A week has passed since on 7 October groups of Ḥamās and other Palestinian organizations in Gaza launched a surprise attack under the name Ṭūfān al-Aqṣā, the Flood of the al-Aqsa Mosque. The attack not only broke through the isolation barrier built by the Israeli military costing astronomical sums, but in several sections swept it aside, took over military positions all around the Gaza Strip, and broke into several settlements. It took around four to five days for the Israeli forces to retake control over these settlements and even after a week, it could not completely secure the area. So much so that at this time it is the Israeli side that is evacuating its settlements.
The attack showed such coordination and precision that just like flood-breaking dams broke the spirit of the Israeli forces and most of the myths that had been built around it in the last five decades.
Even more surprising, while Tel Aviv chose to retaliate with an ethnic cleansing against Gaza, it still struggles to take the situation under control, secure its settlement both around Gaza and in the West Bank, and prevent the salvos of missiles from Gaza. Even though the Israeli leadership managed to rally the full support of the US and some other allied states, time is not on its side, as the chance of an even bigger conflict is getting closer by the minute. A conflict that at this point the Israeli structure simply cannot afford.
There are a number of reasons why this attack happened, but the real matter is what has it achieved, if anything. Why is this massive hysteria in the Israeli elite and how this attack is very different from all the previous clashes with Ḥamās? And where the conflict is heading?
How it all started?
That would be very lengthy to summarize all the events of the last week, and there are detailed accounts by now, thus here we focus on several key points only.
After months of escalating violence in the West Bank on 7 October fighting cells of Ḥamās and other Palestinian armed organizations, a surprise attack launched an offensive against the Israeli military barrier around Gaza. They successfully broke the corridor, took over several military positions, and took Israeli soldiers captives. Several high-ranking military officers were taken alive and moved to Gaza, while others died. Jonathan Steinberg, the Commander of the famed elite Nahal Brigade tasked with guarding the Gaza barrier was one of the first to die.
Video showing captured Israeli soldiers
Video showing an Israeli Merkava tank being disabled and its crew taken alive, while other Israeli army positions run over
At least 22 settlements around Gaza were run over with heavy clashes for three-fours days, while the Palestinians even managed to replace their contingents, only to be gradually pushed back, but not eliminated. In a number of places Israeli settlements were taken over causing an utter shock. This created most of the false claims, like the one by the i24 reporter that Palestinian militants were beheading children, which not only turned out to be false but there are videos showing the total opposite.
The attack was supported by a massive barrage of missiles, some 5000 on the first day, which completely overwhelmed the Iron Dome air defense system, and the infiltrating commandos managed to disable several batteries.
Several things, however, are very noticeable, and in this sense the Palestinian side not only caused a huge surprise, but in many ways won. It could hide all its intentions until the last second and the Israeli intelligence had no intel on what was coming. The other is the Palestinian planning, which was very precise and managed to hit the Israeli army in its most sensitive positions. This level of planning was so efficient that it is hardly believable not to have received help from other sides. Thirdly the Palestinian commandos learned the lesson of media well. All their operations were filmed and posted on social media almost instantly, not only causing fear on the Israeli side but later dismantling many claims that the main goal was killing civilians. Lastly, Ḥamās greatly shifted from its former tactics of small-scale attacks targeting civilians to cause terror. Now the aim was clearly the Israeli military and even to take as many prisoners as possible, while the civilians – though undoubtedly many were taken hostage, or killed – meant a secondary target and here as well the main focus was on taking them alive.
The relevance of that is that it is easier to rally political support later on if the struggle is not shown to the Western audience that it is a terror massacre but as a military conflict. And that point is a hard-learned lesson.
The Palestinians saved themselves
Looking at the current situation when the Israeli war mechanism with its absolute air superiority bombarding Gaza indiscriminately to take revenge, to satisfy its society demanding the utmost brutality and to put an end to Ḥamās’ military capability the war seems one-sided. At least in the Western news. There is nothing surprising in this reaction, as all previous Israeli wars against Gaza showed the same pattern. The Palestinian side must have seen it coming. So, was this attack worth it? The first attacks and minor gains, the surprising resilience in the first few days really made this destruction in Gaza worthy? Regardless of the unimaginable human costs and the by now seemingly completely asymmetrical conflict the Palestinian entity actually scored such a huge victory that cannot be underestimated.
