Last week we dealt with Tunisia, which relatively neglected in the world press, regardless of its puzzling results. Even though few years ago the same worlds press, especially the press choreographed from the west, celebrated the so called Arab Spring under the pretext of democratic change in the Middle East, which in the most case brought nothing, but destruction and despair, now it is almost blind to a good example, which is Tunisia. Yet the script, which was written long ago still still seems to be charming for some. Though Tunisia is not catching the the interest too much, Iraq and Lebanon is in turmoil for weeks now, and the same sources, which in 2011 welcomed the changing Middle East now happy to cover the events. Not surprisingly, many in these states started to talk about a new Arab Spring, while crowds on the streets demand drastic changes with very legitimate concerns. The events reminded many to what happened in Syria, and no wonder they have much to worry about. Especially after what happened this year in Algeria and Sudan, where age old governing systems melted down gradually, but so far nothing solid came out of these.
What is so similar between Iraq and Lebanon? In fact, not too much. Yes, both states are majority Arab countries with a wide range of religious communities playing vital role in politics. But while Iraq is a majority Shia, oil-rich, federal country with an ethnic Kurdish regional sub-state, Lebanon is a service oriented state, where ethnicities play no overall role, but the government is fragmented between a huge amount of religious communities, none having a clear majority. Iraq lived through almost four decades of war and economic hardship, regardless of its immense wealth, in which Dā‘iš is just the last bloody chapter. Lebanon lived in relative peace since the end of the civil war, at least to Middle Eastern standards, and regardless of its apparent lack of recourses, had a relatively modest living standard. The differences are much bigger, mostly emanating from extremely different political traditions and history, that the apparent similarities for the casual eye.
There are, however, two important similarities, at least from the point of view of the current events. Both are pluralistic parliamentary systems, which are not built on one omnipotent leader, like most of the Middle East all over, but on a fragile balance between the leading personalities, all parties representing a political agenda with an ethnic or religious group behind it. Therefore any dissatisfaction is not surfacing against a person, but rather the whole political establishment. Yet these establishments, another strange similarity, came to exist at one point of history with careful Western guidance. Now, however, the same westerners show some level of support to the protests and unhappiness to the ruling systems.
The other strange similarity between Iraq and Lebanon is that in the last decade or so they drifted ever closer to what some call the Shia Crescent, while others the Axis of Resistance. In either denomination, a very effective political-economical-military partnership, which has Iran as its strongest partner, and clearly opposes Western scripts in the region. Both countries lived through long years of political instability, while recently managed to find some sort of stabile management, and exactly that is being shaken in these days.
The very fact that two states, which are in one way or another within the Iranian sphere of influence, and just recently faced blatant Israeli aggressions with no apparent avail should leave one thinking why exactly these states are facing crisis now. But on the ground, regardless the absolute genuineness of most of the dissatisfaction, there are much bigger similarities. So great in fact, that they seem to come from the same script, and the same gracious supporters appear behind them.
Lebanon: a cesspool filled.
The main source of the problem now in Lebanon is indeed a huge economical crisis, which has its roots deep, even into the ‘90s. The relatively small country largely depends on the support it gains from the substantial Lebanese expatriate community, and on the foreign financial support, both coming from the West and Saudi Arabia. Yet due the fact that the country simply does not produce enough revenue, regardless of its well-developed economy and service sector, the whole system and the management of the Lebanese currency, which is tied directly to the US dollar, needed fundamental restructuring. Especially the pegged exchange rate between the Lebanese pound and the dollar caused concern, since a dual system came to exist in which the economy operates in a foreign currency, while much of the state services and the wages in its denominated local version. It is actually not rare to be seen in Lebanon that in wide range of places the dollar, or the euro works completely as a primary currency. Any deep structural reform needs such a government, which is not only stabile, but is stabile enough to take pressure and even be willing to lose popular support temporarily. But the very nature of the Lebanese political structure makes this almost impossible.
