2021 witnessed many conferences and debates as this was the tenth anniversary of the so called “Arabic Spring”. It is true that all over the Arab world, but even in the West, this term turned very bitter after the great enthusiasm in the beginning, but it cannot be denied that the Middle East went through a huge transformation. Which hasn’t even really ended.
It all started in Tunisia, and this North African country always held a special place in this process, because this was the country which was the first one to change, and it was relatively swift and bloodless and even more important, it was decisive. Not only the previous leader, but the whole former ruling elite, the entire system was changed. And for long Tunisia was seen as the prime example, the living proof that the “Arab Spring” was not destined to fail, as showed an overall picture of moving towards a functioning pluralist parliamentary democracy. This view always triggered reservations in the Arab world for a number of reasons. And the long boiling frustrations reached a breaking point two week ago.
There has been a political stalemate for years in the Parliament, while the non-partisan president Qays Sa‘īd grew in popularity. The set of political and economic problems reached a point where people simply had enough. There were sporadic protest all over the county for months, but on 25 July the wave of new marches in almost all major cities prompted the president to take matters into his hands.
Some claim this to be a coup, reminiscent of the old one-party presidential system. Others view the Tunisian President to be a hero saving his country from the Muslim Brotherhood and the legacy of the “Arab Spring”. Qays Sa‘īd, however, merely views himself to be a humble servant of the state restoring order. While one should not doubt the foreign hands moving behind the curtains, this event, surprising as it is, was on the way for more than a year. It is a huge question what will happen now, but it is clear in the Arab world that what happened in Tunisia is still very symbolic.
Was this a revolution? A coup? A counter revolution? Or just an idealistic president trying his best for his country.
Was it written?
At end of 2019 Tunisia witnessed both early presidential and parliamentary elections. The result were very puzzling and by the the time the Parliament got swore it, it was clear that these years will be anything but easy. We discussed it in details in October 2019, and looking back, most of the prognoses were sadly accurate.
In short the presidential and the parliamentary elections brought a very contradictory result. In the Parliament the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the an-Nahḍa Movement kept losing its seats, still was not losing positions as fast as its opponents. The mostly leftists-secular government coalition ruling until 2019 completely fell apart, and want filled the vacuum was mostly a personal project a large magnate. The an-Nahḍa and its Islamist allies made up the biggest block with the an-Nahḍa being by far the largest party, but they did not reach a majority. Their most adamant opponents lost big in the elections, they were divided, and were even at odds with the Qalb Tūnis formed by the businessman Nabīl al-Qaruwī. Consequently the Brotherhood could not form a government, but there could not have been government without the blessing of the an-Nahḍa either.
The stalemate could have been somewhat resolved if one of the two – more realistically three – main power blocks could have won the position of the president. But it was nor al-Qaruwī, nor the an-Nahḍa’s candidate could win, as the direct presidential elections brought the victory of Qays Sa‘īd, a then 61 non-partisan constitutional jurist. He became extremely popular being viewed as somewhat artificial with his insistence on formal language and style and cold, but beyond the party barricades, who might be able to hold the county together and lead it out of the turmoil. This view never diminished, only grew in the last two years.
So the question was what we too suggested back then: How could a state function in the middle of regional, economic and political crises with a deeply divided parliament and a massively popular president disliking and being disliked by all major political camp? It seemed to be an unsurpassable obstacle. And as the conditions show now, it was probably unsurpassable.
The first attempt for a viable compromise came with the formation of government led by Ilyās al-Fahfāh representing a smaller leftist party pleasing the left, but with the blessing of a compromised power-sharing between Qalb Tūnis and the an-Nahḍa Party. While the formally an-Nahḍa–leftist–independent coalition stayed at the helm, most key positions were divided between the two biggest parties formally being the opposition. And the an-Nahḍa Party kept the position of Speaker of the Parliament, which post was filled by the party’s leader, Rāšid al-Ġannūšī. Thus the an-Nahḍa hold the Parliament under control keeping control over the government. The strongest opposition was therefore not the Qalb Tūnis, but the Free Dustūrī Party led by ‘Abīr Mūsī, the heir of the former state party under Bin ‘Alī and some smaller leftist element under their influence.
