Twin summits shaping a new era – Results.

Amaraia Staff August 14, 2022

            This week we finally arrive at the end of our assessment about the Jeddah Summit leading Biden to Saudi Arabia and the Tehran Summit gathering the Iranian, Russian, and Turkish leaderships.

            So far we have seen these summits one by one. What is the aftermath? What has happened so far as a result of these meetings?

            The answers to these questions are important because they highlight what has really happened. And which way the wind is truly blowing in the Middle East in this troubled period.

 

The diminishing American role

            All that is not to say that the Middle Eastern counties are blind to the European needs, or that would have arrived at a state where they are indifferent to the growing European energy crisis. It could be argued that slowly turning towards the bigger and still growing Far Asian markets with India and China at the top of the list eventually the former great plans to rely heavily on transporting energy supplies to the European markets can be afforded to be lost. Possibly not now, but in a good ten years. Therefore there is no need to pay much attention to the European request. Enough to supply as much as convenient, not to upset Russia by taking over its former markets and enjoy the season of good prices.

            However, the European markets are stable and good-paying markets. The Middle East, especially Egypt and the Gulf see good partners in Europe and still keeps the cultural, technological, scientific, and eventually economic relations in very high esteem, so there is not only not any need to cut these ties, but for a number of selfish and moral reasons there is a big incentive to even develop them. And one key aspect of this is that possibly unknowingly the currently shaping energy supply development projects even nurture regional cooperation, pushing the region to more tangible units, slowly moving away from the past decades of eternal division. Of course, there is a number of weak spots in this regard, like the still ongoing Emirati-Qatari rivalry, or the Syrian crisis. But there are indications that these problems can be overcome, and that is the tendency that is taking shape.

            It is significant that even before the Jedda Summit Qatari Emir Tamīm ibn Ḥamad in May took a European tour and visited Germany and signed a major gas partnership agreement with Berlin. This promised to increase Qatari liquified gas supplies to Germany – to compensate for the loss of Russian gas.

            Almost immediately after the Jedda Summit, on 18 July Emirati leader Muḥammad ibn Zāyid arrived in Paris and France signed a long-term energy partnership agreement with the Emirates – very similar to the one signed between Germany and Qatar -, promising stabile Emirati oil supplies to France.

            Not much later the Crown Prince – and de facto leader – of Saudi Arabia Muḥammad ibn Salmān enjoying that his formal isolation in international politics has ended also visited Paris. He came from Greece, where he signed a major agreement about increased energy supplies, and the same matters were on the agenda in Paris as well.

            On June 15 Egypt, Israel, and the EU signed a memorandum of understanding to supply Egyptian natural gas in large quantities via Israel towards Cyprus into the EU, while also developing the Israeli gas input in it. And since eventually, the long-lasting dispute between Egypt and Saudi Arabia will come to an end, finally handing over three smaller islands to the Saudi kingdom at the Straits of Tiran, the building of a gas, oil, and transport link can commence, meaning soon the whole Gulf can join this project. Naturally, the states not recognizing Israel would sell their products to Egypt to do with it as it pleases, but still, the result would be the same. Creating a massive supply lifeline from the Gulf to the heart of Europe.

            On a similar matter, Algeria, which in late July in partnership with Italy found two new gas fields and a new oil field, recently started to move towards a significantly closer relationship with Rome. Though with its “traditional partners”, Spain and France Algiers is severing ties now that does not mean that it is giving up its interests in the European markets. It is simply turning away from the formally used formula, which can be understood that the so far exclusively used supply routes went through Morocco, and also that Spain recently changed its position about Western Sahara, which is a crucial issue for Algiers. But at the same time cooperation with Italy grows, and recently Algeria signed an agreement with Niger and Nigeria to construct a pipeline through the desert. And just as much as the deteriorating Moroccan-Algerian ties had a result of the energy supplies towards Spain and France, the same way growing friendship between Algeria and Italy, and between Algeria and Tunisian go hand in hand. In his last interview on 30 July, Algerian President Tabbūn made it very clear that Italy and Algeria have never had any problems and will soon have full partnership in a large number of cases.

 

            And this development attracts no objection from Europe, despite the fact that the cooperation between Algeria and Russia regarding Mali, economic investments, or even direct military coordination is not only good but is rapidly advancing.

