Turkish-Egyptian connections in a wider perspective

Friends or Rivals?

Turkish member of the Parliamentary Union of OIC Member States, Orhan Atalay criticized the EU-Arab summit held in Cairo in the end of February, 2019. According to Atalay the American steps in Venezuela and the silence of the Europeans about the executions in Egypt show the rest of the world that justice, democracy and freedom are simply lies usually used by the West. However, Atalay also condemned the Egyptian president as-Sīsī and blamed him for dozens of people based on the information provided by the Amnesty International. Atalay clearly declared that nor Americans, nor Europeans, nor Saudi Arabia will rescue as-Sīsī when his time comes. In addition to that Erdoğan in a TV interview also declared that until as-Sīsī does not let free the innocent people he has imprisoned he won’t meet with him. He also underlined that the lack of independent judiciary could lead to the execution of nine young men on 22 February. By the way, the last time as-Sīsī and Erdoğan met, it was in Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul only 40 days before the coup d’etat in Egypt.

But why did the Turkish side comment the summit so desperately? And why did the Turkish media shared the English remarks on the summit as well? Why is it important for Ankara? There must be outstanding reasons why a Turkish MP cites an NGO – Amnesty International –, which can be an instrument in international politics, yet as we saw in the Taner Kılıç’s case[1], it is at same time persecuted internally.[2]

To understand the motives, let’s have a look at the Turkish-Egyptian relations since the failure of Mursī and the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Role of İhvan

It is more or less a well known fact that Erdoğan had good relations with the Muslim Brotherhood (İhvan) since the 1970’s. However, in Turkey, the existence of the Brotherhood became much more visible after 2006, when through the Union of the NGO’s of the Islamic World (UNIW/İDSB) several community like MÜSİAD, İHH, Türkiye Gönüllü Teşekkürler Vakfı, etc. started to get financial support from the İhvan

In addition, also worths to mention that some other official NGO’s are on the pitch. As for Egypt, the Genç Müslümanlar (Young Muslims) broadcasted several videos recently in order to publicize the brutality of the Egyptian leadership and gain some empathy toward the youth, who have been executed just a few days before. According to their website the crew is about 2 persons and all the translations from Arabic to Turkish are made by helpful volunteers.

            But a question is coming into mind that apart from political aspects, why is it so important for the Turkish leadership to support the Brotherhood? Well, the answer in a nutshell is because they have their own ideological roots within Turkey, which have several similarities to the Egyptian Brotherhood. Namely, the Risale-i Nur written by Said Nursi Bedüizzaman (1877–1960). Said Nursi, the founder of the Nurcu movement had connections in the 1950’s with the Brotherhood members living in Aleppo, Syria, who wanted to translate his work, the Risale-i Nur into Arabic. Although Said Nursi recognized some differences between İhvan’s ideology and his own, he described the relation between the two movements as ’two true brothers’. Hence, Erdoğan could speak about Nursi’s heritage as a local, Turkish philosophy in the opening ceremony of the 8. International Turkic Language Olympic Games. Erdoğan used Nursi’s words written in the Risale-i Nur: ’The unconsciousness, necessity and disagreement are our enemies. Against these three enemies, we are struggling with the weapons of art, skill and union.’[3]

So the role of the İhvan and the fact that Turkey – with the approval of Saudi and Qatar – provides shelter for them could not remain in the shadow. After the successful coup d’état in 2013 in Egypt the İhvan increased its activity in Turkey, which of course caused serious political crisis between the two states. In parallel with the gradual cooling of relations – official relations turned down to charge d’affaires – Istanbul became the new regional centre for the İhvan and according to some sources at the end of the year, approximately $90 million transfered to the Brotherhood and its affiliated groups.

When Erdoğan was asked in an interview, broadcasted by al-Arabiyya TV in 2017, he stated that he doesn’t see İhvan as a terror organization, because unlike FETÖ[4], who used violence in order to achieve their goals, they never participated in any terrorist activity.