While the an-Nahḍa Party aimed at increasing their positions within the state institutions and slowly regaining their influence lost in 2014, the Free Dustūrī Party with some foreign help planned the removal of al-Ġannūšī from his position. This was to serve as the first step to break the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence. So in fact, neither waring camp had an interest in the government’s success. The government of al-Fahfāh only formed in February 2020, months after the elections. It was paralyzed by the wide coalition forming the government and the stiff conflict in the Parliament. The change came after the attempt by the Free Dustūrī Party trying to remove al-Ġannūšī with a vote of no confidence, based on accusations of foreign conspiracy with Turkey and the Brotherhood’s alleged agenda to take over the state. The motion failed, but in result the an-Nahḍa pulled the plug on the government. In July 2020 al-Fahfāh had no choice but to resign after alleged corruption scandals and the independent government members resigning. But it was absolutely clear that the an-Nahḍa revoked its support.
With already two failed governments in less then two years – the first could not even form – and with a very divided political scenery the president had two choices. Resolve the Parliament and schedule for early elections, or let the major parties try once again to form a government. Now Qays Sa‘īd clearly points back to this occasion, as he could and might even should have dismissed the Parliament.
The result was the new government of Hišām al-Mašīšī, a formally independent politician and at the time of the advisors of the President. Al-Mašīšī is a perfect example of the political class emerging after 2011, first being in an anti-corruption and embezzlement investigation body then slowly climbing a the ladders of power filling several ministerial positions. He reached the top as presidential adviser for legal affairs, then being Minister of Interior in al-Fahfāh’s government. At first at least he was viewed by Sa‘īd as a reliable, though not too charismatic choice, but soon be turned out to be weak and easily moved by the an-Nahḍa.
Al-Mašīšī did indeed try to form a government, but his attempts were paralyzed by the ongoing political crisis, foreign pressure, regional crises and finally a fatal blow. The Corona epidemic. Though Tunisia took the first two waves relatively well, the third wave of the epidemic made Tunisia the most infected country in the Arab and African world with a staggering death rate. Which in a country strongly dependent on tourism was devastating. And in result of the epidemic and the blockades this year Tunisia had no tourist season. This was the fatal blow of an economy and social structure already pushed to its limits by years of regional struggles and political infightings. So the signs were very bad from the beginning for this parliament, but the epidemic and the political stalemate pushed it over the edge.
Tunisia was in this dead end a year ago and solution was tested. But it failed. So something else had to be tried. And that is exactly what the president did.
Tunisia in crosshairs
Before we turn our attention to the latest developments, we have to understand the regional atmosphere around Tunisia. What happened, and still happens in Tunisia – presumably – fundamentally transforming the political landscape is deep rooted in the Tunisian social and political composition and is primarily a domestic affair. However, it is highly connected to the strong currents in the smaller North African and broader Arab region. Three main matters cross each other, and thus Tunisia is a key position in this chessboard.
For more details, we have also covered this in June 2020. The first and most imminent problem for Tunisia in the close neighborhood was – and still is – the war in Libya. This conflict slowly turned into a power wrestle between the Turkish-Qatari alliance on one hand, and the Saudi-Emirati-Egyptian block on the other. While Turkey and Qatar – respectively, or cooperatively – gained large footholds in North Africa, most importantly in Algeria, Libya was understandably a key financial and security concern for Egypt. The Egyptian allies also had a wrested interest in supporting Libyan forces leaning toward Cairo, so to thwart Turkish and Qatari ambitions in the region. And this “Cold War” is still ongoing, despite a major reconciliation between Riyadh and Doha. Almost two years ago the Egyptian-Emirati allies were winning the war almost reaching Tripoli, which prompted Turkey to pull in arms and Syrian mercenaries in support of the government Ankara viewed to be the only legal one. This intervention blocked the onslaught of the Egyptian allies and Cairo was rightly concerned that soon Turkish forces will arrive to its Libyan borders. So concerned that President as-Sīsī was willing to go to war last summer. At the end, luckily, neither sides were willing to commit to an all-out war, and with the transformation in Gulf a new chance was given to reconciliation. Today Libya is on a fragile, but viable path to restore stability. Yet that does not mean that the Egyptian-Turkish rivalry is over. It was just decreased and channeled to a much more peaceful process.
