For almost a month now there have been intense talks in Vienna between Iran, the IAEA, and a number of Western governments about a possible relaunch of the nuclear deal (JCPOA) signed in 2015. Some of these governments are openly mediating between Tehran and Washington, which the Iranians admit, but at this stage signal that the time is not yet ripe for direct negotiations. At least that was the view a month ago, but there have been signs of a possible understanding in this matter.
As we have noted several times before since Biden took office Washington took a road to ease the tension with Iran and restart the nuclear deal, though possibly with some alterations. This approach has been actually so serious that the White House disregarded the concerns from some of the most important Middle Eastern allies, like Israel and Saudi Arabia. That is one of the very reasons why Tel Aviv recently pumped up its activities against Tehran, which led to the cyber attack on Natanẓ, the “war of ships”, and a possible Iran-related backlash by Syria last week. Regardless of all attempts by Tel Aviv, however, to plant discord between Tehran and the West now, negotiations seem to be unstoppable.
There is a clear reason for that. Interestingly at this point, both the administrations in Washington and Tehran try to keep these backchannels alive. At least until the Iranian presidential elections scheduled for June, because both the Biden and the current Rōḥānī administrations want to prevent the ascendence of the Iranian military or even the Revolutionary Guards to the highest echelons of power. This is a very real possibility, as more and more prominent army figures announce their run for the presidency, which is criticized even by the current Iranian government.
If there is a government feeling itself to lose the most by this gradual change of American policy compared to what it was a year ago that was certainly the Saudi. Most directly Saudi Crown Prince Muḥammad ibn Salmān. On the one hand, he is personally criticized by the Biden administration and there are hints that Washington wishes to see him fall. But on the other hand, most of the policies, which constituted the most direct struggles between the Gulf and Iran in recent years are connected to the Saudi Crown Prince, and they are mostly failing. This is true to the sabotage of the nuclear deal, stirring up trouble in Lebanon and Iraq, and at the top of the list, the war in Yemen.
Exactly within these conditions, we could see this week huge changes in Riyadh’s stance towards Tehran. The first sign came from the Iraqi government, which leaked that Saudi officials accepted the Iraqi mediation for a rapprochement between the two neighbors. But even more, in a highly publicized interview this week Muḥammad ibn Salmān himself hinted that Saudi Arabia – meaning his inner circles – are ready to mend fences with the Iranians.
But why is that a huge change? What are the main reasons triggering this approach, and what can Riyadh hope for at this point? Can there be a settlement between the two banks of the Gulf? And can it be done before a new administration takes office in Tehran? Does Iran really wish for that?
Signals of change
A little more than a week ago Iranian ambassador Masğedī said that Tehran accepts the Iraqi mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. What is more, it was revealed that the Saudi delegation is led by Director of Intelligence Hālid ibn ‘Alī al-Ḥamīdān, showing that Riyadh is indeed very serious in sorting matters out with Iran.
That on its own is not entirely new, at least by Iran, as it launched the Hormuz Peace Initiative in 2019 exactly for easing tensions between Tehran and its Gulf neighbors. At that time Iran was still under heavy pressure from the Trump administration and the normalization process with Israel was still promising. So there was no interest in the change by Riyadh. Things, however, have changed drastically.
Not much after these negotiations in Baghdad were revealed publicly, on 27 April 2021 Saudi Crown Prince Muḥammad ibn Salmān gave a televised interview to the Saudi media, which was heavily publicized by the Saudi al-Arabiyya channel. Amongst many topics, the de facto ruler of the kingdom said: “Iran is a neighbor, and we want to have good and distinguished relations with Iran”. This is a very radical change from a man, who three years ago had the following things to say about same Iran and the possible negotiations with it:
“How can you reason with one, or a regime, which has an official belief that it is a regime built a radical ideology, written in its constitution, stated in the testimony of Homeīnī that they have to control over the Muslims and the Muslim world and spread their own Ğa‘afarī Twelwer [Shia] denomination to all corners of the Muslim world until the awaited Mahdī appears? How can we agree? What is the interest between us and them?”
Yet now, he said there are Saudi interests in Iran and Iranian interests in Saudi Arabia. Even more, he expressed that Riyadh not only does not wish bad for Iran but to the contrary, wishes to see Iran flourish for the benefit of the whole region. However, the very expressions of the Crown Prince’s face tell more about his desire for reconciliation more than his words, and these are easily understandable, even without any grasp of the Arabic language.
What caused this huge change? There are both major regional changes urging a policy change in Riyadh, and some very pressing matters, which urgently need a solution.
