In the early hours of Thursday 22 April 2021, Syria faces yet another Israeli aggression targeting military facilities in the vicinity of the capital Damascus. According to Tel Aviv, the target was a military facility in Dummār, where – allegedly – the Iranian army has a presence. Like so many times before, the massive missile attack was largely repelled by the Syrian air defense, and the rockets, which did reach their target caused minimal damage and wounded 4 Syrian soldiers. Once again Israeli army committed aggression against its sovereign neighbor with the excuse of fighting Iran, yet the casualties prove otherwise.
The response, however, was swift, clear, and shocked Tel-Aviv, even more than in 2018, when the Syrian air defense shot down one of their F-16 warplanes. A Syrian missile traversed roughly 300 kilometers mostly in enemy skies and landed near Dimona in the Negev (in Arabic Naqab) Desert, one of the most sensitive spots all over Palestine. It was largely believed at first that the target was the semi-secret nuclear facility there, but it soon turned out this is just one part of the message. The missile most probably hit another key facility precisely. And beyond that caused shock and confusion in the settler population, as it was thought that these skies are impregnable. This shocking message most probably meant the final blow for Netanyahu struggling to form a government these days, and in doing so escalated the semi-secret war against Iran. Which is one way or another might have just backfired.
The Israeli narrative claimed for a while that the hit came with an Iranian missile. In the first hours on social media, they even spread that from Iran itself. Yet this surprising Syrian feat was largely due to one man, the late Dr. ‘Azīz ‘Alī Isbar. His role in this story is a message itself.
The Syrian strike shocked Tel Aviv to – allegedly – run a large sortie of areal bombardments around the occupied Syrian Ğūlān against the Syrian batteries, including the one, which launched the missile. But the real shock showed in the huge number of stories – many times conflicting themselves – with which Israeli officials tried to explain the event and justify the failure of the air defense.
This comes at a time of noteworthy changes in and around Syria, as the presidential elections are coming up. On the one hand, Dā‘iš increased their numbers in the Syrian desert, the American-supported Qasad militia continued its aggression against the local population in Eastern Syria, diplomatic pressure was increased on Damascus, and also the American sanctions. On the other hand, however, the direct military threats were dealt with and the support by Iran and Russia managed to reverse the devastating effects of the sanctions.
This also comes in the midst of an escalating confrontation between Tel Aviv and Tehran. In that, the attacks on the Iranian ships and the cyberattack on Naṭanz probably meant the last straw for Iran.
The equation has dramatically changed with this one event, and that uncovered many trends developing in the last year or so.
That fateful night.
We have largely covered what happened between Syrian and the Israelis in the early hours of 22 April. The Israeli army committed yet another unprovoked aggression against Syria, to which Damascus ordered a response by a missile strike. The missile crossed roughly 300 kilometers and landed near Dimona, the only – and officially denied – nuclear facility in Palestine. Which was feared in many conflicts before that it was hit, could collapse the settler state with a devastating catastrophe. That is one of the main reasons why Tel Aviv was so keen to develop multiple air defense systems. The Iron Dome for short-range, David’s Sling for midrange, and the Arrow 4 system for long-range. This latter is largely manufactured by the Tomer factory, which is also in Dimona. And exactly that factory was hit, which is a very telling double message. It should be noted that not just one missile hit this target. Only one missile was fired, which precisely hit its target. That caused confusion on the Israeli side.
How big was – and most probably still is – at the Israeli leadership is shown by the myriad of explanations. For some time it was spread in the Israeli media that the missile came from Iran, but some claims referred to the former fears that the Iranians Revolutionary Guards were setting up drone sites in Yemen, and this hit came from there. This scenario was never addressed, simply dropped and it is easy to see why. If Iran was capable to hit targets at such a distance without the Israelis, or even the Americans knowing, it is most curious why the Israeli leadership was talking about a possible direct attack by them against Iran for months. It would be a very unwise gamble.