Tunisia’s most logical and direct interest was to see an end to the war in the neighborhood, which would finally stop the flow of immigrants, mercenaries and foreign fighters, while a recuperating Libyan could lift up the Tunisian economy as well. Understandably, especially at the peak of the conflict, Tunisia was a key asset for Turkey as a bridgehead for its operations in Libya, and for the Emirates and Egypt to cross this move and see a government blocking the Turkish support. Thus the Turkish backed Libyan government could be somewhat blockaded. In many occasions the Tunisian state was crumbling under this pressure, and once again only the firm stance of President Sa‘īd managed to keep Tunis out of the war. At least not being engaged directly. Sa‘īd’s strongest gamble was to rely on Algeria having the weight to secure Tunisia. However, Algiers with its own deep troubles is building profitable ties with Ankara, so saw no interest in a direct antagonism. In result Sa‘īd started a careful set of maneuvers keeping Tunisia equally distant and impartial from both Cairo and Ankara.
The second constellation is the all over regional rivalry between the aforementioned regional blocks and most directly between the Emirates and Qatar. And this present itself on a ideological level, where Ankara and Doha support Muslim Brotherhood affiliated Islamist movements and governments, while Abū Zabī mostly secular military based formations – like as-Sīsī in Egypt -, but practically anyone willing to struggle against the Turkish-Qatari-Brotherhood ideology. This rivalry is present in every country, even beyond the individual conflicts. Meaning that even if peace and stability would return to Libya today, this rivalry would not cease in Tunisia. And in this rivalry Tunisia is a symbolic battlefield, as this was be starting point of Brotherhood’s march to power in the “Arab Spring”.
The third component in this web of interests came in the last year of Trump pushing hard for the so called normalization process, which in the region was a mostly Emirati project. Any country willing to go along with the process would automatically orbit towards Abū Zabī, while resisting it would attract Qatari-Turkish attention. Once again, President Sa‘īd was firm to state that Tunisia under no circumstances can join the normalization process and stands with Palestine. This was just as much a message to Algeria, which is always relying on this tune. However, the president had to be careful with this, as this way he was boosting support for the an-Nahḍa, further polarizing the internal political conflicts.
The result of this tight web around Tunisia was that there were very strong and capable forces all seeing an interest to see a friendly government in Tunis, and the local enemies purged. The an-Nahḍa and its Brotherhood affiliates enjoyed a very obvious Turkish support, while ‘Abīr Mūsī and her allies had the Emirates – and to some extent Egypt – behind their backs. But to their mutual frustration there is a president, who is not willing to give in to any currents and only wish to keep Tunisia stabile, not to make it a battleground. So he became an obstacle, while plans were drawn in both camps to remove him in one way, or another. It was already revealed in June 2020 that there were plans to plunge Tunisia into a civil war, which at the end would lead to a coup with or against the president and to the purge of the an-Nahḍa from power. It is less known, but very probable that similar counter-scenarios were also drawn up. Allegedly these were only stopped temporarily by the Corona epidemic and curfews. Yet when the protest – against the whole political system – started to flare up in January 2021 many felt that the mechanism was already in motion.
It should not be forgotten that Tunisia is in very dire economic situation. It was already in 2011, which led to the Yasmine Revolution, and hardly had time to get better, when it was hit by the Libyan war and the mismanagement, a result of continuing political struggle. This already catastrophic situation was worsened by terrorist attacks in 2015, and when these were somewhat overcame allowing the tourism sector to recuperate – which never really did – the Corona epidemic hit the country. In result this year there was no tourist season.
It is not a miracle at all that Tunisia now blew up. The miracle would have been if it didn’t viewing the situation. Under such circumstances no country can allow itself to be without effective government for two years and slowly slide with foreign interests. In fact the situation was ripe for tragedy. And on this 25 July the wall broke down.
The dam broke through
On 25 July a wave of mass protests swept through Tunisia despite the pandemic measures and curfews. It suddenly hit almost every major city, not just the capital, and had one clear voice: This cannot go on like this anymore. The reaction came almost immediately.
