By the beginning of this week what was hanging in the air for months happened. The forces of the Sana’a arrived at the gates of Ma’rib in northern Yemen, and with the fall of the last major Saudi stronghold in the neighboring became imminent. This eventuality was further underlined by the recent setbacks of the Saudi protégées around Ta‘azz causing even more progress for the al-Ḥūtī Movement and newer waves of barrages by the Yemeni troops against key Saudi facilities deep within the kingdom.
How deep is the desperation at Riyadh became obvious, when on 22 March Saudi Foreign Minister Fayṣal ibn Farḥān announced a comprehensive Saudi peace initiative. That suggested an immediate ceasefire under U.N. supervision, the partial reopening of Sana’a airport and the port of al-Ḥudayda – the main gates for Sana’a to the outside world – and general settlement process with all Yemeni sides involved. Including the al-Ḥūtīs. Clearly, Riyadh is ready to end its military engagement and withdraw, but still had a lot of conditions. The initiative was bluntly refused by Sana’a and was responded to as the biggest drone barrage ever against Saudi Arabia.
These developments come at a time when Washington’s relations with the Saudi kingdom are at an all-time low, while Riyadh’s main rival, Iran is gaining momentum in regional affairs. Recently Saudi Arabia tried to ease the pressure with a rapprochement with Turkey and Qatar, which though indeed entered as supporters on one hand and mediators on the other, so far brought little help.
The end of the Saudi war on Yemen, and with that all hopes for Saudi regional hegemony came to the end. That will surely rearrange much of the regional conditions, as Riyadh’s role falls back, while another power center in Sana’a enters the regional pattern. But is that the end of the war for Yemen? Or just a prelude to an even more desperate struggle for the war-stricken country?
The gates of Ma’rib
On 22 March it was reported that the troops of Sana’a finally arrived at the gates of Ma’rib city itself. That was hanging in the air for months now, as the troops loyal to Yemeni President Hādī have collapsed and the Saudi troops were steadily falling back. It was clear in the last few weeks that with more resolve the al-Ḥūtī forces could storm and might even take the city, and that was semi-officially admitted as well by Sana’a. Yet progress was intentionally slowed down. Officially to minimize casualties and to protect the civilian population, but more probably to force political reactions from Riyadh. Which eventually came on the very first day by a Saudi peace initiative. This is probably the last major attempt for some sort of settlement.
When Ma’rib falls the frontlines will become open once again with no immediate pressure for Riyadh, but also the Saudis would have nothing major to lose. Meaning that the war in a frozen stalemate could last for further years, depending on how much the Saudi economy can handle it.
While the battle for Ma’rib was coming to its end Riyadh urges its local allies Yemen to open a new front at Ta‘azz, which collapsed within days and the Sana’a managed to make progress here as well. There are also reports in the last two weeks that Riyadh asked for help from Turkey. Ankara was approached to provide sophisticated drones and deploy its Syrian trained mercenaries in Yemen, as they were used in Libya and Azerbaijan before. There are indications that this is in progress, but so far there are very few results.
Given the political and regional developments, it is very likely that now Ma’rib is a major bargaining chip and pressure point against Riyadh. If it falls that will be the final testament of the Saudi impotence to wage war in Yemen and all its influence on the political development will be lost. Yet this humiliation can be avoided if Riyadh is willing to make concessions both towards Sana’a and in the region in general.
The peace initiative.
The very first day the first clashes were reported in the immediate vicinity of Ma’rib city Saudi Foreign Minister Fayṣal ibn Farḥān announced a comprehensive peace initiative. According to this “offer”, an immediate ceasefire would come on all Yemeni fronts. The Saudi forces would stop all their military activities and allow U.N. supervision as guarantees. In addition to that Sana’a airport – also under U.N. supervision – could also receive planes once again with certain restrictions and the port of al-Ḥudayda would be open for limited activities.
That would mean that the government in Sana’a would gain partial international recognition, a formal gateway to international trade and movement, so its representative could attend international forums, and the areas under its control could receive foreign supplies once again. Most important food supplies and oil. Because energy is one of the most pressing points of the Saudi blockade on Yemen, and one of the key aspects of the battle for Ma’rib, as the area is relatively rich in crude oil. Sana’a could get some breath and economic supplies and the total political isolation would end.
In addition to these points, the Saudi initiative calls for an immediate and comprehensive peace negotiation process under international supervision, so a Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue could start resembling the recently successful Libyan format.
Sana’a refused the initiative almost immediately but signaled its readiness for something similar, but on a more unconditional basis. There are two key aspects why the Anṣār Allah Movement led leadership in Sana’a refused the initiative. First of all one step away from a major victory, they don’t want to compromise on the basis of international supervision. They want the total lift of the blockade as the first step for peace negotiations. Also, Sana’a signals that it is ready for talks with both Riyadh and its Yemeni rivals, but on two separate models. In short, it wants no Saudi role in the internal settlement, knowing all too well that in such a way negotiations can last forever, and the Saudis would still have a major influence in the process. Yet at this point finally hitting the kingdom hard they can only accept Saudi withdrawal, nothing less. Another major point is that Sana’a does not want to give space to international meddling in domestic affairs after practically winning the war. Not only fearing Saudi meddling, but also knowing that these struggles will start immediately after the war is over, and those will be very costly battles.
The Saudi initiative is the first practical admitting that Riyadh lost the war in Yemen. But unlike the Soviets and the Americans in Afghanistan after similarly lost long struggles they could not manage to leave facade puppet governments behind. Which they tried to achieve with the Riyadh agreement and the recent unity government, which never managed to materialize. Understanding this, the Saudis tried now to use the recent Libyan format for a comprehensive settlement with a new government. But that even that failed for two very specific reasons.
