By now more than a week has passed since the White House practically pulled the plug on Saudi Crown Prince Muḥammad ibn Salmān and we still don’t see clearly how Riyadh will react. On the one hand, this is a clear message that Washington wants to see the practical ruler of the country out, as we see more and more suggestions in the news that the U.S. might even demand public punishment. On the other these all can be understood in a way as well that if Muḥammad ibn Salmān leaves now that will be the end of it, but if he stays more drastic measures will be applied.
As for Riyadh, the situation is more than delicate. In such a highly centralized and authoritarian state structure once the succession struggle is over the ruler’s power is unquestionable. And Muḥammad ibn Salmān during the internal struggles of the last few years clearly won, even if not with the most chivalrous methods. By now he and his circles run the country, regardless of the general disfavor from him. Such a clear scandal against the “boss” under any other circumstances would result in a direct political confrontation. Yet Saudi Arabia is highly dependent on America. That is true in general, and now in with the war in Yemen taking a very bad turn for Riyadh in particular. If ever, this is exactly the wrong time to sour relations with Washington, as by now the Yemeni forces strike at vital Saudi installations deep inside the kingdom almost daily.
Yet the most important question is how the other states in the region will react. Will they show solidarity with Riyadh and its ruler, or will they turn a blind eye to the conflict, practically sealing the fate of the Saudi Crown Prince. And if they turn away from Riyadh, how will affect relations in the whole region. This is an important matter, as barely two months have passed since the GCC Summit in al-‘Ulā. A meeting, which ended a very traumatic chapter in the inter-Gulf relations, but also gained many enemies for the lords of Riyadh.
And in exactly this climate a lightly covered huge slap came from Saudi Arabia. A set of revelations, a message that is very threatening and has potentially very harmful consequences for many sides. Yet that less clear to whom the Saudis aimed the message. That much, however, is clear that right upon the scars of the Gulf crisis ended in al-‘Ulā a new conflict is forming between Cairo and Riyadh.
The accusation and the reactions
Almost instantly after the Biden administration made the CIA report public and thus directly accused the Saudi Crown Prince of the murder of Hāšuqğī in 2018, and with that opened the door from his removal within a grand international criminal process the Saudi Foreign Ministry on 27 February issued a statement. In that, the Saudi authorities categorically denied the accusations, referred to the trials and sentences in response to the murder, and refused to give any floor for any further process in the matter. Their speed was not surprising, as they knew exactly what was in the report and Biden’s move was expected, though clearly very painful.
It is also not surprising that Bahrain was the first state to stand by Riyadh, support the Saudi statement, and said: “The Kingdom of Bahrain expresses its refusal to all what on its own interferes with the sovereignty of the brotherly Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”. Nothing less was expected from the country being practically under Saudi military occupation for years. But the reactions of the other Arab and pan-Islamic organizations, though Riyadh did its best to claim massive support, were much less convincing. The Emirates for example supported the Saudi statement and claimed full trust in the Saudi justice system, while Oman simply stated: “The Sultanate is in solidarity with Saudi Arabia”. Most of these statements referred somewhat to the Hāšuqgī case, but usually understood the American report for what it is, a challenge against the kingdoms. And they reacted according – though very lightly -, stressing that Saudi Arabia plays a very important and by their view positive role in the region. Meaning that whatever happened and whatever one might think about the Saudi Crown Prince the U.S. should not play around with Saudi Arabia and not shake its foundations, as that can have unpredictable impacts on the whole region.
It was less surprising to see that this “solidarity” and by the phrase of the Saudi Foreign Ministry “common Arab standing” did not much go beyond the Gulf, and even states like Qatar chose to disregard the scandal. But it was a much bigger surprise for the Saudi court to see that such former allies, like Egypt, chose not to react. Which in light of their formerly close, almost alliance strong relations can be regarded as a surprise. Especially that Egyptian semi-state outlets clearly vented the fumes saying that the relations are already bad.
And then came the subtle, but a very sharp response. Which can be understood in many ways.
A bombastic response.
On 2 March 2021, the Saudi Halīğiyya channel aired a two more than two hours long interview with Saudi State Minister for African Affairs Aḥmad Qaṭṭān. An interview, which ignited a considerable scandal that will surely have its serious response from Cairo in one way or another.
In one section of the interview Qaṭṭān, who was the Saudi ambassador to Egypt at that time, claimed that in the 2012 Egyptian presidential elections Aḥmad Šafīq, Mubārak’s former PM won and not Muḥammad Mursī of the Muslim Brotherhood. Who in fact eventually came to power after the elections, only to be toppled by the Egyptian army for only a year and die in prison in 2019. According to Qaṭṭān, who based most of his words on Egyptian journalist and MP Muṣṭafā Bakrī, the Egyptian authorities even announced Aḥmad Šafīq’s victory, which eventually was changed. And in that, the American ambassador to Cairo at that time played a significant role. Also according to Qaṭṭān shortly after Mursī – and with him, the Muslim Brotherhood – took over there was a high-level meeting in Riyadh with the participation of Saudi Foreign Minister Sa‘ūd al-Fayṣal, the Saudi ambassador in Washington ‘Ādil al-Ğubayr, Qaṭṭān himself and State Secretary Hillary Clinton accessing several regional matters, including Egypt. And during this meeting assessing the situation to Clinton Qaṭṭān foretold that the Egyptian Army will not allow the Brotherhood to rule Egypt and that they will only discredit themselves. Which truly all happened.
This might not seem much, but it is full of very scandalous remarks – which was even emphasized by the anchor – and clearly meant to be some sort of threat.
