijab -, or even a full cloak over them – chador -, that is not the case anymore. While on government premises this sort of dress code is still heavily promoted, all around the country a scarf on the women’s head – rūsarī – and generally modest dressing is enough. Though in theory the old rules still apply, its actual context relaxed hugely. So much so that by the late 2010s it was generally accepted for women not have these restrictions not only in their homes but even in their cars. Nonetheless, reminiscent of the old times, the once all-powerful and feared Moral Police, almost all of them women, is still active. And here comes the friction.
While the growing number of youth, many of them Western-educated want to change and view these old rules as oppressive, the classes the state ideology is built upon seeing them as necessary to preserve the “achievements of the Revolution”. And since women’s rights is a popular topic – with very different content – in the West as well, it is an ideal matter to criticize Iran. Right, or wrong, however, that is still a huge debate in Iran, along with a number of social and political themes all revolving around the legacy of the Revolution.
Because of this social contradiction between the older and more conservative elements and the liberal youth with the government constantly swinging between them to keep some balance, there is a massive grey area of rules, which means one thing on paper and another in practice. The result, especially in large cities, where the most extreme viewpoints tend to clash is the regular raids of the Moral Police randomly and arbitrarily picking on people to prove their point, and to keep on their understanding of the law. And since the government cannot openly trample on the old legacy, it tends to turn a blind eye to these measures. However, it also tries to limit the effects. And usually, the result of these raids are random quarrels and arbitrary arrests guiding the “indecent” women into a local “guidance center”, where they are lectured about “proper behavior”. Arbitrary as it is, it almost never goes beyond a level of nuisance, or fines. And that is exactly what happened to Mahsā Amīnī.
It should also be added to this that in certain parts of Iran clothing, especially traditional ones tends to differ heavily from the dark long dresses in the central areas to the colorful and even flamboyant ones in the wealthy, or ethnic areas. And Kurds – amongst others – are known for their more colorful dresses. Which again in big cities can cause arbitrary troubles. It would not be unimaginable for a conservative eye in Tehran to find a woman’s appearance unacceptable, which would be otherwise perfectly normal in her own region.
Here comes the question, of how much Mahsā Amīnī was breaking the law or walking this “grey area”. There is a rather clear answer to this. The Iranian authorities released the security camera footage of the guidance center to which Amīnī was escorted into.
It is clear from the footage that Amīnī wore a rūsarī and long had a long enough dress. This might be to the unliking of some conservatives, but it is definitely within the generally accepted limits. So what happened was the result of some overzealous Moral Police officers – again, women -, which is also clear from the footage, as one of the debates with Amīnī mocking her dress.
When honesty falls short
Noticeably since the CCTV footage came out the tone of the media, at least those talking to the Western audience toned down the claims mostly focusing on the aftermath and the general controversies of the dress code policies, but interestingly this very footage is almost never shown. But it should be, as it puts the whole matter in a very different light. Especially since the authenticity of the footage was never challenged by anyone.
The footage shows how Mahsā Amīnī walked into the guidance center. She was clearly walking on her own and shows no signs of trauma. She also appears inside, clearly unharmed and it is clear to see that she collapses without anyone touching her. It was probably viewed as a cheap drama, which is why it was downplayed. Which led to the truly tragic outcome. The official preliminary investigation also stated that Amīnī had heart complications that caused her death, but the authorities in charge also suspended the officials of the Moral Police with charges of negligence.
It is a tragic incident, which was boosted to the maximum causing unrest. Interestingly, not only world leaders rushed to comment on the event, but there were massive rallies in Iraqi Kurdistan portraying it as an ethnic atrocity, and very soon a very long detailed Wikipedia page was created in 31 different languages. This is hardly the work of outraged locals, and the internet since then is limited, and the page for a long did not appear in Persian.
Truly there are protests. That is not denied by the authorities either. There were many similar ones in 2009, 2019, 2020, and even this year, though the same size was not seen since 2009. There is a number of reasons for that. There are people, who are genuinely dissatisfied with these very rules. Others criticize the government and its policies, the social hardship caused by the sanctions, or a number of other topics.
What is usually not mentioned, however, is that Iranian authorities regularly catch foreign infiltrators smuggling in weapons to cause unrest. The numerous assassinations against scientists and army officers and the sabotage operations against key Iranian facilities is a clear proof of that phenomenon. So it is not far-fetched to assume that while there is genuine dissatisfaction there would be hands manipulating the events from abroad.
It is rarely reported that police officers are shot at in protests, or other protesters also killed by live fire, claimed not coming from the police. Such events can be very familiar from the events of Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria in 2011, which mostly turned out to be proven actions to stir up violence, but later on, completely looked over to deal with the results.
