For long, but really in the last decade or so, especially since the Trump administration undermined the nuclear deal and increased the turmoil with Iran, it has been a sort of paradigm that Iran is on the constant verge of collision with most of its Gulf neighbors. Relations have always been troubled since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran, with both parties to blame for trying to undermine the other. And this conflict always involved the whole region, as both parties constantly opened new fronts to gain more political and strategic ground against the other.
A few years ago, when the relations were simply poor, turmoil was exacerbated with diplomatic relations being cut between Riyadh and Tehran, constant accusations of clandestine activities all around the region, and finally escalating into the so-called normalization process with Israel, to which Bahrain and the Emirates officially joined, but it was always heavily implied that soon others will also join with Saudi Arabia at the lead. Signaling that an Israeli-Gulf alliance is forming against Iran, which understandably worried Tehran.
Since Trump left office the massive push for the normalization died out and it was a positive sign that the Biden administration kept signaling it wants to return to the nuclear deal. But still, Iran’s relations with its Gulf neighbors were poor.
In the last few weeks, however, Tehran became the center of diplomatic activities in the region, with some surprising results. Bettering relations with Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman were well on the way, but not on this level as we see it now. As the Saudi-Iranian negotiations are progressing well, other relations are also improving. There are surprising signals from all around the Gulf, all suggesting that Iran really managed to turn the table around and even arrived at the verge of a comprehensive settlement with Saudi Arabia.
It all started with Syria
As we said before, while the world is busy following the latest developments of the war in Ukraine Iran launched a feverish diplomatic offensive in recent weeks. That mostly focused on regional matters, as there is a frustrating halt in the nuclear negotiations in Vienna.
This series of noticeable meetings started on 8 May, when Syrian President Baššār al-Asad paid a surprise visit to Tehran meeting both President Ebrāhīm Ra’īsī and Supreme Leader ‘Alī Hāmeneī.
Since there was no major event in either country at this time and the Syrian President under the current circumstances rarely leaves his country, the question was raised: Why was this meeting, and why now? Of course, Syrian-Iranian relations are excellent given the strategic alliance between them, and there are worries in Tehran that the Emirati diplomatic efforts might lure Damascus into a settlement with Israel to end the war, the meeting was still very curious. Especially as no major details were shared about it on either side beyond the usual diplomatic formalities.
The answer came only four days later when Qatari Emir Tamīm ibn Ḥamad arrived in Tehran as the first stop on his diplomatic round trip. While Iranian-Qatari relations are also improving and are very important, the central matter was the mediation now Tehran plays between Doha and Damascus.
By now most Arab states agree to end the diplomatic war on Syria and reintegrate into the Arab fold by bringing it back to the Arab League and opening all formal diplomatic and economic channels with it, despite all the Western pressures to the contrary. Practically the last major Arab opponent of this path is Qatar, which successfully prevented the next Arab League meeting in Algeria to be a ceremonious reintegration of Syria.
One of the main causes of this antagonism is that Doha heavily supported the war against Syria since 2011. A policy very hard to backtrack on, regardless of the greatly changed realities since then. But the more pressing reason was that Turkey was is more involved in this war with Syrian territories being illegally occupied by it, and now preparing to launch new offensives and flooding these areas with a massive amount of Syrian refugees. A step Damascus deems equal to ethnic cleansing. Qatar built much of its regional policies on its alliance with Turkey and heavily relied on it in its conflict with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Bahrain between 2017 and 2021. Was it not for the Turkish support, Doha would probably have to yield to the demands of its adversaries? And in recent years the Turkish-Qatari tandem proved to be a very strong ideological-military-economic axis in the Middle East. So a sudden change in the relations with Syria would undoubtedly cause huge complications with Ankara while promising nothing in return, as Syria will not be a receptive ground for major Qatari investments or economic gains.
This equation, however, has changed in recent months, given the overall rapprochement between Turkey and the Emirates on the one hand, and between Turkey and Saudi Arabia on the other. President Erdoğan now talks about unprecedented heights in the relations with these two Arab states. Consequently, this suggests some sort of rift in the formally unshakable Turkish-Qatari alliance, and the time of utter Qatari reliance on Ankara might soon be over.
Sensing this, Tehran sees this opportunity to step in and try to mend fences between Damascus and Doha. If this could go through, it would be a huge benefit for Syria easing its economic hardship and finally ending the era of war. A real settlement could start around Syria. But of course, Tehran is not entirely altruistic in this approach, as would improve the standing of its most stable Arab states ally, while could once again step in as an influence deal broker in the region.