Beyond the unprecedentedly high number of casualties, which once again lights up the deep inner crisis of the Israeli entity that is the main reason for the panic and hysterical reaction that is ruling the Israeli elite. The results of this flood will only be seen in the months after the dust has settled.
Looking at the humanitarian costs it seems beyond reckless to risk the lives of more than two million people in Gaza by launching a war that in the traditional sense cannot be won and in which the lives of these people cannot be protected. Especially since 2006, when Ḥamās took control over Gaza several wars were fought all with practically the same devastating result, the Israeli military bombing Gaza until a face-saving ceasefire was achieved. However, it should be kept in mind that more than two million people have lived in miserable conditions and under unimaginable blockades since 2007. Fighting, or not, war or without it, their living conditions offer very little hope. And desperation fosters aggression, as there is very little left to lose for these people. That is the general reason now in Gaza why the people while suffering even more are not breaking in spirit but support the resistance ever more. Though it should also be kept in mind that with total political cruelty, this is something Ḥamās exploits and uses to boost its own grip over the area and rally regional support, with little regard to the human costs. Because the regional states want to save the civilian population of Gaza, they have to negotiate with Ḥamās.
While the humanitarian side is catastrophic, politically the attack was massively successful. One of the main, or possibly biggest threats to the Palestinian political establishment and for the future of any Palestinian state is not the blockade or military aggression, but the end of Arab-Muslim support for their cause. And in this regard, the biggest threat was the so-called normalization process manifested in the Abraham Accords between “Israel” and certain Arab states under the oversight and huge pressure of the USA. Though after Trump lost office this process, largely due to the internal Israeli political crisis with five governments in the last three years, the process practically came to a halt.
But in the last few months, there were several rumors that other Arab states might soon join the process launching a second major round. That is because gearing up for the elections the Biden administration needs political success, and because since December 2022 Netanyahu regained his office as Prime Minister somewhat stabilizing the government. In August it was revealed that the Libyan Unity Government of ad-Dabība held a secret meeting in Rome with the Israeli establishment. This caused such an uproar that ad-Dabība had to sack his Foreign Minister and rapidly backtrack denying any possibility of normalization. Also in August, the Israeli media rumored that Tunisians might also be persuaded, despite the firm stance of Tunisian President Sa‘īd against such an agreement. Yet, in the last two months, the most rumored candidate was Saudi Arabia. The Western and the Israeli media went far as to discuss that the negotiations are already well developed and Riyadh is only asking too high a price. But also that this might change and before the next American elections Biden can celebrate his own Abraham Accords. Which would have been a huge feather on Biden’s and Netanyahu’s cap. There were also similar rumors about the Saudi-endorsed Yemeni, the Omani, or even the Lebanese governments.
Netanyahu went even further. In his speech to the UN General Assembly on 22 September he not only talked about an upcoming peace deal with Saudi Arabia and hinting at other states but visioned a whole new economic corridor from India via Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and his administration all the way to Europe. Strangely it resembles a counter to the Chinese Road and Belt Initiative, to which Tel Aviv is not a partner, but almost all Arab states around it are. And for that, he had the audacity to show a map, which marked all of Palestine and the Syrian Golan Heights as part of “Israel”, not only now, but all the way back to 1948.
All that, however not only came to a half but completely reversed. On 10 October Saudi Crown Price Muḥammad ibn Salmān and Iranian President Ra’īsī discussed the Palestinian situation and how to unite efforts to help the Palestinians and the conversation lasted for almost an hour. This does not mean they agree, but it shows that Riyadh will definitely not normalize its relations with Tel Aviv in the near future, especially that its ties with Iran and its allies are warming rapidly. The massive protests in the Arab world even in unexpected places, like Muscat or Rabat, or when on 8 October an Egyptian policeman in Alexandria killed two Israeli tourists shows that even in Arab states are usually more leaning towards cooperation with Tel Aviv there is a massive fury and popular sentiment is very vocally supporting Palestine. Not only new states are not joining the Abraham Accords club, but even the ones that had established ties with Tel Aviv now have a hard time not to cut them completely. It is also very telling that one particular normalizing state, Sudan despite its internal war right in the midst of this war reestablished its diplomatic ties with Iran.