Almost from the very beginning of the state there was a careful balance between the different sectarian segments of the society, and the key posts were allocated accordingly. The President has to be a Maronite Christian, the PM and Sunni, while the Speaker of the Parliament a Shii. These are, however, are just the most obvious features and the sectarian division goes much deeper. It is present in all aspects of the public life and created primarily sectarian parties with very few, and only partial exceptions. That system, which was last amended in the 1989 aṭ-Ṭā’if Agreement, largely delegating powers from the president to the PM and equaling out the employment ratio between Christians and Muslims, set the scene that realistically no party can gain a majority. Therefore any Lebanese government has to be a patchwork of – usually competitor – parties. The result was that either the major parties joined the government, in which they conspired against each other to benefit in the next elections, or some stayed out and did their best to bring the government down, which instead of restructuring the state, waged practical wars against the rival political parties. That usually, but not exclusively targeted the Ḥizb Allah. Within this context deep reforms are indeed very hard to achieve, yet on the other hand, the very structure, which was primarily keen to keep all major forces content and prevent a new civil war, made the administration swell, and nurtured nepotism and corruption. Especially, since any effective accountability was impossible. While this system is in many ways extremely democratic and pluralistic, a prime example of democracy, it is also horrifically ineffective. As for one example, the current Lebanese cabinet is made up by 30 ministers, while the current Syrian one by 33 – but 6 of them are state ministers with broad portfolios -, the Egyptian 35 and the Jordanian 29. Compared to the size of the country that is quite staggering. And all this inner squabble was met all the time with outer interference.
That is the framework, which so far paralyzed any government to act properly, even when there was one. But between 2009 and 2018 there were not even elections, because the war in Syria had far reaching effects in Lebanon as well. While the Ḥizb Allah moved in to help the Syrian state, on the other side of the orbit the leader of the biggest Sunni block, Sa‘ad al-Ḥarīrī supported the militants there. For which Syria issued an arrest warrant against him. Since 2011, when al-Ḥarīrī stepped down as PM, there has been a number of caretaker government, and there was a political deadlock. This manifested perfectly in the lack of elections, and that after the term of President Mīšāl Sulaymān ended in 2014, the Parliament could not elect a new one for two years.
Normality started to return in 2016, partially due to the fact that the region started to calm down, and the Syrian folder was clear, which trajectory would take. In October that year Mīšāl ‘Awn, an old enemy of the Syrian presence in Lebanon, who lived in exile between 1990 and 2005, was elected President. His nomination was a deal struck by the varying forces, since he was representing the strongest anti-Syrian Christian branch, yet he signed a memorandum with Ḥizb Allah in 2006. That deal guaranteed an operational relation between the two forces, which is still functioning today. ‘Awn’s movement, lead by his son-in-law, current foreign minister Ğubrān Bāsīl, became one of the strongest pillars of later government, which officially targeted to fight corruption. As part of a strategy to end the inner fight ‘Awn nominated al-Ḥarīrī in December 2016 to lead the government. Consolidation within the framework of national unity reached its peak in 2018, when after nine years general elections were finally called. After which practically the same unity government stayed on, representing 11 parties and with al-Ḥarīrī as PM. So in short, after the Lebanese Civil War, the troublesome ‘90s mostly occupied with the liberation of the south from Israeli occupation ending in 2000, the Cedar Revolution in 2005 ending the Syrian military presence and total meltdown as result of the war in Syria, Lebanon only started to get back on track in 2016. The firm legitimacy of the government and all state institutions only returned by the elections in 2018. And the government was only finalized in 31 January 2019. Therefore al-Ḥarīrī might be in office for some three years, the current Lebanese government is actually quite fresh. In that al-Ḥarīrī is not the national leader he once wished to be in 2009, but rather a figurehead, a political prisoner of the much more formidable Christian Free Patriotic Movement – the ‘Awn party – and the Ḥizb Allah. That should be kept in mind in the current context. And what sort of man al-Ḥarīrī, this is just one example of the many.
