The web of contradictions. The evidences of a conspiracy.
There is a massive amount of contradiction about the behavior of both the neighboring states and the behavior of the Syrian state as well. These events themselves suspicious on their own, but putting them all together, give out a pattern of conspiracy.
The main “rebel” group, Hay‘at Taḥrīr aš-Šām was not only a Dā‘iš subgroup, but itself and its leader al-Ğūlānī were on the U.S. terror list. Now the main pretext of the American presence in Syria in the name of the International Coalition was to fight against the resurgence of terrorism. And this presence means around 30 illegal military bases in Eastern Syria. With the terrorist campaign taking Aleppo, however, not only one attack was carried out by the American troops against them, they attacked the Syrian troops in Dayr az-Zūr. And on 9 December already started discussing to removing the HTS from the terrorist list. Followed immediately by the British. And it also made no problem that Starlink internet access was provided to the “rebels”.
The terrorist attack came the very day after Tel-Aviv agreed to a ceasefire in Lebanon, freeing up enough attention and opportunity to a later attack against Syria, which was expected. Netanyahu on that very day stated that “Baššār al-Asad is playing with fire”. The attack came immediately the next morning against Syrian Army positions around Aleppo, heavily supported by the Turkish army. This could not have happened in such a paste without a prearranged Israeli-Turkish deal. The “rebels” themselves from the very beginning stated their good connections with the Tel-Aviv regime after Aleppo appearing on Israeli media and promising to open embassies. If Türkiye was really taking a side with the Palestinians, as Ankara’s rhetoric held, this agreement could not have happened.
These outer forces, however, were not enough for the plan to succeed. By all indications there were internal elements within the Syrian state, which were part of this plan, their contribution was essential. There must have been one, or more key military commanders at the very top of the military hierarchy, someone with direct access to the president, who kept withdrawing the troops, yet maintaining the charade that all is well. Iranian Foreign Minister ‘Arāqčī meeting the Syrian president the day after Aleppo fell in a recent interview said that Baššār al-Asad himself was stunned by the “poor performance” of the army. Which to admit this is proof that he was detached from reality. The troops from south withdrew without a fight and in perfect condition, yet they were never ordered to redeploy in the capital and to defend it. Nor were the army units on the coast ordered to launch a counterattack. The army was systematically pulled back, Homs was handed over, and the army was made to surrender. There were, however, complicit elements within the state apparatus as well, as almost all Syrian embassies changed their flag on the very night Damascus fell, and most hoisted the new flag the very next day. Which means they already had a flag that was until then considered an insignia of a terrorist organization. No major Syrian embassy’s staff asked for asylum, simply sided with the new system. How could that have been ensured without complicity from the core of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? In a similar example of state meltdown, after the Iranian revolution in 1979, most Iranian embassy personnel did apply for asylum and not sided with the new government.
Another intriguing fact is that while in the last four years, especially in the countryside most essential commodities were rationed, scarce and expanded, and foreign currency exchange was constantly rising, suddenly the very next day the government fell the access to these commodities grew and the dollar rate started to fall. Indicating that there was an artificial increase, or even caused food shortage, which “miraculously” started to dissipate after the “rebels” took over. Which should have happened to the contrary.
Also impossible to explain logically that the very same groups which were exploding cars and committing the most heinous crimes against civilians and army personnel for years, suddenly appear everywhere with slogans that ‘Alawīs and Sunnis are one, no one is to hurt anyone, and also saying a that they are not to last, soon they will disappear and “educated and cultured people” will take over. And indeed, though there have been horrific incidents, in general, the armed groups are held back from mass massacres and everywhere communicate the same message. Right after a fierce military campaign they simply let all army personnel go home. How is that all possible, without a prearranged deal at the most upper levels?
These crucial details give out a pattern of conspiracy, which gradually led the population to be desperate and detached from the government, tired to fight, and in the end handing the country over. And this explains a lot from the events of the last few years. Such internal policies clearly devastating to the society could not have happened without planning, or by negligence if, after the fall of the government, the right policies were immediately applied.