While in Libya the internal front was less active and it was more of a battleground for the regional powers, Yemen attracts little international interest. In Libya, the main outer powers involved in the conflict, Turkey, France, and Egypt came not only to a stalemate but also to the brink of war. The only way other than a direct war was the current settlement. But none of these forces clearly lost, especially not to any local formations. In Yemen, however, regardless the supposed Iranian support really came, or not Riyadh has to deal with a local element, which managed to defeat it.
The only way to achieve a similar settlement could have been to reach an understanding with Tehran convincing the al-Ḥūtīs for a ceasefire. But Saudi Arabia has no leverage on Iran, quite the opposite now.
The only benefit the initiative brought that at least on the international forums it can apply for help so international mediation can help to hammer out an organized pull-out and a humiliating defeat can be prevented. This also seems unlikely, as international attention is very limited. Nonetheless, before, or rightly after the fall of Ma’rib, the al-Ḥūtīs will likely accept some sort of U.N. settlement plan. Sana’a is in a dire economic and humanitarian state and cannot appear in a form of missing an opportunity to improve living conditions simply for revenge. But even more than that, it knows that time is not on its side.
The Saudis are beaten and they know that. They will be out of the picture soon. But after that, a new struggle will start within the winning coalition, and with the separatists at the south already setting up a new state. In light of these struggles, the Anṣār Allah cannot afford to lose time and resources to an already closing chapter, if there is a way to end it more efficiently.
But to speed up the process Sana’a is still using its tool most effective against Saudi Arabia, the devastating drone attacks. On 26 March the Yemenis launched their biggest bombardment ever and warned with even more severe attacks. By focusing on the oil installations the message at this point is less for Riyadh, but more to the international forums that it is time to force the Saudis to an unconditional settlement.
The deafening silence
While the battle for Ma’rib is coming to the end and al-Ḥūtīs launch waves of successful attacks on the Saudis there are curiously few reactions from both Washington and ‘Adan.
It is true that the Americans welcomed the Saudi peace initiative and called upon the al-Ḥūtīs to accept it, there is very little Washington is ready to do. There are no suggestions of military involvement, renewed support, or even reconsidering diplomatic pressure tools after the Anṣār Allah Movement was taken off the terrorist list. Washington is simply letting the Saudis lose.
It is hard to see exactly why this happens. It might be due to the desire by this administration to remove the current Saudi Crown Prince. It might not be open for a major costly engagement with clearly no way out after a similarly bitter experience in Afghanistan. It might not want to jeopardize renewed talks with Tehran before the Iranian elections in the summer. Or there might be other calculations.
Equally curious, but much more understandable why the Southern Transitional Council led by ‘Aydrūs az-Zubaydī lets the forces of Sana’a retake Ma’rib. Even on the fronts around Ta‘azz, these southern separatists gave very little support, though roughly a year ago they fought fierce clashes with the forces of Hādī for the area.
The reason is that the leadership in ‘Adan is working on reestablishing the South Yemeni state. It already has firm Emirati support behind it. Also by not objecting to the joint Israeli-Emirati bases on Socotra and recently on Mayūn, there can be possible Israeli support for it. In February in an interview with RT az-Zubaydī admitted that the Southern Yemeni state is ready to recognize Israel and establish formal relations with it, only putting the matter somewhat early at this stage. Which can be understood as a plea for Israeli support. At this stage, the main problem for ‘Adan is not the al-Ḥūtī progress in the north, nor the drone attack. Which curiosity doesn’t attack southern targets anymore, not even military ones. The main obstacle is to take over the final remains of Hādī’s government and end the Saudi meddling. And for that aim the event in Ma’rib is useful.
Is it the end, or just the beginning?
The Saudi peace initiative clearly proves that the Saudi war on Yemen came to the end. With that soon not only its military plans will end and the government it tried so hard to establish fall, but also all attempts since 2011 to transform Yemen into a satellite state will collapse. With this, we could say that Sana’a with or without Iran behind it won. But that is far from being just that simple.
As soon as the peace agreement with Saudi Arabia will be signed, even before the last Saudi soldiers left Yemen, two new major struggles will erupt. One inside Sana’a, and one with the south.
Though most Western and Saudi influenced sources simplistically put the government in Sana’a simply as the “al-Ḥūtīs”, the office called “Government of National Salvation” is a broad network of smaller forces. Within this, the al-Ḥūtī led Anṣār Allah Movement is just one section. So far these somewhat different factions – many formerly loyal to late President aṣ-Ṣāliḥ – were held together by the war effort and to repel the Saudis. This achieved, however, the old wounds will appear once again, and it is not that certain that the Anṣār Allah Movement will be able to hold them together.
And here comes the other dilemma. What to do with the emerging South Yemeni state? So far Sana’a was always talking in the name of the whole of Yemen and claimed to fight for total unity and liberation. By its very concept, this should include the Emirates and the newly established Israeli presence on some islands. This would mean war, just like this happened so many times before in Yemen after all major realignment. But the war with the southern separatists will be a very different and even more demanding war, as there are many in the south, who support an independent state. Also, the al-Ḥūtīs have relatively little support in the south.
After such a devastating war and in the current catastrophic situation there will be many in the north as well, who don’t want to continue the war in the south. But that would be the interest of the Anṣār Allah. And here we can expect new cracks opening between the hardliners and the “northerners”.
Either way, while the Saudi presence in Yemen might close to its last days, the war itself is far from stopping. Its transition, much more than its end is about to come. Because of the contradictions between northern and southern Yemen, there has never been a solution. Only occasional “strongmen”, who managed to pull the state together by force and blood. But there is no such person in sight either.