The same night President Qays Sa‘īd held an emergency meeting with the commanders of the armed services, and then with Prime Minister Hišām al-Mašīšī. It is still not entirely clear what went on between the President and the Prime Minister, but it surely did not satisfy Sa‘īd. Based on the constitution he activated the by now infamous section 80 citing imminent danger and took a series of decisions. He deposed the Prime Minister and with him the Minister of Interior and Defense. These posts were later filled by his personal advisors. He took over the executive power from the government and froze the Parliament for a period of 30 days. The army was ordered to surround and isolate the Parliament, which it did. With this, the whole political structure was deposed, but that was only the beginning.
Suddenly Rāšid al-Ġannūšī, who on 13 July announced that he will continue his work in isolation as he was tested positive for Corona, suddenly appeared at the Parliament and after a short confrontation – mostly with the protestors – he decided to dig in and protest until he can enter the building. This never happened. And in the middle of the confusion caused by the protests and the takeover Qays Sa‘īd took to the streets to rally support. He was met with an overwhelming enthusiasm and support on the streets for deposing the government.
With the first debacle won Sa‘īd went further. Prohibited traveling for all MPs, lifted their immunity and deposed most directors of the state institutions – most of them being political appointees. By lifting the immunity of the MPs a series of court cases being blocked for months against certain politicians could start again. These mostly hit the smaller Islamist formation, the Dignity Coalition (I’tilāf al-Karāma), but other parties were hit too.
It was clear that Sa‘īd had enough and started his personal quest to clean the system out of political appointees either being corrupt, only interested in political struggle, or simply being inefficient. In this he also showed no support for any political formation. To the contrary, just like most of the people on the streets wanted, his quest seemed to go against the every party, while not being interested in the dialogue with any party. Many times he even hinted that there were plenty of occasions for this, but that time has passed. But he was basing his new power on two key elements. The armed forces, with which he had a particularly good and strong connection since his election, though he is not coming from the army corps, and the unions with still some channels to the population.
Many politicians in Tunisia called this a coup and unacceptable, but funny enough, Qays Sa‘īd is indeed nothing like the old regime before 2011. He is not an army man, but a constitutional jurist, knowing the constitution better then his critics. He has no party, so he is not favoring his own entourage. Yet he claims himself to be defender of the people, who so far do seem to love him. However, and here we can witness that he is aware that his moves might be exploited and warns against this, he has already stated that there are payed protests and some are taking advantage of the people’s suffering.
A very delicate balance
It is somewhat admirable and seems to be naive in our age, but it really looks like a President had enough and started a personal campaign to clean up the state. And it is hard to categorize this at any level. It is not a coup, as the political institutions should come back after 30 days, thought possible only to see early elections. No one was arrested, only previously started and suspended legal cases started finally, hitting all parties, but almost exclusively for corruption charges. In the beginning it was rumored that Prime Minister al-Mašīšī was beaten and arrested, or threatened with weapons, but this was all refuted by al-Mašīšī himself. The restrictions are present by the epidemic, but those were not increased and the army commanders don’t appear beside the president. Almost all the classic signs of a military putsch are missing. But it is not entirely normal either.
Unusual as it may be, it is certainly popular. And that is exactly why most parties don’t really know how to consider it. The enemies of the an-Nahḍa in the beginning viewed this as a fight against the Brotherhood, especially considering that in some protests the offices of the party were attacked. But by now it is clear that no party is safe from the presidential crusade. So even the Free Dustūrī Party is cautious to openly support it, as the President might turn against them as well. But no party can really turn really against the current measures either, as they are generally popular. So in result almost all parties and politicians claim that the President is getting rid of their enemies and support them, but lightly in case the process turn against them. In other words, all try to show himself as supporter of the cleanup, thus proving himself clean as well, so to come out positive at the end. They all try to show that they are with the President and the President is their man.