Yemen on the top of the list
We have also dealt with the war on Yemen several times. When the Saudi intervention started in Yemen at the top of an officially broad coalition, it was part of the personal projects of Muḥammad ibn Salmān, a young Minister of Defense and Deputy Crown Prince at that time. Since then he managed to take his country over with a persistent and brutal campaign on his opponents. But the war effort backfired miserably. The coalition fell apart. Most member states left or kept only a symbolic presence. Even the closest ally, the Emirates has officially pulled out from the war, and the government of Yemeni President Hādī completely fell apart. Not only the government in Sana’a managed to take the north almost completely under its control, but what it does not run is broken between several militias, only some wishing for a Saudi presence. The last effort for a face-saving pull-out was the hastily patched-up “unity government” under Hādī, which also fell apart before any major attempt for change.
Being stuck in a war with no foreseeable exit strategy Saudi Arabia is hit with missile attacks on its military positions and vital oil facilities, sometimes deep within the kingdom itself. While at the first such strike there was an international outcry, by now these regularly repeated attacks don’t even reach the international headlines. There is no international interest to save Riyadh.
Amidst this crisis, the troops of Sana’a are sieging Ma’rib, the last major provincial capital in the north of Yemen, and a major oil-producing region. Once this falls to the al-Ḥūtī led government, it will be the end of the Saudi military presence in the country and the final blow to this ill-conceived military quest. Nearly a month ago Saudi Arabia announced its own peace initiative, recognizing for the first time that the al-Ḥūtī Movement is part of the Yemeni political scene. Suddenly the Saudi tone shifted from an anti-terrorist crusade to a peacekeeping and mediation effort, as if Riyadh had nothing to do with the source of the conflict.
Sana’a largely disregarded the offer saying that only a full ceasefire and Saudi pull-out is acceptable with the immediate lift of all embargoes, and kept pressuring Riyadh with more military strikes. The slowly tightening noose around Ma’rib also indicates that Sana’a – and the supporting forces behind it – are more interested in a political-diplomatic victory than in the capture of the city itself. And this strategy seems to be working, and time is very precious for the Saudi leadership.
How is it connected to Iran? Ever since the war started in Yemen Tehran was regularly accused, and not just by Riyadh, to be backing the al-Ḥūtī war effort. Despite the legitimate suspicions Iran was never actually caught red-handed directly shipping arms and troops to Yemen, only claiming diplomatic and political support. Recently, however, Deputy Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Jerusalem Forces for Economic Matters Rostem Qāsemī in an interview admitted that Iran has military advisors in Yemen. Though he claimed that their number is small and that all weapons used by Sana’a are locally produced, this was the first official admission by a leading Iranian official for their support.
Of course, this is a lightly veiled message to the Saudis. But it has just as much to do with Iranian internal politics, as since then Rostem Qāsemī announced his bid for the presidency. Thus such an announcement is part of the campaign of the military wing in Iran showing political and foreign policy prowess. And it can be understood in a way that a much firmer stance can be expected by Tehran if the military gives the new president.
A growing isolation
Yemen, however, is just one of the symptoms of Muḥammad ibn Salmān trouble. Though possibly the most obvious one. Ever since Biden took office the White House not only denied directly engage in any contact with the Crown Prince, who under Trump was treated as a very close personal ally, but was even directly named responsible for crimes, not just in the Hāšuqğī murder. Washington officially stopped its support for the Saudi war effort. This was just as an iconic shift in policy as Muḥammad ibn Salmān’s own, as this step was announced by State Secretary Bliken, who in 2015 as Deputy State Secretary promised unrelenting support for Hādī’s government and for the Saudi war effort against “the al-Ḥūtī led military aggression”.
There were very serious concerns in Riyadh that Washington will soon support the Crown Prince’s rivals and will strive to oust him, as part of the easiest solution to end the war in Yemen and open a new chapter in American-Saudi relations. Unless he finds a way to solve this matter.
The Saudi strategic chances to balance the influence of Iran are also shrinking fast. The Emirates, which was a driving force for the normalization with Israel and most of the policies conducted by Saudi Arabia in the region for the last five to seven years left Riyadh alone with its troubles. Israel tried its best to disturb the now ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran or to provoke a military conflict in which Tehran is the aggressor but failed. And as there is a chance to see a new Israeli government led by someone other than Netanyahu soon, the reliance on Israeli support became questionable.