            So, as we can see right around the time of the Jedda Summit, and mostly even after it, the signals of increased Arab energy supplies somewhat easing the European crisis are plenty. And. In almost all regards these are multilateral deals pulling a number of regional states closer to each other, while the two biggest oil suppliers and the biggest gas supplier cut promising deals with the two biggest economies of Europe. Even though the contradiction is clear – even if not much is discussed about it –  that all these are long-term agreements on future cooperations and developments, not – as was wanted – immediate relief missions. But still, the signs are good, the major energy-supplying Arab states are not turning away from Europe.

            So in this regard, we could say that Biden was successful. But what is strikingly obvious, all these deals are cut with very little to none American involvement in it. Biden wanted an immediate increase in supplies, which is not happening. What is happening is that these states are now in full knowledge of their advantage and they coordinate their moves with Moscow well. However, there is no American role in this process. And unlike all the precedents of the last four decades, whenever there was a disturbance in the energy supplies, or there were regional crises and Washington demanded specific steps from its Middle Eastern allies, these states don’t play an inferior role. Quite to contrary, they are rather dictating, with Algeria’s case being the least dominant, and even there we can see so far a balanced partnership.

 

While one group shrinks and the other expands.

            The most puzzling result of what we could outline from the Jedda and the Tehran summits is that while the U.S.-E.U. tandem is struggling to keep their Middle Eastern allies in line, and the alternative camp, the BRICS forum is about to grow significantly.

            It was shortly before these summits that news surfaced about the likelihood of the BRICS forum expanding significantly. According to this news, the last summit meeting of the BRICS forum in June discussed the possible membership of such significant states as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Argentina. There were similar indications from Algeria as well. What is noticeable almost all the mentioned Middle Eastern states have been so far in the last few decades firm allies of the West politically, militarily, and most importantly economically with no intentions whatsoever to join any alternative camps. It is true that the BRICS group idea is often largely exaggerated and is still very far from being a potent alternative to the Western-dominated global economic system. But what is significant is the trend that these important energy producers in the middle of a European and overall global energy crisis, and a time of milestone summits by America and Russia are showing interest to turn away from the West, or at least being partners of the alternative camp. The important factor is the indication that the wind is changing.

            However, this is just the broader, more long-term possible expansion of ties that are not favoring Washington now. The more significant immediate indications, the real fruits of the Tehran Summit are showing in the immediate aftermath.

 

The aftermaths

            While the Jeddah Summit had no follow-up, nor any tangible positive result, the Tehran Summit very much had. We had discussed how important agreements were signed between Iran and Russia and the cooperation in technology, bilateral and regional trade, and a set of regional matters is still growing.

            Equally important, however, that not much after the Tehran Summit the two presidents of Russia and Türkiye met again on 5 August in Sochi, Russia for a bilateral summit. While much of what was discussed is still not public, the meeting was by all accounts very cordial.

            Which was usually not the case in the last few direct bilateral contacts, and was somewhat surprising in light of a possible problematic Turkish military operation in Syria, or the news that Turkey agreed to set up an attack drone factory in Ukraine, which Moscow vowed to bomb down if that goes into operation. What is public, however, is that the two countries agreed on a number of key matters. Increased gas supplies to Europe via the Turkish Stream pipeline, secured trade corridor for the Ukrainian grain exports, after which the deliveries started to arrive in Istanbul via the Black Sea with Russian cover, and they even seemed to agree on something tangible about Syria.

            The matter of grain supply is a topic equally important to the oil and gas supplies, as a number of African countries for example depend heavily on their supplies. On which Russian and Türkiye together managed to get a firm grip.

            And while there were Western expectations towards Türkiye not to be too friendly with Russia at a time, when tensions are high and there are still hopes for Western sanctions really have an effect on Russia, it seems that beyond the conflicting matters the two states managed to understand each other well.