It is also worths to mention that president Erdoğan usually uses the symbol of the so called ar-Rabī‘a which symbolises the resistance – and in a wider scale freedom – against the military intervention on 3 July, 2013 in Egypt. From Egyptian point of view ar-Rabī‘a is equal to the support of terrorism. However, it is also true that Erdoğan declared the popular sign has another meaning for him. Namely, “one nation, one flag, one motherland, one state“. Nevertheless, the symbol of ar-Rabī‘a also connects the İhvan and the Turkish president. In addition, ar-Rabī‘a derives from ar-Rabī‘a l-‘Adawiyya, the first Muslim female saint, who lived in the 8th century, born in Basra and died in Jerusalem.

The usage of ar-Rabī‘a was also criticized by the largest opposition party in Turkey. As the leader of CHP mentioned in a political meeting held after the crisis of Qatar in 2017, the Turkish Prime minister should not use the sign and should be neutral between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Kılıçdaroğlu, chairman of the CHP reminded the Turkish government that İhvan has been denounced as a terror organization not just by Egypt, but by Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates as well. However, Qatar openly continued to support the Brotherhood.

Back to the official relations, when later on, the mutual relations could have put on the „right path” in the end of 2017, some Egyptian experts like Muhammed Sabreen expressed that though there are many fields where the two country should cooperate, Cairo considers the acts of the Turkish side as intrusion into their internal affairs. Shortly, from Egyptian perspective, what FETÖ is for Turks, İhvan is for Egypt. However, the same person also emphasized that behind the Turkish-Egyptian diplomatic crisis there is a massive American/Israeli political project aimed to displace Israel from the focus point of the Middle Eastern political discussion and instead put Turkey and Iran as the main enemies of the Arab world.

Egypt did not miss to react to Erdoğan’s words and reminded the international community that within Turkey 70 thousand people have been convicted politically and 130 thousand Turkish citizen got fired in the previous 2 years. Turks have not managed to put the Egyptian side at ease even with the expulsion of some İhvan member like Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ.

The government sided by Turkish media criticised Emmanuel Macron as well, as according to Ankara, that the French president needs as-Sīsī in order to fulfill its expectations in North Africa and especially in Libya, where there is an obvious rivalry between Paris and Rome. In this connection Egypt can make the difference for the French positions in North Africa. If we take into consideration that since 2013 France is the third biggest weapon supplier (after USA and Russia) for Egypt and there are almost 150 companies providing work for more than 33 thousand people, it is more than understandable why Ankara tries to demolish the European plans in Egypt. Therefore, behind the curtains, Turkey as a weapon exporter also wants its share in the North African market, not to mention the political, social and economic ambitions in Africa. Which increased in a remarkable way in the past 15 years. It is not hard to imagine that some within the Turkish decision makers utilize İhvan not just for Middle Eastern aims, but for European – especially French and German – and African ’projects’ as well. And this can also increase the tension between the two sides.

 

The Island of Suwākin

On a bilateral level there is an other problematic point, namely the island of Suwākin that belongs to Sudan and is also known as one of the key points on the Red Sea.

The agreement signed between Sudan and Turkey on 24th of December, 2017 made Cairo angry and suspicious. Turkey managed to lease the island and the port for $650 million, which is frankly speaking not a huge amount of money. Especially that the area is suitable for strategic, economic and military purposes. After Somalia, this will be the second Turkish military base in Africa. In addition, thousands of Turkish soldiers are in Northern Cyprus as well, which means that in the neighborhood of Egypt all together 3 Turkish military bases exist. Not surprisingly these circumstances are disturbing the Egyptian government, which partly considers the Turkish foreign policy as a threat.