This has been going on for years. This is why the Syrian government never progressed in the Astana process and refused all Russian-Iranian-endorsed settlements with Türkiye. This is why Syria was turning a blind eye to the Israeli attacks against its positions, mostly hitting Iranian allies, not because it was so weak. That is why Syria was absent from the war in Lebanon. Which was noticeable even before, as in all speeches by Ḥizb Allah in the last year, Syria was not mentioned anymore. That is why so vital Iranian positions were constantly revealed and hit by Tel-Aviv within Syria, which led the Iranians to pull back almost all their assesses from there. With their presence, especially on the intelligence level the plan would not have succeeded. And most alarming of all, the pagers and the wireless com devices Ḥizb Allah had and the Israelis managed to explode were not the result of infiltration into the Lebanese resistance, nor by Iranian negligence, but by the very elements in Syria, which handed the state over.
That would still not explain why the Russian help was so inadequate, however. Unless the traitor was not someone intimately linked to the Russian commanders and thus managed to mislead them. Because the Russians put infantry forces on the ground before Ḥama fell, yet they were pulled back at the end. And that means that this widespread internal conspiracy was played out against the Russians and the Iranians as well.
Was that all inevitable?
Today all what is Syria is ruled by a state of shock, confusion, and smokescreens of media warfare, primarily fought in numbers and not quality on the social media platforms. The whole country, especially since the Tel-Aviv regime destroyed all Syrian military positions and bases, the whole Syrian Air and Naval Forces is ruled by a puzzle of small extremist military groups, not more than around 10-12 thousand people, augmented by extremist foreign fighters and Ukrainian and Turkish army detachments. Yet the streets are ruled by the first one.
Despite the very small number of the now ruling militants, there are three key factors that keep the Syrian society – in large rejecting the unfolding trajectory – absolutely paralyzed.
First is the extremist nature of this patchwork of ultra-radical groups, their long history of heinous crimes against civilians since 2011, and the fear of bloodshed. The fear from the outbreak of an ethnic and sectarian real civil war, which at any moment can surpass the levels of the war since 2011 in brutality.
Second is the total confusion, as the state with all its institutions, not only collapsed, but was switched off overnight, while what has just happened is not even understood. The state that has ruled Syria for almost six decades disappeared, there is no clarity about what is coming, and thus there is no vision for what to do, and what alternatives can be offered for a new beginning. That hinders any attempt to save whatever possible from the state apparatus. And the most necessary dialogue on the level of the whole society cannot even start, exactly in fear of the first factor.
Thirdly, and is the most important internal factor, there is no real longing for what has ended. As one of our sources put it:
“The people are not missing was has just left, but are afraid of what is coming”.
That is the real tragedy of the collapse of the Syrian state, which prevents it from recovering swiftly, or might just at all. Its moral, ideological immune system is dead, and the realization that it has been dead for long has just hit everyone. And that is not even connected to President Baššār al-Asad, though no doubt he had a very negative and negligent role in this.
The Ba‘at ideology forming in the ‘30s and ‘40s of the last century had a clear message and appeal to the society. An answer to the contradictions of the ethnically and religiously diverse Syrian society, which stated that all the people are part of one Arab nation from Morocco to Iraq, the Arab nation has a clearly describable history and historical role, which can be separated from Islam, and in this all religious groups, even Christians had their contribution. This ideology was even receptive to non-Arabs developing the history of the region, accepting the Kurdish, or Circassian heroic figures. Built on this the movement fought for the unity of this nation and for its liberation from all foreign, primarily colonial interference advocating self-reliance and self-determination. This ideology was eventually augmented by the social message of Socialism, which after the Second World War gained a huge boost.
Despite all the rapid turns of Syrian history since the late ‘40s until 1971, the Ba‘at Movement had its appeal and had a valid social message, which was effectively translated into progress until the late ‘90s. Since then, however, especially with the collapse of the Socialist brand (cégér) and very visible Arab division after the Gulf War in ‘91 the Ba‘at steadily lost substance, by this message and appeal. The Ba‘at in Syria kept the slogans alive, but gradually transformed into a patriotic nation-state model upheld by the army, keeping the Palestinian cause as a reminder of the old ideals. The ideology was further undermined by the pragmatic, though very useful and effective alliance with the theocratic Iran. Which was fitting in a sense that one patriotic nation-state finds an ally in another, which was largely the pragmatic reality, but was absolutely contradictory to the idea that secular Arab unity is being built on social ideal, opposed by most Arab states almost none of them Socialist, but supported by a non-Arab theocratic state. And this fermented the counterclaim that this was a Shia alliance, which was very far from the truth. But as long as the internal social fabric was largely intact, one massive middle class existed with a small number of impoverished and a thin layer empowered rich.