Though practically the same names are recurring for some 15 years in the Lebanese politics, these events nurtured corruption, which slowly allowed the state to sink into immense indebtedness. For the promise of narrowed budget and smaller deficit, in April 2018 a huge outer support package deal was reached. Some $11 billion, mostly credit, but $860 in direct grands, was poured into the Lebanese economy by the World Bank, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and Saudi Arabia. The whole anti-corruption agenda was only starting in 2016 by the President, for which only in 2018 were created the financial means and the political authorization. Since that it was a recurring theme addressed by all parties. The Saudi support was quite a surprise, since in April 2017 Saudi Arabia practically kidnapped the Sa‘ad al-Ḥarīrī, who was then visiting the kingdom, and forced him to resignation, which was only ended by intense French mediation. Probably not a coincidence that the Lebanese-Saudi Economic Council only started its work in September 2019. Al-Ḥarīrī was once a protégé of Riyadh, especially in his first tenure between 2009 and 2011, and later in 2012, but he clearly fell out of grace. Since than the Saudis found a new apprentice, Samīr Ğa‘ğa‘, a Maronite Christian, who was the enforcer for main the Christian forces in the civil war. He has such a shocking criminal record that after the civil war, regardless the general amnesty, he was the only notable person to be put in jail, where spent 11 years between 1994 and 2005.
Two other aspects are interesting to taken into consideration, which might show the huge inner contradictions of the Lebanese situation. The relatively small country has had financial problems even before the civil war, after which in got back on its feet surprisingly fast. For long decades it hosted great amount of Palestinian refugees, who in time became permanent residents serving the Lebanese economy’s black market with cheap labor. And their conditions just reached a breaking point in this summer, when, as we already dealt with in some previous articles, became a concern for the whole Lebanese political life. That already problematic situation was met with a great amount of Syrian refugees, who also swell the illegal labor market. The lack of trade and supplies from Syria was also problematic, while on the other hand it was also highly lucrative for some, who benefitted from the massive smuggling operations. So while the refugee card, whether it be Palestinian or Syrian is a nuisance for many, mostly the middle classes, whose living standards went down, it is not something the elite is keen to address, because it has very positive sides as well.
The other absurd feature of Lebanon is that while governments were coming and going, sometimes only just holding on to power, one of the most stabile institutions of the state is the Central Bank. Its governor is Riyāḍ Salāma, a non-partisan Maronite, who is not only the head of the Central Bank since 1993, but also a number of economic controlling bodies, including the Higher Banking Commission. He is also a member of the Board of Governors at the IMF and the Arab Monetary Fund. Meaning he not only regulates practically all aspects of the Lebanese economic life, but also has a remarkable connections to the Arab and International money taps. Would be quite surprising from such a small country, but quite understandable from such a remarkable standing, he is a regular guest in the American channels. And while almost third of the Lebanese population fell under the poverty line in the last decade, Salāma’s career not only survived all political turmoils, but also the scandal, when his son’s wedding this spring in Paris became publicly known. A wedding that puts even the Oscar galas in shame.
And than it started
The beginnings of this huge movement in Lebanon, which started some two weeks ago already started to slip out of memory with the new developments, but that is something most interesting. Because these slight details tell a lot about the whole nature of the phenomenon.