As an interesting side note, also around the time of the Saudi Crown Prince’s recent interview Asia Times published an article about the Moğāhidīn-e Halk-e Īrān (MEK) organization, and how it is losing all support by Washington since Biden took office. The Moğāhidīn-e Halk-e Īrān’s history dates back to the Iranian monarchy is an Iranian movement, and by now somewhere between a cult, a mafia, a terrorist organization, and a powerful clandestine mercenary movement. Under Trump, it was considered as a powerful asset to destabilize the Iranian government, but under the Biden administration, clear steps were taken to distance Washington from this shady movement. However, MEK has excellent connections with Israel, to which it helped to perform several assassinations in Iran, and it allegedly received lavish support from several Gulf countries. The fact the MEK is losing support and might regain its terrorist group designation by Washington soon means the Saudis would lose one of their most valued clandestine operatives in the region.
It is very likely that this newfound understanding for Tehran seems to be part of Muḥammad ibn Salmān’s effort to save his position. Not as much towards Tehran, as for Washington that he can still be a useful asset. And it seems to be working. Only one day after the infamous interview, State Secretary Bliken stated that “Muḥammad ibn Salmān will lead Saudi Arabia for a long time, and we have to deal with him”.
Iran gaining
In the last few months, Iran managed to improve its regional position on a number of symbolic, though minor victories. The aforementioned nuclear negotiations, or the thwarted Israeli attempt to stir up trouble all show this, just like Washington’s effort to restart relations where they were broken off under Trump.
The war in Yemen, or the fact the Syrian consolidation after the presidential elections there might be very close all show that Tehran’s allies survived the pressure. Meaning Tehran’s calculations were proved to be correct.
There is, however, one major diplomatic victory recently scored by Tehran, which stands out. In late March Iran signed a strategic partnership deal with China. This was a questionable choice, as Tehran gave huge concessions to Chinese economic and political interests, but this 25 years long partnership secures stable markets and immense $400 billion investments for Iran. In other words for sacrificing certain security interests, China will appear in Iran both economically and militarily. Thus Tehran gains a supporter equal to the American support for the Gulf state by America. The magnitude of this deal needs to be examined separately, but it is in fact so big that Iran even let its formerly promising deals with India deteriorate.
The fact that China will appear in the foreseeable future as a military power in the Persian Gulf is a major challenge for Washington. Being one of the reasons why the Biden administration wishes for more friendly relations with Iran now.
The role of the Iranian internal policies
In June there will be new presidential elections in Iran. According to the constitution, President Rōḥānī cannot run for a third consecutive term, meaning a new administration will come to power. So far Iranian politics meant a regular change between the “hardliner” and the more conciliatory “reformist liberals”. Rōḥānī was from the latter, yet most of his policies were hindered by the Trump administration, after the initial success with the JCPOA.
We still don’t have a final list of the candidates, but several military and Revolutionary Guards figures have already announced their bid for office. And by the pattern seen so far, the new government will likely be from the “hardliner” circles. Meaning the military has a good chance of winning. And with the Chinese deal behind them that might mean Iran will not continue on a rapprochement path with Washington after the summer.
However, these risks are understood by many in Tehran. Despite the changes, as we saw, there are voices in Tehran strongly critical of the prospect of a military takeover. And there are many on the upper echelons of the Iranian leadership, who still wish to give a chance of compromise with the West – and the Gulf – despite the general failure of the Rōḥānī era.
Therefore a consolidation not only with the Americans but also with Gulf neighbors persuading them not to follow up on the Israeli alliance is within Tehran’s interest. Yet all dealings now are not only connected to regional and strategic calculations, but also to the now strong power struggle within Iran.
The prospects of a consolidation
As we see there seems to be a readiness by Saudi Arabia to settle matters with Iran. Most Gulf states have already supported this approach, like Qatar, which even offered to mediate. This is supported by Washington now as well. And right after the Saudi Crown Prince’s statements Tehran swiftly welcomed the message. It would all seem ideal for normalization, and had it came a year ago would have created a very positive atmosphere in the region.
No doubt the region needs that kind of calm after ten years of catastrophes following the so-called “Arab Spring”, and the warlike relations in the last two three years. But is that possible?
Much relies on the outcome of the next Iranian elections. If there was a major policy change in Iran with all likelihood the troubles of the last few years will continue. But even if there was no real change and the new government was to follow the policies of Rōḥānī an overall consolidation is very difficult.
First of all, internal conditions at the moment are way too unstable both in Iran and in Saudi Arabia for a lasting settlement. They also belong to two completely different global camps with little room for major understandings. The two countries not only have a fundamentally different approach on most regional and economic matters but have four decades of accumulated distrust. Settling them would need years of meticulous work and gradual trust-building measures.
There can be settlements on smaller, more local matters. The signs are promising for that, even if a major realignment is a more challenging task. The future of this possible rapprochement, however, is largely determined in June, when Iran elects its eighth president.