Another interesting feature of the media attention is that while the very same Western sources constantly criticize Iran for its policies toward women – regardless of their validity – the same moral standard is seldom applied to key Western allies in the Persian Gulf, such as Qatar, the Emirates, or Bahrain. Especially now, in a time of utter need for energy sources.
Timing is usually the answer
This unrest comes indeed at a very inconvenient time for Tehran. That is because after long years of troubles following the nuclear deal’s collapse and almost a warlike atmosphere ruling between Iran and many of its Gulf neighbors, the equation in the last year or so turned to Tehran’s favor.
The most important is that Tehran managed to settle most of its problems with its Gulf neighbors, most importantly with Saudi Arabia. Only this week Iraq, which itself is in deep political crisis, noted that the Iraqi mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran is successful and rapprochement is reached. The relations of Iran with the other Gulf states are even far better, especially with Qatar, the Emirates, and Oman. The only exception is Bahrain.
The other key issue is the course of the nuclear negotiations. Since Biden took office there was a clear intention by Washington to revive the JCPOA signed in 2015, but Tehran during the Vienna negotiations demanded assurances. At a certain point, these negotiations were so promising that Israel, the only remaining real opponent of the deal, resorted to open threats to act alone “if necessary”. The matter of the nuclear deal was of peripheral concern until the Russian military operation in Ukraine started. Since then Europe has desperate needs energy sources and the Gulf is reluctant to increase output. The removal of the sanctions against Iran and thus its return to the global energy market would greatly help to ease this problem, but now this does not seem possible as the negotiations came to a halt. Yet on 15 September Iran joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, meaning its economic options are not better, and lifting the sanctions have become more pressing for Europe than it is for Tehran. As trade with Russia and Turkey grows as well, it is expected that Tehran could in 5-10 years span significantly improve its social conditions. Meaning of any side wanted to cause internal troubles for Iran, time is now running short.
Also interesting that recently Lebanese Ḥizb Allah, a key ally of Iran managed to force Israel to a favorable maritime border settlement, which caused serious tension in Tel Aviv.
It is also worth mentioning, the fact that Mahsā Amīnī was a Kurd caused massive protests in Irbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, where it is viewed as an ethnic, rather than a women’s rights issue. Most Western sources point out that the core of the protesters was themselves Kurds from Iran who migrated to Iraq and are resentful toward Tehran. Interesting fact that in 2021 BBC produced a long “documentary” about such Iranian Kurds and how many of them in Iraq joined Kōmala, a branch of the infamous PKK. This video was only produced in Arabic, and not shown to the Western audience, as it would be probably controversial why this PR film was created for an organization that is viewed in most parts of the world as a terrorist organization. And it is not a coincidence at all that the Iranian authorities have found active Kōmala members among the arrested destructive protestors.
Girls that matter and girls than don’t
As we saw the tragic incident of Mahsā Amīnī caused a huge uproar in Iran and produced considerable international and social media attention. With all its suspicious controversies and the truly destructive results, it is nonetheless a tragedy.
However, the dishonest nature of this campaign allegedly outraged women’s rights was perfectly shown by another recent event. The tragic death of an Iraqi girl, Zaynab ‘Iṣām Māğīd Hazz‘alī.
This 15-year-old Iraqi girl was killed on 21 September in the Abū Ġarīb district of Baghdad by American troops. According to the Americans, U.S. troops were conducting live fire training when a strained bullet shot and killed the girl. Iraqi authorities swiftly opened an investigation, but there is not much they can do with the Americans. Who downplayed the event as an incident, even though their fighting troops officially left the country limiting their presence to training Iraqi troops. And this is clearly not the case here. Some sources allege that the girl was in fact killed in a random shootout by the Americans, or by their random shooting at their will.
Whatever the truth is, Zaynab Hazz‘alī’s death has no Wikipedia page, even though there were massive protests demanding justice. Her name was not brought up in the U.N. and her death was not condemned by Western leaders. Even though the murder is much less in doubt in this case. There is no Western campaign for her justice, and so far there is very little media attention in the West about this. And when it did, like with al-Arabiyya, it turned the story against Iran saying that it is Tehran that is trying to build a story of this to cover its own problems.
Clearly, not all girls are equal.
It is hard to know whether Qatari Emir Tamīm’s remarks only one day before Mahsā Amīnī’s tragedy warned against another Arab Spring he was simply prophetic, or he felt something already. He might have meant something completely different, or just in general. Yet more than a decade after the infamous Arab Spring, which was similarly supported in the West as the current protests in Iran, the Middle East is still struggling with its legacy. There is little positive in the memory of the region’s peoples. So whatever the Qatar Emir meant, it is indeed menacing to think that would happen again.