The Lebanese economy was in imminent crisis for a year or so, when on 17 October the government held a regular session to discuss next year’s budget. That came in a critical time, as for weeks prior there were gas shortages, dollar payment restrictions, rumors of wages can’t be part, and the Lebanese pounds’ exchange rate started to skyrocket. Since the situation is so precarious, a number of ideas were put forward to raise revenues. The possible solutions in the session included the gradual increase of VAT, and a fee on all internet based phone cervices, like Facebook (Messenger), or WhatsApp. It is still unclear how, but the words got out, which naturally caused outrage. Especially the internet fee. That very night a small number of outraged protestors, by all estimates in the range of 100s, took the streets in Beirut and practically paralyzed the capital’s downtown. That is also the time, when the Minister of Education, Akram Šihayb crossed over at night with his convoy, which was attacked and one of the bodyguards shot bullets in the air. Šihayb, an already controversial figure, is one of the two Druze ministers in the government, nominated by the Walīd Ğunblāṭ’s Progressive Socialist Party. Ğunblāṭ is a member of the old guard from the civil war years, who is one of the most notable Druze leaders in Lebanon, who once aspired to be a national hero, much like al-Ḥarīrī, and has a very eventful political career. Though he changed his positions many times, since 2005 he took a firm anti-Syrian position, but in years he was slowly fading into the darkness. Now he plays a crucial role in the events. After the first incident Ğunblāṭ a handed over the bodyguard to the authorities and supported the protests, but what is even more interesting, that from 18, when the protests started to transform into a massive movement, Šihayb ordered all education facilities to close down. A decision, which he only revoked in 30 October – in effect from 31 -, after the Lebanese Army started in intervene and open up the main roads. It is very puzzling why an already controversial minister took his convoy into downtown that night, how was he even recognized, instead of escaping why he chose to confront the protestors, but after this incident he decided to keep the schools closed, which obviously boosted the numbers of the protestors.
The next day, on the 18 October, when the news of more taxes and the whole internet fee idea was only a rumored suggestion, huge protests started all over the country and attacks happened against the Ḥizb Allah, its main Shia ally the Amal, and its Christian ally, ‘Awn’s Free Patriotic Movement. The movement, mostly in the foreign diaspore became shown as a mass parade, it in fact had a high number of violent and alarming incidents. The main the roads in the capital and between the main cities became blocked. Even more than that, mostly far away from the limelight, complete banditry started to appear, where unknown people set up road blocks and initiated random searches, much resembling the civil war years. On the political level, though it all stared by economic concerns and it is widely held that the movement wants to fight the corruption and the hardship, claims started to appear wishing to topple the “regime”, the some asked for the disarmament of Ḥizb Allah. While on the other hand Ğunblāṭ and the other equally shady character, Samīr Ğa‘ğa‘ welcomed the protests.
They were the first ones to call for the government to dissolve and Ğa‘ğa‘ was the one who pulled the rug under the government by recalling his four ministers on 20 October. Interestingly, while the protests were allegedly ignited by the internet fee, PM al-Ḥarīrī did not hold a cabinet session ever after 17, nor he sacked the Minister of Telecommunications, his own party member, Muḥammad Šukayr, who came up with this idea in the first place. Instead, on the night of 18 October he held a speech to the nation and on the 20 presented a reform package free of more burdens and ordered the salary of the ministers to be cut into half. Right in this critical time, when protests were already everywhere it was oil on the fire, a very pathetic gesture, while it was also insincere, since if he had such a package, while were there rumors of tax increases? Also interesting that this program was meant to fail, since on 28 October Riyāḍ Salāma held an interview with CNN, in which he said the country is only days away from collapse. He immediately back paddled saying he did not mean an imminent crash, and not such a short term problem, the video evidence is clear. Since than the situation was slowly, but steadily worsened. Al-Ḥarīrī offered his resignation, which President ‘Awn first turned down, as he as well wanted to calm the people. In the meantime Ğa‘ğa‘, held most of his supporters on the streets and claimed that violence was committed on against the protestors by the supporters of Ḥizb Allah. The claim is so far absolutely unproven, but highly aired by the western and Israeli press. In that climate Ğa‘ğa‘ demanded a new government with his majority in it.
Since than al-Ḥarīrī stepped down, but what was the response to that and what all this has to do with Iraq and so many other examples, shall be where we carry on next week.