In addition, this step got also many negative comments coming mainly from the CHP and İyi Parti, led by Meral Akşener. Akşener objected the project, arguing that a single island in Sudan should not be more important for the Turkish government than the 18 island that are under Greek occupation since 2004. Regarding the question of the occupied islands, there is a disputation even among the Turkish decision makers. On the one hand, there is a group that consider the situation as a casus belli. On the other hand, mainly the government circles, think that the loss of the mentioned „rocks” can not be perceived as an aggressive Greek attempt against Turkey. Also when that problem occurred – in 2004 – the EU-Turkish negotiations just started again. Therefore, Ankara did not want to risk the process for territories where only „goats are grazing”.

Beside the two crucial point – the İhvan and the island of Suakin – the Turkish support for Ḥamās also means an obstacle. The AKP government has paid special attention to that question, which is more than sensitive for Cairo and has a direct affect on the Israeli-Turkish-Egyptian triangle. Not surprisingly, Ḥamās is more than thankful for the support given by the Turkish policy and never misses the chance to strengthen the Turkish connections. And by that many Arab countries, just like Egypt, consider that Turkey may want to be seen as a protector of the Muslims who are under occupation, Ankara strongly cooperate with Israel. And it is a charge hard to dismiss, since in the questions of Palestine, Ḥamās or the İhvan, Turkey successfully made a wedge in the Arab world, which is far from being united anyways. The same process is visible in connection with the Syrian war. Because Turkey never took any action which could have been perceived as a strategic act against Tel Aviv. Quite the opposite, it is a common goal not to let Iranian and Russian interests hold directly close to the neighborhood. Therefore, however AKP uses strong messages against Israel in the internal affairs, in the foreign policy Turkey is still a confident ally of Israel, especially within the framework of the so called ’Arab spring’. In fact, Egypt accuses the Turks as the traitors of the Palestinians and Muslims, and underline that despite the Turkish propaganda, in the reality Ankara have strategic partnership with Israel.

Egypt’s most prestigious newspaper, al-Ahrām naming Erdoğan as the “Satan”.

Future Scenarios

As indicated above, the Turkish-Egyptian relations changed dramatically after the coup d’etat in 2013. However, both sides emphasize the willingness to restart the dialogue, due to the political and economic rivalry nobody can bury the hatchet. Although Turkey tries to block the Western initiative that can affect Egypt’s future and tend to hold important cards in her hand. On the other hand Egypt considers the Turkish steps as a potential threat against its national interests and the shelter for many members of the İhvan, which is equal to the support of terrorist fighting against Egypt’s official government. While Cairo puts pressure on the Turkish side and blame it for financing and supporting of terrorists, the Arab state try to further improve its close ties with the Western powers.

The pot of the rivalry is basically the following. Both sides want to be the ’balance’ or the ’bridge’ between the West and the Muslim world. That is the reason why the Turkish government immediately reacted so desperately to the the Arab-EU summit and why the British comments were useful for them. Even the Amnesty International became suddenly an acceptable reference. However, to be a bridge in this context does not mean that Turkey or Egypt considers itself as an inactive actor of the international politics or even a tool in the hands of the great powers. Turkey has the historical and cultural background allowing her to act as a proud and sovereign state. At the same time Egypt – with the largest population in the Arab world – also has serious aspirations. Until there is serious change in the Turkish or Egyptian political life the bilateral relations will remain on the same intensity level. On 31 March, 2019 Turkish local elections will be held. The international community will see whether the results affect the Turkish foreign policy or not. If yes, Cairo will will hope for the victory of the so called Millet İttifakı, namely the CHP and İyi Parti.

 

[1] Taner Kılıç is the president of the Turkish branch of Amnesty International. He was alleged terrorist activites and arrested on 6 June 2017. He was released more than one year later, on 15 August 2018.

[2] Also worth to check Andrew Gardner, as an AI member also openly criticises the Turkish government. 

[3] The original text in Turkish is: ‘Bizim düşmanımız cehalet, zarûret, ihtilâftır. Bu üç düşmana karşı san’at, marifet, ittifak silâhıyla cihad edeceğiz.

[4] Fethullah Gülen Terör Örgütü is – at least according to the Turkish laws – a terror organization, headed by Fethullah Gülen.