One other claim, which actually did not even address the matter of the missile – which is the real question here – focused on the explosions. The Israeli Haaretz claimed that there was a controlled routine blast experiment at the Tomer factory, which somehow went wrong and caused panic. Slightly signaling that the locals overreacted to the event, but there is nothing to be afraid of. Though this article did not mention the missile, the same picture was used in it as many others connected to the Syrian missile’s case. Meaning that two events are indeed connected.
Other explanations by Israeli sources claimed that this was simply a Syrian air defense missile shot towards one of the Israeli planes, which went astray and landed eventually at Dimona. This was to say that the Syrian missiles are extremely imprecise, could never hit so accurately a long-distance target, and are well known to be useless. This was even underscored by a disputed recent event on 8 April, when after another Israeli attack one Syrian air defense missile – or its fragments – landed in Lebanese territory. This explanation, however, is obviously flawed in many ways. Syrian Air defense rockets largely hit their targets well, and are capable, as the Israeli learned when their F-16 was shut down in 2018. Never again they dared to enter Syrian airspace. About the event on 8 April, the Israeli missiles mostly came from above Lebanon, therefore such an incident was logical to happen. The mentioned fragment landed very close to the Syrian border. This infamous one hitting Dimona, however, took 300 kilometers. Some Israeli sources even suggested it blew up in mid-air. Such distance is beyond the range of the Pantsir and S-200 – named after its range of 200 kilometers, but several models have a claimed top range of 300 kilometers – missiles Syria usually uses against the Israeli attacks. The distance makes an air defense missile very unlikely. But that fact that it was launched two hours after the Israeli strike would suggest that this missile was launched against an Israeli plane, stayed in the air for more than two hours, and then crossed most of Palestine without any reaction from the Israeli air defense. And this was a sole rocket, not a whole sortie. It is an extremely weak argument.
Netanyahu even went so far as to say that the Israeli attacks – which happened first – came as a response to the Syrian missile. Thus indirectly admitting that this was not at all a rogue missile. Because nothing can hide the fact that the Israeli air defense did not even react. None of the three systems. Proving extreme vulnerability.
This problem was usually addressed as human error, as it was poorly judged, which system should be applied. That is also unlikely since every Israeli war scenario is built on hundreds, or thousands of missiles being launched against them at the same time from various sources within Palestine, Lebanon, and even Syria. If these targets were to be assessed manually there results would be catastrophic. In either case, suddenly a huge vulnerability was exposed. The sheer volume of contradicting Israeli narratives and careful disregard to the fact that they could not thwart the missile shows that they were surprised. It was revealed that there are no impregnable skies.
The mysterious missile
Most Israeli sources claim – apart from the original Iranian missile story – that it was an old Syrian SA-5 missile, otherwise known as S-200. A Soviet design from the late ‘60s improved several times since then. As we saw this is practically impossible, though it seems this is about to become the canonized version in the Western media.
Some Israeli, but also Iranian sources hinted that the missile was a newer model of the Fāteḥ-110, the one developed in cooperation with Syria under the name of M-600. With the official range of 300 kilometers with a payload of 650 kilos, this one fits the pattern much more. This is a surface-to-surface solid-fuel precision missile, which was designed for mid-range hits, and after entering service in Iran and Syria it was delivered to Ḥizb Allah even before 2011.
Some, mostly social media Syrian claims mention the Ğūlān-2 missile as a possible weapon used. This is a local version of the Soviet Scud-D designed in 1989, which has a range of some 700 kilometers as the payload of almost 1 kiloton. This was improved greatly in Syria, but apart from various claims in the war since 2011, Syria has never used them in action. Though this one would be more fitting, this is a relatively old and known base model. Regardless of how much the Syrians managed to improve it, this should be fairly known by the Israelis and unlikely to trick the Israeli air defense systems.
We could also hypothesize a drone attack since Iran and its allies have considerable experience in this field by now and this suggests the future of warfare. But there were no indications on any side suggesting that. All sources talk about a missile.
Whichever way it is, and we are left with more questions than definite answers and the true identity of the missile stays relatively mysterious at this point. The “official” Israeli stray missile version can be disregarded. So it was either an Iranian missile – which by now would have been celebrated in Tehran -, a Syrian designed or developed one, or a joint project.