The first meeting with the Syrian President aimed to outline the Iranian diplomatic efforts, while also gathering information on how far this can go. The second meeting aimed to act upon this mediation, as the officials statement focused on Hāmeneī’s message that the matter of Syria has to be solved by dialogue. It is especially telling that right after Tehran Emir Tamīm arrived in Ankara on an official visit, without revealing much about the nature of these discussions. So otherwise, we have no information why Emir Tamīm went to Ankara right after Tehran on the very same day.
Has Qatar turned out to be the “best friend”?
The real value of the warming Iranian-Qatari relations really showed in the latter part of Emir Tamīm’s trip, as he arrived in Germany on the way to the Davos Forum.
The visit to Germany was well-publicized, as Qatar and Germany signed an agreement of energy partnership, thus Doha agreed to increase its natural gas supply for Germany. Many viewed this step as a deviation from Doha’s former stance of siding with Moscow and not becoming a strong alternative to end Russian energy supplies to Europe. In theory, it would be a mutually beneficial deal with Germany having a way to end the Russian dependency and relieve some of the mounting pressure on it, while Qatar gains a stable market for its increased output at a highly elevated price. However, Bloomberg soon pointed out correctly that the deal is largely a failure, as this project cannot really commence until 2024, and will not seriously increase the supplies to Germany until 2026.
Yet at the same meeting, Emir Tamīm also expressed that Qatar is ready to mediate between Europe, America, and Iran about the nuclear agreement for the sake of a general settlement. Of course, if that is needed. Right at a time, when Europe, especially Germany feverishly tries to find alternatives to the Russian energy supplies and Qatar is a pivotal partner in this, such an offer is hard to ignore. Emir Tamīm also argued that while Europe is looking for alternatives it should really keep Iran in mind, as Tehran’s reintegration and the return of Irani oil to the markets would yield stability and could be a huge asset. So while Iran is negotiating with Qatar for the sake of Syria, Qatar is also heavily bargaining with its European partners for the benefit of Iran. Interestingly, possibly to check back on the results, the next day the Iranian and the Qatari foreign ministers held extensive negotiations on bilateral matters, undoubtedly reflecting on the reception in Europe.
But why is that so important for Qatar on the eve of cutting a huge deal – at least seemingly – with Europe? The Irani-Qatari relations were never specifically bad. At least they were far better than with the other Gulf states. These ties, however, skyrocketed after 2017, when Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Bahrain launched a blockade against Qatar. At that point, Iran opened all its ports to Qatar, flooded the Qatari markets with commodities, and what is most important, opened its airspace not only for commercial Qatari flights but to the vital Turkish economic and military supplies. This was a favor hard to forget, and surely well pointed out by Iranian officials on every occasion.
Since the blockade ended it was expected that the ties between Doha and Tehran would cool down. But they kept on surging with by now a series of high-level meetings on both sides and a number of agreements on security, economic, and energy cooperation. Seeing these recent remarks by the Qatari ruler, it can really be said that Qatar has become the best friend of Iran in the Gulf.
Oman, the old friend
Not long after Emir Tamīm left Tehran, Iranian President Ebrāhīm Ra’īsī also left for Oman on 24 May. A state with which Iran also had particularly good and balanced relations in the past. Most notably it was Oman, which behind the scenes set the stage for the JCPOA back in 2013-14.
This visit, however, also went beyond the formalities, as the two sides signed 8 memorandums of understanding and 4 joint projects while encouraging investments from both sides. It was also indicated that economic activities are heavily encouraged, as the “obstacles will soon be lifted”.
Oman was an important economic partner even in the worst of times, though not the most important for Iran in the Gulf. But this rapidly improving tie shows the growing influence of Iran in the region.
Even the Emirates
These negotiations are important but do not mean a breakthrough, as Iran’s biggest contradictions were always with the Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
On 17 May Iranian Foreign Minister Amīr ‘Abdollahiyāh arrived in Abū Zabī, where he met with the new president of the state Muḥammad ibn Zāyid himself.
Considering the deep division between Qatar and the Emirates, improved relations between Iran and Qatar should invoke problems between Abū Zabī and Tehran. However, both sides now talked about a “new chapter” starting in their ties. It is especially noticeable that while with Oman and Qatar the Iranian negotiations were led by the highest authorities, and this delegation was only by the Foreign Minister, it was received by Muḥammad ibn Zāyid. The same person, who recently refused to negotiate with Biden and gave a very cold reception to British Prime Minister Boris Johnson.