Beyond the sympathy, however, the Palestinian attack undermined the normalization process on three other levels as well. There were always three arguments for the states in the last decade to normalize relations. One is that the agreement would serve to help the Palestinians, as they would get some compensation and in general have no concern about this process. The second is that it is beneficial, as this militarily strong, technically and intelligence developed “Israeli state” can provide help for their security forces by buying modern weapons and technology from it. The third was that there was no point in holding on to the animosity anyway, as the Israeli army will always gain the upper hand, and cannot be beaten, therefore achievements can only be gained at the negotiating table. A week ago, however, even by the Israeli accounts not more than a thousand Palestinian fighters broke the separation barrier and flooded the settlements surrounding Gaza. Meaning that the Palestinians still want to resist and are ready to make sacrifices. This means that the famed Israeli military can be beaten badly, even by small forces, so the resistance is not futile. This means that Israeli technology, like its cyber capabilities and its famed Iron Dome system is very far from being invincible. Not necessarily useful to purchase them instead of their Western, Russian, or Chinese counterparts.
That late part is also significant in the sense that selling such technologies promised on the one hand a huge profit, while on the other hand access to the intelligence circles of the region. That project was hugely undermined.
Winning the demographics
There is one other aspect in which the Flood of al-Aqsa probably will make a massive shift in the course of the events and that is the field of demographics. According to the latest available statistics from 2016 the Israeli non-Arab growth rate was around 1,8%, while the Arab growth rate within the 1948 borders and in the West Bank is more than 2,2% and the Israeli is declining faster. The main factor that was compensating these numbers was the immigration of Jewish settlers from all around the world, but that was already counted in the 1.8% rate.
However, on the Arab side, there is no measurable immigration. In the current composition of the Israeli society, roughly 9.7 million people only 73% are Jews, roughly 7.15 million people. The rest, around 2 million are almost all Palestinians. The West Bank has a population of around 3 million people, of which 71.7% is Palestinian – roughly 2 million-, while around 28% are Jewish settlers, around 850 thousand. Gaza holds an additional 2 million people, who are practically all Palestinians. The West Bank has a slightly smaller growth rate than the Israeli society, but Gaza has a higher. Overall in the area that is Palestine the Israeli-controlled areas together have a population of roughly 15 million people, of which 8 million are Jews, while 7 million are Palestinians. With an overall higher population growth the overall composition is the area is shifting towards the Palestinians, and the main factor that was relatively compensating for this was immigration. Mostly to the settlements with huge state financial endorsements. But to be sustainable had to hold the strong conviction that the area is generally safe, there is a prospect here.
The Flood broke that picture, especially, after Tel Aviv on 10 October decided to evacuate at least 15 settlements around Gaza because it could not prevent the incursions and the missiles falling on them. The problem is even bigger by the fact that the latest government coalition of Netanyahu was largely built on the settlers, while the most productive middle-class segments of the society were largely dissatisfied with him. With this war proving that there are no safe areas, the settlement policy is not without repercussions and there is a possibility of an even greater regional war the immigration will slow even more and the emigration of the middle classes will increase. Simply put, the “demographic race” is getting lost, casting serious doubts on the future of this entity.
That is exactly why the normalization was crucial, to embed this polity in the region before the demographic bomb explodes, and leave options for the Palestinians leaving more and more. Despite the horrific losses and gamble with human lives, both sides play a very cold long-term war of attrition. The Israeli side was not winning it until now. And with this slap, the figures will turn even more. That explains the hysterical push of Netanyahu to expel the whole population of Gaza to any Arab state, which will almost definitely not play out as he claims.
Possible further scenarios
Right now, as the Israeli military mechanism starts to regain its composure and carpet bombs Gaza there are reports of a possible land attack. That is certainly something the Israeli society wants and Netanyahu is ready to provide, but that is much easier said than done.
