On 29 January 2023, the second round of the Tunisian legislative elections was held. This was to conclude the first round held in mid-December 2022, meaning to fill all the still vacant seats in the new parliament in every district where in the first round there was no conclusive result. Which in fact was the majority of the case. Out of the 154 parliamentary positions only 23 were filled in December.
This would suggest a very fierce competition, where stakes are high and a much-anticipated result still hangs in the balance. However, quite the opposite seems to be true. Turnout was low, while general apathy and party boycotts were so strong that it was very difficult to announce any results, putting the whole process to question. With participation in the first round of 11.2% in December and 11.4% in the second, the message can be read as the people said “No” to the whole election system.
This parliamentary election process was planned to be the one before the last in President Qays Sa‘īd’s admirable quest to reshape the political landscape of the country and to create – or recreate – a new system. This process started in July 2021, when the President took over all executive and legislative powers, and in his crusade to end the years-long political deadlock dismissed the government, dissolved the parliament, and drafted a new constitution. This so far, though not without controversies proved to be working, while the country was in a massive economic crisis.
The last two steps of the transition were planned to be the current parliamentary elections, and a presidential one in late 2023. But with such low participation in the constitutional referendum and now with the parliamentary election, it is highly doubtful whether the new legislative body can even be formed and a new government can be put together.
While the political system started to form in 2011 and took shape in the 2014 constitution was highly unpopular and unsuccessful, the counter-revolution of President Qays Sa‘īd seems to be equally flawed. Yet with all its problems, Tunisia is receiving remarkably little attention and criticism. Despite being a most symbolic piece in the Middle Eastern chessboard.
A long and ordeal process
While there is a controversy, as we shall see, about President Sa‘īd’s reform process, it should be understood that this is also a symptom of how the results of the 2011 revolution decayed. After the overwhelming victory of the pro-Islamic movements in 2011, especially the an-Nahḍa Movement, the new constitution was only adopted in 2014. Which transformed Tunisia into a parliamentary democracy, where the parliament became the supreme ruling body of the state. However, adopting the constitution was the last achievement of the an-Nahḍa, and the government soon fell apart.
The elections of 2014 brought together the sides against the an-Nahḍa – still coming out second -, but that was the only thing that kept the former opposition together. Most parties winning in 2014 either fell apart or lost most of their voters giving way to new alternatives. Thus in 2019 the an-Nahḍa still losing seats in the National Assembly – compared to 2014 – came out first. Yet even its Islamist allies could not gain a majority. As result, the parliament which was the main political and ruling institution became deeply divided along political lines, and not only between two camps, but between a huge number of ever-quarreling parties.
This very stalemate brought Qays Sa‘īd to power with a landslide victory in the 2019 presidential election, for he was non-partisan. A person clean from the shortcomings of the whole period after 2011. But because of the parliament’s powers, he could do little, and because the parliament’s division governments kept falling apart.
That ordeal is what Qays Sa‘īd put an end to in July 2021, when he dismissed the parliament and practically took over the state. He dismantled most of the institutions with political power in 2011 and laid out a reform program. Which had its appeal for ending political struggles while the country was sinking into economic collapse, but brought huge criticism for moving towards authoritarianism. The question was how far the people are willing to support him. At the beginning that support and the disconnect with the post-revolutionary system seemed to be convincing. After the recent elections, however, this is not the case anymore.
The return of a military dictatorship?
In many similar cases in the Middle East, the general model is that in fact the state is run by the army and the security organization, of which the president is either a former member of or in strong cooperation. Major state companies and welfare structures are tightly linked to these institutions either through personal, or even structural links, practically running the state behind the legislative and executive branches. That ruling system is generally represented by a bloated “state party” under various names to which the president is usually the chairman or a leading member. We see this model in various Arab states in its most pristine form in Egypt and even the monarchies are run in a very similar fashion.
Tunisia was of the same model until 2011, where despite the relatively large number of parliamentary accepted parties and the low number of forbidden ones, the Democratic Constitutional Rally was the practical state party. Its president was also president of the state Zayn al-‘Ābidīn ibn ‘Alī winning five consecutive elections between 1989 and 2009. At certain times with 100%. The party was also winning the legislative elections with steadily above 80% of the seats in a constantly growing parliament. So despite the elective facade, the state was practically run by one multilayered organization based around the army and the security apparatus.