This shows that despite all contradictions the Emirati-Iranian relations are improving, and that is important to Abū Zabī now. That is very important for Iran, as the Emirates led the normalization process, which is a major worry for Iran.
A breakthrough with Riyadh?
All these ties are important, but the key issue is which way the Saudi-Iranian negotiations are heading. It has been reported that there have been five rounds of negotiations in Iraq between the two and was indicated that there is progress, so far Riyadh was far from showing a positive attitude about this.
That is until the Davos Forum this year, where Saudi Foreign Minister Fayṣal ibn Farḥān stated that “our hands are open for Iran”. He even went as far as to say that if the nuclear deal was to be revived it would be a positive thing.
He also mentioned the recent Lebanese parliamentary elections, as being positive, though so far insufficient step in the right direction, hinting at Iran.
While this is only just one step, this is nothing short of a breakthrough between Iran and Saudi Arabia. And a surprising turn, as now Riyadh officially endorses the nuclear deal with Iran, unlike in 2015.
The Lebanese elections as a perfect indicator
When we assess the matters of the Middle East we should always keep in mind that all its societies, without exception, are of a very traditional mindset. Therefore their political conduct is nothing short of a live-action documentary of Byzantine court intrigues, where struggles or offenses seldom really mean war, but at the same time rapprochement, closeness, or settlement can be just as void.
For just two ideal examples, we should remember the struggles between Qatar and four of its Arab “allies” between 2017 and 2021, or the conflict between Turkey and Saudi Arabia after the Hāšuqğī murder in Istanbul in 2018. In the first case Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt waged a complete blockade and economic war against Qatar since the summer of 2017, which at the beginning was close to open war. Though the original ultimatum against Doha was that it should change its government, break all ties with Iran, close its biggest media corporation al-Jazeera and surrender itself to Emirati-Saudi-Egyptian foreign policy, the whole struggle in January 2021 ended without any of these demands being achieved or even seriously addressed. And by now all is back to normal, though the relations are still somewhat cold. In the other case, Turkey did its best to publicize all the horrific details of the infamous Hāšuqğī murder, implicate the Saudi Crown Prince in the worst light possible, and demand serious accounting for the culprits, in April 2022 Ankara simply handed over the case to Saudi Arabia, without any tangible result in favor of a rapprochement. In both cases, Saudi Arabia was at the center of the matter.
So when we hear about rapprochement and mending fences from Riyadh, it is not entirely clear how far such news goes. The most telling indicators are always those matters, where interests clash. Now, between Iran and Saudi Arabia there are a number of such cases, but nothing as important as Lebanon. That small country has always been a battleground between conflicting agendas. Lebanon is home to the Ḥizb Allah, Iran’s possible most successful agenda projecting programs in the Arab world and most reliable allies, while on the other hand the Shiite party’s opponents always count on Saudi Arabia to counter this influence.
Recently Lebanon had its regular parliamentary elections, which had a specific weight after four years of ineffective and collapsing governments, while also falling into its biggest economic crisis. Right in the middle of the allegedly promising rapprochement between Tehran and Riyadh this election could be just as much a positive sign of bettering relations, as a casus belli to renew the quarrels. There are no final results yet to the elections and the formation of the new Lebanese government is still far away, the preliminary indications show that Ḥizb Allah and its allies gained a landslide victory, even though their gains have fallen back since 2018. Considering that in the last four years most attempts were made to squeeze Ḥizb Allah out of any possible government and marginalize it in Lebanese politics, and practically all these attempts failed while at the same time causing a shocking economic downturn, it is not that much surprising. It is also not a surprise that the pro-Saudi media conglomerates signaled a massive loss for Ḥizb Allah, while this term is only true in a very relative sense. The situation, as is usual for Lebanon, will surely lead to long disputes about how to form a new government.
While that all is not surprising, it is more curious how little all that troubles the Saudi-Iranian relations now. Saudi Foreign Minister Fayṣal ibn Farḥān recently in the Davos Forum even indicated that this could be a positive sign. Though he also pointed out that this in itself is not enough. And such remarks had a noticeably positive reception in Ḥizb Allah’s media array. At the same time, Iranian reactions were also mild, mostly criticizing the U.S. and much less Saudi Arabia for meddling with the elections.
This indicates that amidst the general rapprochement neither side really wants to use this opportunity now to invoke provocations against the other. While this is a very sensitive case for both camps. Thus suggesting that something tangible is forming between Riyadh and Tehran.