The last similar conflict in 2021, which started with a massive missile operation by Ḥamās named Sayf al-Quds, the Sword of Jerusalem had a very similar layout, just on a much smaller scale. There was no Palestinian ground attack, “only” missile barrages, the conflict lasted 15 days, and in the end, 365 people died on the Palestinian side and 17 on the Israeli. The Israeli loss had only one soldier. Even at that time, there were plans for a ground attack, but that was eventually abandoned knowing that Ḥamās actually wanted to draw the Israeli forces into an area that was full of traps and well-built tranches where it could cause real losses to its opponent. That was exactly what the Israeli leadership did not want to provide.
Now the losses are higher than any Israeli war in the last four decades. At least 1300 Israelis died, a big part of them – by the recent Israeli accounts 279 – soldiers killed in the first two-three days and the numbers are still rising. The numbers on the Palestinian side have already surpassed this and will grow even more with the indiscriminate shelling of Gaza and the sporadic clashes in the West Bank. With these numbers, the Israeli society and even the political class are in shock and the trust in the military leadership is shaken. Going into Gaza, when even in 2021 it was viewed as unwise to walk into a trap, the Israeli military losses will be much higher. Further shaking the trust in the military.
The big difference is that in 2021 Ḥamās held no new captives, so there was no real pressure for the Israeli army to invade. But now Ḥamās holds at least 150 Israeli captives in Gaza, by Israeli claims 126 soldiers, including some high-ranking officers. Bombing Gaza even more dangers their lives, but leaving them is also not an option now. The even bigger problem is that there is no winning game plan here. The Israeli army might go in and might even manage to take control over the area, despite the losses and the possible loss of the hostages, but it cannot stay there. Because establishing military control over Gaza would drain such forces that cannot be sustained even for months.
Meaning that Netanyahu is between two very hard choices. He either gambles with a land invasion risking even much bigger losses, further international condemnation, and possibly even losing the captives, or very soon opts for some sort of mediation securing the release of all hostages – at least the civilians and ordinary soldiers – and facing fury after humiliating agreement without real revenge.
Can there be a regional war?
Possibly the biggest admission that the Israeli army mechanism suffered a crippling blow was that only two days after the Flood of al-Aqsa started Netanyahu called Biden and asked for help. Which came almost immediately, as Washington sent a fleet including its most modern carrier to Palestine. The aim was to persuade any other regional actors not to join the conflict on the Palestinian side. Meaning that even after decades of massive military aid still, the US has to protect its Israeli allies in a war against the Palestinians. On 12 October State Secretary Antony Blinken also arrived in Tel Aviv to show support.
The effect, however, was very limited, mostly boosting the Israeli morale that in a worst-case scenario, the Americans will help them out. But as soon as the Americans sent their fleet, there were statements from various military factions from Iraq to Lebanon that if America gets involved directly there will be repercussions against American military positions everywhere in the region. Ḥizb Allah in Lebanon has already shown support by allowing Palestinian groups to infiltrate from the North, there have been border skirmishes and Ḥizb Allah has hit two Israeli military positions.
Also very telling that the very day Blinken went to Tel Aviv Iranian Foreign Minister ‘Abdollahiyān has also arrived in Beirut, lightly threatening that the conflict might escalate further if the Israeli side does not stop its operations.
There is a high likelihood that at any given moment Ḥizb Allah might also join the war, and if the Americans do get involved that might expand to American positions in Syria and Iraq. The Israeli army and even more the society is not ready to handle another, wider front. The American is, but the scope of such escalation is not predictable, and so close to the American presidential election the last thing Biden wants is singing into a whole regional quagmire.
The regional actors, Egypt and the Gulf states are also not interested in massive regional chaos and, therefore with all likelihood try to de-escalate the situation. Though it is noticeable that all Arab allies of Washington refused to condemn the Palestinian attack. Also significant that China and Russia have shifted from their former stance and taken a very clear position siding with the Palestinians. In other words pouring gas on the fire, as it boldens the anti-Israeli side and challenges the Americans to a risky gamble.
The most crucial question these days is whether the Israeli leadership decides to risk a land invasion, or not. If so that will be an opportune moment for many regional players, both politically and militarily to intervene and hit Tel Aviv very severely. Not to overrun Palestine, though that is widely circulated in the Arab opinions, but to cripple the Israeli military mechanism and break the Israeli society. Yet, if Netanyahu chooses not to go into Gaza, that can just as much sell the image that Tel Aviv is beaten this time, accelerating further conflicts.