            And here once again the matter of Syria is an important indicator. First of all the possibility of, a new Turkish military operation in Syria, which seemed very real before the Tehran Summit, now became unlikely, despite the recurring claims that Ankara still wants a “safe zone” in Northern Syria. Very soon after Sochi, the Turkish media started to talk about a possible meeting direct phone conversation between Turkish President Erdoğan and Syrian President al-Asad. Though this was immediately denied by the Syrian authorities, the tone of Ankara very obviously and fundamentally changed. At a conference in Ankara on 11 August Turkish Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu said that there must be a reconciliation in Syria between the government and the opposition – so far very deeply supported and financed by Ankara -, so that the Syrian state can regain full control over all its territories. According to him, this is the only way to lasting peace in Syria. Çavuşoğlu also said that he has already had a brief encounter with his Syria colleague this year.

            There is a very clear message here about Syria Ankara is deeply disappointed with Washington’s policies and rather support Russia, Iran, and even Damascus in their efforts to oust the American presence in the country. But it also shows that Ankara is ready to give up its Syrian proxies and force them into a settlement, eventually giving the now controlled areas to the Syrian state. Which is a fundamental change from the so far proclaimed line that Ankara would help the “rebel” groups to victory. The change is so huge that it caused shockwaves in the Turkish-occupied Syrian areas, where massive protests broke out against the Turkish presence burning Turkish flags and attacking Turkish bases. And the attackers were themselves the Turkish-backed armed groups.

 

            In this context, the Tehran and the Sochi meetings are very important, because according to the Turkish media the idea of direct phone contact between the Syrian and the Turkish presidents was suggested and promoted by President Putin. In other words, if that version is true, Putin suggested Erdoğan call the Syrian President and finally break the ice. What is significant about this is that according to the same reports there is at least one Gulf state – most probably the Emirates – and an African state – almost certainly Algeria – that are taking heavy diplomatic efforts to mediate between Moscow, Ankara, and Damascus for a Russian endorsed Turkish-Syria reconciliation. It is worth mentioning that this year it was the Emirates to break the diplomatic isolation of Syria in the Arab world, while recently the Algerian Foreign Minister visited Damascus. Damascus may refuse this now, but Ankara seems to be ready for it. This clearly indicates that the possibility of a new Turkish military operation in Syria greatly complicating these matters has diminished. And if so, Moscow played a key role in that.

            So what is the real aftermath of the American and the Russian regional tour in July in the Middle East? On the one hand, Biden achieves nothing, while getting serious criticism for abandoning his former policy and letting out the Saudi leadership from the diplomatic isolation. He could not guarantee the desired energy supply increase to Europe, could not counter the Russian diplomacy in the region, and could not even satisfy Washington’s most important Middle Eastern ally Israel. About which the recent war in Gaza is a sobering indication. Not like Washington could not take scores. In fact, it had a number of huge opportunities after Jeddah. It could have taken a firm position on Yemen either endorsing a peace process or sending increased help to Riyadh. Yet Washington did not anything, while the delegation of Sana’a is in Moscow this week to negotiate on the prospects of a final peace settlement. Biden could have taken sides between Egypt and Ethiopia in their dispute to gain the favor of at least one of them. He could have pushed forward the revival of the nuclear deal with Iran, or the normalization process between Israel and some willing Arab states. Yet since Jeddah, the most significant steps of Washington in the Middle East were complete inaction about the last war in Gaza, and the criticism of the Tunisian constitutional referendum, which only caused a huge backlash.

            On the other hand, the Tehran meeting was overwhelmingly successful. It paved the road for increased Russian-Iranian partnership, which now seriously worries Tel Aviv. It expanded the horizons not just for a bilateral partnership, but for an increased Russian-Indian, and Russian-Chinese-Iranian economic cooperation. And it paved the way for the Sochi meeting. Which Russia and Türkiye managed to reach an understanding of energy and grain supplies, and seemingly even about Syria. In other words, Russia managed to give an impression that is solving problems in the Middle East. While Washington either has no response to these developments or doesn’t want to be bogged down while its concerns in Ukraine and Taiwan are growing.

            Indeed, once the Jeddah and the Tehran Summits are compared thoroughly the difference, especially the following aftermaths are huge. On the one hand after much preparation, nothing, while on the other with a seemingly effortless step huge results were achieved. And that is why most probably after a decade or so these two summits will be remembered, as the milestone where something started to really change in the Middle East. The point, where the era of the Arab Spring ended, and the American unilateral dominance got shaken.