Who was ‘Azīz ‘Alī Asbar?
Almost immediately after the strike on Dimona Syrian social media site was all recounting one theme: ‘Azīz ‘Alī Isbar was avenged this day. But who was he, and what did he have to do with this event?
He was a lesser-known scientist and the director of the Syrian Scientific Research Center in Maṣyāf on the Syrian coast, operating under the Syrian Ministry of Defense. In August 2018 he was assassinated with his driver when his car was blown up in Maṣyāf. It was a bizarre and mysterious incident leaving many questions about the reasons. That was mostly due to fact that he was unknown to the public, and even after this death, almost nothing was revealed about him. Since all indications pointed to the Mossad even then and he was a scientist of physics, it was believed that he was a nuclear scientist, one of the many assassinated by Tel Aviv in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Given the Research Center was hit several times before his assassination by Israeli raids, it was likely that he was the target himself.
Only now, after this shocking hit news started to surface from Isbar that he was one of the top leaders of the Syrian missile program, which was wrecked by assassinations in 2011 and 2012 when the country was still in the early stages of the war launched against it. The death of Isbar stayed a mystery, until now. But his name resurfacing in this story has a clear message in itself.
The message
If we disregard the weak theory of the “stray missile”, we can see that Syria launched a direct hit with clear intention. And since the hit was one – by some sources 5 – missiles, it is clear that the aim was not major material damage. Much more a moral shock, a message. But what was Damascus’ point? In fact, we can see a number of messages in one package.
First of all the target, Dimona is very symbolic. It is the long-known Achilles’ heel of Tel Aviv for decades. The point if ever gets a direct hit the whole settlement state is over. However, Damascus knows full well that such a direct hit can only result in a nuclear response. However, by not hitting a random target in the vicinity, but a key missile factory there the message clearly meant Syria has very precise striking capabilities. Not only by missiles but in intelligence. The target could have been the nuclear reactor. And of course, the message was to show that the Israeli air defense systems are vulnerable. The legendary invincible Israel war machine is not that all-powerful.
It is also not a coincidence that suddenly the social media became full with ‘Azīz Ibras’ name, though previously not much was mentioned about him. It is logical to assume that some of the intel came from Syrian state sources. By this, the message is that the program led by Ibras was not stopped and the project he worked on yielded results.
However, we suppose an even more important message. Surely it came in the context of the now rapidly escalating semi-secret war between Tel Aviv and Tehran. Back in January, when Israelis conducted their biggest raid on Syria concentrating on its eastern part it was a curious event, especially that many of the targets were long abandoned storage facilities. Since that time the intensity of the Israeli airstrikes grew rapidly, became an almost weekly event. Even at that point, we suggested that Tel Aviv is desperately looking for something. Something on the way probably from Iran, possibly to Lebanon. Something they know about, but not finding it and therefore hitting every possible target randomly hoping for success.
We suppose that the biggest aim behind the latest Syrian response was to say that the parcel has arrived. That is not necessarily the missile itself, which hit Dimona. That was probably ready for quite some time, which the name of Isbar in the story suggests. Something either in very developed, or something in sufficient quantity, which makes Syria and its allies capable to be severely hit back to Tel Aviv and take the chance of open war. Something that brought balance. Whatever that is, we might just need to wait to learn. Just like it took almost three years to learn what was behind ‘Azīz Isbar’s death.
An escalating conflict
We should not underestimate the role of global developments behind what happened. The tension between the U.S. and its allies on the one hand and Russia and China on the other is growing.
In the meantime, Washington is constantly probing Iran to return to the JCPOA – the nuclear deal -, or signed a new version of it. The current Iranian government has had only a few months left in office, so it can hardly solve that matter, but President Rōḥānī and the camp behind him wish to avoid their failure in the next presidential elections and prevent the ascendence of the Revolutionary Guards taken over the government.