That system for reasons still mostly unclear failed to keep up Ibn ‘Alī’s rule, or revoked trust in him, causing the meltdown of the former ruling form. But while the former state ruling party, the Democratic Constitutional Rally fell apart to several smaller parties, there were actually very few changes in the upper echelons of the armed and security services. That deep state is the key pillar behind President Sa‘īd now, despite himself not coming from the army, nor was he a devoted party official. That is largely due to the trend that the new order after 2011 systematically kept dismantling the old ways. It first greatly reduced the prerogatives of the president and then kept reducing the influence of the deep state by slowly replacing key members. However, the deep party divisions completely paralyzed the state by 2019.
So does that mean the return of the old ways, the rebuilding of the lightly concealed military rule? In most cases similar to Tunisia now assessments usually do not shy from stating this. Yet, there are noticeable differences. President Sa‘īd is very obviously not pushing for the same one-party system as before. Noticeably he did not even find one for himself. His reforms practically eliminated the overwhelming influence of the parties, as by the new constitution parliamentary positions are only filled by local representatives. Party lists came to play no role in the process, though they were allowed to work freely.
Also by the new constitution, the president of the state has practically absolute powers in forming the government and handling state affairs, while the parliament is relegated to a conciliatory body. That indicates a pattern of an even more direct one-person rule even compared to before 2011, where only by-elections the president would the people have a direct saying in state affairs. Thus giving parties, the traditionally strong unions, and civil society organizations a much smaller role in state affairs. This indicates a pattern of largely returning to the old ways. Though Qays Sa‘īd himself is not specifically an army-type leader, nor seems to be a figurehead of the deep state, under the current conditions it is not hard to imagine that the deep state would replace himself in the next 2-5 years with a fresh face. Who could rule the state once again single-handedly?
While the current president may or may not be a genuine champion of the people waging a crusade against rampant corruption and party-camp divisions the problem is that he opened up a way for the return of the old system. In theory, the image of a single resolute rescuer of the state could have been promoted. If he had major popular support. As long as he was fighting against the party system, the result of the changes in 2011 could be argued for. The low participation in the constitutional referendum put that into question. But the real test was the new election. Because a high turnout would have meant support for the changes. Trust in the current political track.
The parliamentary elections
The new constitution of Tunisia was adopted by a popular referendum on 25 July 2022 with mixed expectations. Though 94,6% of the votes supported the new constitution, participation reached only 30,5%. Which was low, but not shockingly low in a state of more than a decade of permanent political crisis.
This was a turning point in Qays Sa‘īd’s reform process, as for the first time the people could express made their opinion heard. And though practically all political parties boycotted the referendum and mostly unions also distanced themselves from it, the result showed that the parties are far from having an absolute grip on society. There is a clearly visible portion of the people who joined the voting, in essence saying “no” to the party boycotts or supporting the change.
The real question was of the new system could function. And the real test was the new parliamentary elections. Under the new constitution, there are no party lists anymore, all MPs are elected locally. If in the first round, no candidate wins the clear majority a second round is held, in which the candidate with the most votes wins.
The first round was held on 16-17 December 2022, and according to the Tunisian Supreme Electoral Institution, the participation was 11,2%. Out of the 154 seats in the new parliament, only 23 became filled in the first round. Thus the second round, which in theory should only be an additional measure became the practical main step. Yet even the second round held on 29 January brought only 11,4% participation.
With this, almost 90% of the people distanced themselves from the process, and that opens the path for several interpretations. It could be said that the people rejected the new process, and thus the reforms of the president. The low turnout in the referendum also points in this direction, though it is interesting to see that less than half of the people who voted for the new constitution actually went to vote for the legislation. On the other hand, it could equally be argued that there is a general apathy towards politics in general and that does not necessarily support the claim of the parties that people refused the reforms. Because there were no general protests against the elections either. The parties equally could not mobilize the people.
Whatever that case is, this is the first real and undeniable setback in Qays Sa‘īd’s quest. His support is decreasing and there is no overwhelming enthusiasm for what he is offering. Which puts very serious doubts on what would come in the presidential elections. On the one hand, he is not necessarily going to win, as criticism and discontent are growing. Yet on the other hand with almost absolute power given to the president, there are serious questions about who would take Sa‘īd’s place and what would that bring. Because a new president without a clear agenda and vision for solving the economic problems, a field Sa‘īd has hardly touched so far, turmoil would just start once again.