This is indeed significant, as it shows that at a time when Tehran is the center of Middle Eastern diplomacy and making remarkable gains, even the “traditional adversary” the Saudi kingdom does not oppose this track.
Questionable indications
If one is to say that the Lebanese elections show a positive sign that contradictions between the two sides can be patched up, it can also be pointed out that there are a number of signs to the contrary. As not long ago we also assessed, that there is a broad clandestine war now between Tehran and Tel Aviv. This war is now even escalating with increased Israeli attacks in Syria, while at the same time the Israeli media discusses that by now Iran managed to build up a strong strategic position in Syria. Thus the indications in case of a future war, in which Tel Aviv is gearing up primarily against Syria turned to the worst. Since the infamous Israeli bombing campaign in Eastern Syria in January 2021 and the later the Israeli raid against Syrian Palmyra from above the illegal American base at at-Tanaf, which caused a reaction by bombing this illegal American base, we have suggested that the main motivation for these attacks that something, most likely war materials are heading to Syria and Lebanon from Iran, which Tel Aviv zealously tries to prevent to arrive. The recent debates in the Israeli media suggest that ultimately this goal was not achieved, despite the frequent attacks. And since that time relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv also turned very bitter about Ukraine, and Russia will likely increase its protection for Syria further limiting Israeli striking capabilities. As an indication of this, the last time Israel attacked Syria and bombed the area surrounding the capital Damascus Russia activated its S-300 defense systems and fired upon the Israeli warplanes. This is of course just a warning by Moscow, but an alarming one for Tel Aviv, nonetheless.
Also recently another assassination was carried out in Tehran against Pāsdārān Colonel Ḥasan Ṣayyād Hodāī. Little is officially published about Colonel Hodāī’s real importance or role in the Pāsdārān, by most assessments he was an important member of Iran’s support activities in Syria, especially in the field of missiles technology. If that is true, this is a serious blow to Iran, but also suggests that the Israeli leadership is indeed deeply worried about the missile arsenal to its north and the clandestine war is indeed at its peak.
Iran was quick to blame Israel for this murder, but this time even the Western press seems to agree. On 27 May the New York Times reported that the Israelis admitted the murder to the Americans, and it caused fury in Tel Aviv that the word got out to the public.
Right at this time, the Israeli media discussed that “something big is about to happen between Saudi Arabia, America, and Israel”. According to the reports Jared Kushner, Trump’s son in law and the main architect of the so-called normalization process is to mediate a huge Saudi investment deal in Israel, and on 27 May a leading Israeli official visited the royal palace in Riyadh on this matter, while dozens of Israeli businessmen also visited the kingdom. This story, which so far gained no reaction from Saudi sources, might be true, but it should not be forgotten that this is something the Israelis vent vigorously. And that is the key point here.
While it would not be entirely surprising to learn that especially with prominent American middlemen there are joint business projects between certain Gulf states and Israel, as such things have happened in the past, this is far from being open conduct between Riyadh and Tel Aviv. So this event, especially the frequent reports about it in the media now, when the normalization process practically loses steam, might very well be a part of the Israeli psychological warfare causing doubts and fury between Tehran and Riyadh. And such psychological warfare is also very active now, as Israel just had a major military drill with the U.S., heavily implying that this was the grand rehearsal for an attack against Iran.
But if the story is true, what does that mean for the possible Saudi-Iranian rapprochement? In fact very little. It is more indicative that Tel Aviv fears this prospect and tries to undermine it. Doing business indirectly between Gulf entrepreneurs – even with government support – and Israelis can be hardly surprising for the Iranian leadership. But this is far from building a strategic alliance, which was in the air under Trump, but now seems ever more distant.
While overall Gulf-Iranian ties are rapidly warming, especially with Qatar as we saw, it is quite enough if Saudi Arabia agrees not to take measures against Iran. Two years ago an Israeli-Gulf defense alliance with American mediation, or direct participation was well on the way, but since then it broke down. The normalization process broke down, as Arab states are pushing for criminalizing any settlement with Tel Aviv. Recently Iraq approved such legislation, and there are similar voices from Tunisia and Algeria as well. The Saudi-American, just like the Emirati-American relations also cooled down, especially regarding Russia.
Meaning that Iran has indeed managed to improve its position in the region. It is very early to judge how much the parties are truly committed, with the biggest doubts surrounding Saudi Arabia. But if the nuclear deal really goes through, the ground is there for good economic relations between the two sides of the Persian Gulf, further undermining the possibility of an effective Gulf-Israeli alliance.