In a statement on 18 April Rōḥānī already expressed that the army should not provide the next president. So, right now Tehran is signaling readiness for talks. Not necessarily for a real breakthrough right now, but to give enough space for the less radical political circles to take over the state after Rōḥānī, in which case there can be a limited rapprochement and a new JCPOA. That is where now Tehran is heading with a reconciliation attempt with Saudi Arabia accepting Iraqi mediation. And this is what Tel Aviv tries to undermine now. The Israeli leadership tries to provoke Iran to a rush action, which can bitter the relations enough to prevent this new nuclear deal and a cooling process in the Gulf. That is not only for Tel Aviv’s perceived interests but also for Netanyahu’s own. Because not being able to form a stable government after four elections by now, and with possibly a fifth ahead he tries to create a warlike atmosphere, which so far helped him.
The latest round of escalation started with the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Fahrīzāde in November 2020. This was a joint American-Israeli operation – one of the last ones in the Trump era -, which meant a huge blow to Iran. This was continued to the attacks on Iranian cargo, mostly oil vessels. This led to a “war of ships”, in which Iran was hitting back already, and what even Israeli analysts considered an unwise and failing effort. And this was followed by the cyberattack on one of Iran’s most important nuclear facilities in Naṭanz. As the provocations both directly against Iran, both against its allies with airstrikes in Syria grew, it seemed inevitable to see a harsh response. So much so that by February even Russia warned, Syria will hit back sooner or later.
Beyond the direct approach against Iran, Tel Aviv has one particular aim with its a war on the Iranian ships, and that ties the matter to Syria. As much of the Syrian oilfields are under American occupation, there has been a fuel shortage and economic crisis in Syria. Since the Americans cannot be thrown out immediately, this shortage has to be compensated. Which Iran is ready to do, yet so far most of its cargo was attacked, or disturbed by Israel.
However, on 22 April three Iranian oil carriers – with other four on the way – arrived at the Syrian port of Bānyās under Russian navy cover. This cooperation was agreed upon in February between Moscow and Tehran. Since then this is the first shipment. So far Russia was willing to turn a blind eye to the Israeli aggression in Syria, as long these were focusing on Iranian interests. Because Moscow also found a nuisance in the Iranian presence there. Since February, however, the circles of interests have been agreed upon and new cooperation started. This was signaled by Moscow as a possible Syrian retaliation, and by the support for the Iranian oil transfer.
Just how important this is, and how vengeful Tel Aviv is now is shown that these Iranian ships have already suffered an Israeli drone attack killing three men and causing considerable damages.
Higher stakes in Syria.
It is not a coincidence at all that the escalation spirals out on right in Syria now. In roughly a month there shall be presidential elections, in which President Baššār al-Asad will likely win. Not only Syrian, but even Western analysts now admit that his victory will be the practical end of the Syrian conflict, after which the pending matters will start close one by one.
This seems to be a little matter, as Washington has already announced that it will not recognize the results, but the stakes are high. Because if Baššār al-Asad was prevented in any way to win, the conflict could be started again. And that is why this week saw a rapid growth of pressure on Damascus. There were reports of Dā‘iš pockets in the Syrian desert planning an attack in the east soon. This was suggested many times before seeing that the Americans are transporting Dā‘iš prisoners from Iraq and Eastern Syrian prisons to at-Tanaf to use them. These reports were proven to be somewhat correct. The American mercenary Qasad militia renewed its attacks on al-Qāmišlī and other Eastern Syrian areas. And also this week on 21 April the OPCW (Organization for the Proliferation of Chemical Weapons) in an unprecedented move revoked Syrian memberships rights following accusations of chemical weapons use in 2018. Which is a clear American pressure tool. As their press suggested, though the matter is symbolic, this can be the first step for the Syrian President’s international trial. And of course, came the newest Israeli airstrikes.
These threats were fairly well dealt with. On 20 April Russian and Syrian warplanes destroyed the Dā‘iš hideout in the Syrian desert killing 200 militants. The Qasad attempt was stopped and the Russians started mediation, which so far calmed – though not yet resolved – the situation. The Israeli aggression was answered after a very long time. And the economy is somewhat recovering now as well.
There seems to be a new balance forming. The message is that slowly uniting behind her Syria is can defend itself if needed very painfully. The matter is surely not over, and we will probably see more escalation until the elections. But now Damascus has much more promising indications than six months before.