Can Sa‘īd go forward?
It is very questionable after such a low turnout, which is practically a general rejection by the people of the whole process and the new order to come, whether the new parliament and based on it the new government can even be put together. While the new prerogatives of the president give him the power to forcefully make that happen and the new parliament is largely relegated to an advisory role, with such low popular support it will be a very fragile system. This foreshadows that in the next presidential elections, either most votes will be cast against the current president and all his steps will be reversed, or even with his victory civil unrest breaks out.
Strangely, however, Tunisia is not receiving much attention, nor remarkably harsh criticism for the whole process. Here we should remember that other elections in the region, like those of Türkiye, Egypt, Syria, or Lebanon with far higher participation received massive criticism, or were considered outright scams. So why is it that now much of the West seems to accept the current status?
Not even that, but in the middle of the political struggle and economic crisis even bigger than that of 2010 toppling the system of President Ibn ‘Alī, the IMF keeps granting trust to Tunis. After a long negotiation process hammered out a macroeconomic plan to put Tunisia back on its feet and in October 2022 despite the political controversies the IMF agreed to provide an additional $1.9 billion loan for 48 months. Which is insufficient to solve the core problems of the state, but gives enough room for the government to move forward with its economic restructuring. This, along with other loans from neighboring Algeria and some other states gives just enough support for the country to move ahead and not collapse. What is significant here is that not only some traditional hard allies of Tunis are giving a helping hand, but even the West is generally turning a blind eye to a situation that in most other countries would have redeemed a dictatorial takeover.
That is largely due to two key factors. Economy and stability. With the war in Ukraine and the sanctions against Russia practically ending the energy supplies from Russia in Europe the EU had to turn to the precious little alternatives that are available. One well-known partial solution is the increased import of American liquified natural gas (LNG), which is not only extremely expensive and needs massive infrastructural investments, but also insufficient in quantities to solve the problem altogether.
The other alternative is the Gulf, from where massive quantities of both oil and gas can be acquired. However, most of these states are not keen on rushing to Europe’s aid lacking the economic incentives as most EU states are unwilling to make similar contracts which are common in the Asian markets, and also lacking the political incentives to have good relations with Moscow for the moment. The example of Qatar is specifically interesting here. Another promising project is to extend the oil and gas pipelines from Greece to Cyprus, Israel, and eventually Egypt to make use of the newly explored reserves under the Mediterranean. Also, the long-planned projects to bring gas from Nigeria – and other Central African countries – through the Sahara to Europe have also been accelerated. But all of these plans can only provide a long-term solution and much more immediate answers are required.
In this regard, the role of Algeria cannot be downplayed. A state with huge gas reserves and already available pipelines to Spain and Italy, but also with a growing antagonism with its Moroccan neighbor. This indicates that Algerian supplies will turn ever more towards Italy via Tunisia, thus its stability is of far bigger importance than its political structure.
Stability is also important in the sense that Tunisian sliding back to political turmoil would have a severe impact on regional stability. Most immediately in Libya. Another key source of oil and to Europe now, since on 28 January an agreement was signed with Italy investing $8 billion in the African country to import 750 cubic feet of natural gas per day from 2026. And Italy is also encouraging others to invest in Libya, despite its huge internal division. Currently Tunisian serves as a crucial barrier to the influx of migrants from the Middle East and Africa, which collapsing would reopen still unsolved problems in Europe.
Therefore the current Tunisian leadership enjoys much trust now in the West to keep the situation under control, while much bigger questions are at hand. However, this also means that President Sa‘īd losing grip on the state would mean an even faster meltdown than what happened in 2011. The President’s problem is not his troubled relationship with the political parties – and not having his own -, as much of his quest was practically a crusade to eliminate party-camp politics. His problem is the equally hard relationship between civil society and the unions. Especially the Tunisian General Work Union, which so far went along with the presidential reforms, but demands increased payments in the public sector and organized strikes to give weight to its demands. However, such demands are hard to meet in the middle of a political and economic crisis, when the IMF deals and the support of very few others state to keep the state running and the IMF is pushing for deep structural changes.
Until now all criticism could have been brushed aside saying blaming the political parties for defending their interests and claiming that all is done for the people and by the people. The problem is that with the last parliamentary elections, the very thing that was missing is the participation of the people. Which is a very troubling indication for the upcoming presidential election scheduled for this year.