After 2000, however, with Baššār al-Asad taking over two major changes happened in steps compared to the state model what was before. First, the new president gradually sidelined most of the old cadres of his father, especially in the military, giving positions to new, younger technocrats, who were very far from the official ideology. Second, the economy was revitalized very similar to the Chinese model. Economic openness and development, with no political-ideological modification. The new economic model was surprisingly effective, Syria by 2010 was one of the fastest developing regional states, rapidly moving away from self-reliance and attracting Turkish and Gulf investments. Very naturally, just like in the formerly Socialist European countries, the economic change brought along huge wealth, which was not distributed equally, creating a huge social rift with very few actually becoming poorer, but a segment of society suddenly becoming extraordinarily rich. And most of those, by the very nature of Middle Eastern societies, were personally connected to the ruling presidential elite. This created a nature of corruption, which became a fertile ground to the dissatisfaction that only became strikingly apparent in 2011.
When the crisis hit Syria 2011 it largely relied on the personal loyalties of the old cadres, many of the disregarded for years, and the message of patriotism, which was not the official ideology of the ruling political facade. The new elite, the young technocrats failed to deal with the situation and those had to be replaced, mostly by the old elite.
The result of all this was that by 2018, when the military war was largely won, but not solved, there should have been an ideological and economic rejuvenation, which never came. The president became ever more isolated from the establishment, relying on a very small circle of key figures. The daily life of the people, who saw no plan about how to tackle the economic war waged on Syria by U.S. sanctions and isolation, nor had an ideological message, while the old slogans were clearly not fitting the realities anymore were kept untouched.
The years between 2018 and 2024 witnessed the gradual and total impoverishment of the society, the middle class almost totally died, the masses fell under the poverty line, while a small elite kept its privileges. This period saw no real progress on the political landscape and provided no hope that the situation would improve, causing an even bigger exodus than the events of 2011. And in the meantime, the state lost all ideological legitimacy. The people started to wonder, why should they struggle for Arab unity and solidarity, when most Arab states took a stance against Syria and helped the intervention? Why should they struggle for Palestine, when most Arab states do nothing about it, and many Palestinians took arms against the Syrian state between 2011 and 2018?
The Syrian state became utterly dependent on the support of its two key allies, Russia and Iran, which represented itself only in military terms – with no progress of ending the conflict – and almost not at all in economic support. Which led to allowing illicit black market projects to flourish to keep the state alive, but leading to even more social conflicts and rampant corruption.
Even all these problems could have been handled with enough military and diplomatic support, which existed if the state could have presented a mobilizing ideological message. The old one failed, but not discarded, but there was no new one. Making the masses disenchanted. Why would anyone fight and die for a state, only to see a small elite benefit at the end and the masses becoming poor and hungry, while the elite benefits, and corruption and inflation paralyze their daily lives?
That is why today the Syrian society, shocked as it is, has no longing for what has just ended. In the form it existed, it had to end. And that is why it has, and will continue have a very hard time to recover. Because national dialogue about the future hasn’t even started. Nor the previous, nor the present leadership shows any openness to it, pushing the people towards separatism. To the idea that it would might just be better to have three – or more – separate states, all continuing on their own ways. That is the real death of the Syria that has existed to far, regardless whether separation happens or not.
Regional dynamics
The results of this dramatic change are huge. The Axis of Resistance, which was so far winning the regional war and turning out to be the dominant block has just been crippled. Russia’s presence in the region got significantly weakened. This is such a broad topic that it worth a separate study.
However, there is one aspect in it, which should be pointed out, because it might hold clues about what is coming for Syria and the region. Why Iran and Russia do not intervene now, at least to repel the Israeli troops, or to eliminate the terrorist groups and impose a new local government, under whatever framework?
Simply because the Syrian state ceased to exist. Those who were supporting and former government are confused and feel betrayed, and thus would not likely side with any major rescue attempt. Those who were against the government, and the “establishment” have always been against these states’ support, they especially hate Iran. If the Iranian state tried to intervene with its own army, much of the Syrian population can be turned against it, portraying this as an invasion. So it would turn out to be a suicide mission.
However, both states have been tricked by a Syrian internal enemy, and Türkiye, benefiting the Tel-Aviv regime. Which will urge them to stop this expansionist project in the bay in Syria. And so, the fight within Syria has been ended, but the struggle for it has just begun.