The most grotesque is the behavior of the an-Nahḍa. It is no secret that Qays Sa‘īd is no friend of the Brotherhood, but so far their relations were within civilized limits. On the night of 25 July al-Ġannūšī suddenly appeared in public and claimed that what happens is a coup, it is against the revolution and the return of the old dictatorship. It was a very confrontative, but risky position. Regardless the travel ban two days later al-Ġannūšī left the country – officially to secure Corona vaccines – and very tellingly he did not go his strongest ally Erdoğan, but went to Washington. On 31 July he gave an interview to the The Times. In this he repeated his claims calling the events a coup, claiming it to be the machination of the Emirates and being against the revolution of 2011. He gave a picture as the President is has no idea what is he doing, being a mere puppet. Interesting to note that in such a prominent Western journal he is constantly called a democrat, mild Islamist and even liberal, with no indication that he is part of the Brotherhood, and that his government until 2014 was deeply involved in supporting terrorist groups in Syria and Egypt.
Yet the party leadership was on a different course saying that the President knows best and what he does is mostly lawful, but there should be a dialogue and the an-Nahḍa is ready to give any concessions to form a new government. And lately even the party’s youth organization turned against the formal position urging the leadership to be a part of the current process.
The situation is delicate. There seems to be a personal feud between Rāšid al-Ġannūšī and Qays Sa‘īd the overwhelming popular President is now viewed favorably and ruling the moment. All major political formations are either silent, or at least officially backing him, though almost all of them are afraid of him and interested in his failure. And surely there are opportunists around him and the army eager to exploit the situation for yet another turn. Meaning that while Sa‘īd is fighting an almost impossible battle against the whole – mostly an-Nahḍa – post-2011 establishment, he is surrounded by enemies masking as supporters and time is running out. Because after 30 days he has to either return to what was before, order new elections, or keep on ruling alone. All are extremely risky.
The international reception
Interestingly, while in the first few days there were indicating signs to which way this step was moving, since then the regional reactions are like the Tunisian internal ones. Officially everyone is happy, supportive, but urging caution and moderation.
On 26 Algerian President Tabbūn called his Tunisian colleague to show support. On 31 July new Algerian Foreign Minister Ramṭān La‘māmara arrived to Cairo to meet his Egyptian colleague. Though the agenda was long, they hurried to support the Tunisian President and express willingness to assist. President as-Sīsī openly supported the measures of Qays Sa‘īd and days later started his own quest expelling every Brotherhood member from state offices. And then on 3 August he sent his Foreign Minister to Tunis, to express that Tunisia can count on Egypt on everything. So that would show an Egyptian-Algerian agreement about Tunisia to be turned to their fold. And probably this is in line with what al-Ġannūšī claimed that the Emirates is in the background motivating the events. And indeed, though with huge delay, on 7 August the Emirates officially expressed support for the Tunisian President.
However, the Emir of Qatar, so completely the other camp also called Sa‘īd on 28 July and showed sympathy. Even the reactions of Turkey are very mild. Though Erdoğan in the past had a reputation to slack out against such events in a very harsh way. This time, however, after the initial stance calling the events a coup, he only urged Tunisia to return to ordinary parliamentary measures and preserve the integrity of the state institutions. Considering their strongest asset in North-Africa is about to be purged this is almost as good as a support and it is very telling that al-Ġannūšī did not dare to escape to Ankara in fear that they might extradite him.
It is puzzling to see that even from the US and the EU the reaction are very mild, only urging President Sa‘īd to restate the Parliament soon. There is no talk about coup, there are no strong statements and demands and there are no sanctions. As if the international was caught by surprise, which is hardly the case. And that is interesting, as many political forces say that Qays Sa‘īd will work on dismantling the constitution of 2014, which was the an-Nahḍa‘s biggest achievement, and what is widely referred to as “Hillary Clinton’s constitution”. That was the foundation of the political system, which failed now, but ensured the influence of the Brotherhood in Tunisia.
It can only be supposed that there is an Algerian, possibly Egyptian support for the President Sa‘īd now, but that seems to be limited. Surely the forces which were moving behind the scenes are active now all trying to outflank the other. The moves of Sa‘īd can be turned to their benefit, so for the moment all interested parties wait to see what will happen.
What can happen now?
That is indeed the most difficult question. The President has very little time to choose between the three aforementioned scenarios, while pressure will surely increase upon him.
Time is running out short, because if he offers no solution his current popularity can soon evaporate, while today that is the only thing protecting him.
It is certain, however, that there is a very fierce struggle within and around Tunisia. And the outcome, which is to come soon, will determine a lot where the Arab world is going. Will the third republic be born with Qays Sa‘īd?