First of all, Aḥmad Qaṭṭān might not be particularly known in the West, but he has had a long diplomatic career as one of of the protégées of late Foreign Minister Sa‘ūd al-Fayṣal, who run the Saudi diplomacy for 40 years. And Qaṭṭān is known to have a confrontative nature, have a particular dislike for Qatar, and an equal affection for Egypt. He is also not particularly known to be in the close circles of the Crown Prince now. He is more of a skilled official, who was kept in place because posed no threat in the internal wars in the last few years.
The Egyptian journalist he is referring to, Muṣṭafā Bakrī is a very known and noted figure in Egypt, who started his political and political-journalist journey under in the ‘70s, and managed to stay always as a vocal “permitted opposition” later on, even until Mubārak’s fall. He had very good connections in the highest political circles, and since the military coup in 2013, he wrote 3 books all full of first-hand details. These books mostly deal with the events of the troublesome changes between 2010 and 2014, but in his books, he also revealed many lesser-known details about the connections between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Western governments going back to the early 2000s. So he is far from being “an ordinary journalist”. Bakrī dedicated one of his books to praise the army and as-Sīsī personally, but he is also known, as Qaṭṭān put it, to be “a good friend of the kingdom”. By which he probably meant that what was revealed in 2017 by Wikileaks, namely that Bakrī in the early days of Mursī visited the Saudi ambassador and asked financial support from the kingdom to increase his media activity and form a political party. And that time the Saudi ambassador was Qaṭṭān who supported the request.
The message is bombastic because it suggests that the Americans back in 2012 supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and arranged their ascendence to power, even against the will of the Egyptian people. That in fact has a substantial basis. The Brotherhood has extensive political connections with Western governments and had a very positive reception in the American press after their takeover. It should also be remembered that back in 2013 President Obama was reluctant to accept the military coup by as-Sīsī, and the Egyptian-American relations were strained, until Trump’s arrival. This topic is one of the main themes of Muṣṭafā Bakrī, for which he in fact showed some evidence, even if he is not the most reliable source.
It is also somewhat curious to suggest that back at that time Saudi Arabia was against the Brotherhood and Mursī. That is the situation now, for sure, and Qaṭṭān used these themes will against Qatar for years. But that was not so clear policy back in 2012 when Riyadh, in general, was supporting the whole “Arab Spring” process at the expense of many countries.
A message, or a threat?
Such a person as Qaṭṭān surely does not talk about such things, especially in such sensitive times as a coincidence. This was a clear message. But to whom?
Let suppose it was for the Egyptians! The message can be that back in the days Saudi Arabia helped the army and eventually as-Sīsī, and this should not be forgotten. Nor that the Americans cheated their election in 2012 bringing them the now-outlawed Brotherhood. So the attack by Biden now against the Crown Prince should be understood in the same context, and Cairo should support Riyadh now. What the Saudis indeed need, as Egypt weighs significantly more than Bahrain.
But his can be a message to the Americans as well. Signaling that if Washington really pushes the Hāšuqğī matter, Riyadh can also unveil some unpleasant memories. And it should be noted that if this claim is true and Washington brought the Brotherhood to power in 2012 that has direct consequences for Biden. Because the Vice President at that time was Biden, and he was always specifically close to Hillary Clinton.
Whatever the intention was Qaṭṭān definitely managed to cause a little scandal. However, this is an indisputable sign that the Egyptian-Saudi relations took a very bad turn.
Severed friendship.
It is clear both from the statements and the official reactions that the Saudi-Egyptian relations, which were perfect even a year ago and Egypt was probably the most influential Arab ally of the kingdom after the Emirates, are in very bad shape now. And there is frustration from both sides.
As far as Riyadh is concern Egypt “broke the united Arab rank”, by not supporting Saudi Arabia now and not getting itself involved in the common matters. The Egyptian leadership expresses little, but their frustration is clear. Two months ago in al-‘Ulā, the Saudis reconciled with Qatar against the firm objections of Cairo. And at the end humiliated the Egyptians for not even allowing them to participate in the meeting, only making Cairo sign the final statement. With this Egypt had to abandon its quest against Qatar and Turkey, though this struggle against them and their Brotherhood network was a cornerstone of as-Sīsī’s presidency. Yet he was forced to accept a humiliating surrender after years of sharp confrontations.
In this context, it is only understandable that as-Sīsī, who himself has some reason doubt Biden’s intentions, would not take any effort to support Riyadh. Especially that the American-Egyptian relations are also not perfect. Nonetheless, this growing rift is a very bad omen for the region.
In the midst of this growing dispute between Cairo and Riyadh Egyptian President as-Sīsī on an official visit arrived in Sudan on 7 March. This is his first visit to Khartoum since the Sudanese army’s coup in April 2019. Officially the two leaderships came together to coordinate their stance on the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which deeply affects both, but there are several key militaries, security, intelligence, and economic questions on the agenda. Meaning that finally Egypt and Sudan are getting closer, which is an important question for Riyadh. For one, the current Saudi and Emirati leaderships were the biggest supporters of the Sudanese army’s takeover, and since then Khartoum was counted under Saudi-Emirati influence. For the other, and in consequence, the Sudanese army – though the Sudanese paramilitaries much more – is heavily involved in the war in Yemen. Without them, the Saudi Coalition will have a very hard time even slow down the advance Sana’a’s forces take now.
But this severed relation has a very negative impact on Saudi policy as well. Losing its most robust Arab ally now will force it deeper into the arms of the forming Israeli-Emirati alliance, which became an openly debated topic in the media by now. More and more we see that Saudi experts openly discussing it claiming that they are not interested in any “common Arab stance”, only in the interests of their own country. And for that they ready to make an alliance “even with Satan itself”.