On late night 22 February Russian President Vladimir Putin recognized the two separatist entities, the People’s Republics of Donbas and Luhansk as independent states. The same night Russian “peacekeeping” forces already crossed the Russian-Ukrainian border and moved into these two entities to secure them from any possible Ukrainian military actions. Yet this action was soon expanded to a military action against Ukraine with the aim to cripple its military and to “disarm it”.
This brought the world, but most definitely Europe so close to an all-out war that was not seen since 1945. By Russia moving massive military forces into these two separatist entities that means that the de fact control over these mostly Russian inhabited areas is a fact. And the Russian move to “disarm” Ukraine, means that Moscow now neutralized a possible threat on its doorsteps. Which can only be reversed by military force. Thus the ball is at the American-European court, the question is how they will react.
This unilateral step by Moscow comes after long weeks of escalation directly between the U.S. and Russia, in which the EU was heavily involved. This de facto military confrontation has already led to an extensive economic war between the West and Russia, but might be a prelude to a much bigger, much more global war.
This is a serious matter, which should be of global concern. Here, at the Amaraia Center this matter is way beyond our sphere of interests, and we don’t aim to deeply evaluate it. However, it would be a mistake to consider the conflict about the Ukraine an isolated matter. It is not only deeply connected to the Middle East and Russia’s involvement in the region now, but it has been so since 2014.
A number of recent steps by Moscow in the Middle East indicate that the Russian leadership as well consider the question of Ukraine and the contradictions with the West in the Middle East connected. And that is the focus of our attention this week.
An eye for an eye: when Ukraine and Syria became the same matter
It is by now well studied that before 1990 the Soviet Union had intensive relations in the Middle East and a number of states were within the informal Soviet sphere of influence. Though some, like Egypt, “changed sides” in time, many others, like Syria, Algeria or Libya stayed really close to Moscow, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even in times, when the realistic value of this partnership became really questionable.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union there was an informal understanding that world known thus far shall be rearranged. Russia practically gave up most of its interests in the Middle East – not having the power to hold on to them – and evacuated all its military bases in the region, or reduced them to truly symbolic size. However, in Europe it was also somewhat understood that while Russia accepts its positions largely lost, or reduced to certain economic interest around the world, the newly independent former Soviet republics still stay within Russian influence. This not only included Belarus, or the Central Asian states, but also Caucasian and Baltic states and Ukraine as well. Eventually states like Estonia, Lithuania or Latvia, which were not only allied states, but part of the Soviet Union joined the NATO, which was a breach of this understanding, but given the circumstances Moscow had to accept it.
The fundamental change in Ukraine in 2014, however, marked a turning point in this trend. Not only because Ukraine has a very different meaning in the Russian psyche, or that it has a massive Russian speaking diaspora, but also because Ukraine joining the NATO would seriously limit Russia’s power projecting capabilities. That is why – regardless of all its legal connotations – Russia had not choice, but to incorporate Crimea to its own territories. It was also a turning point, as the capabilities of Russia in 2014 both economically and militarily were incomparable to the Russia of 1991. It was not a weak and receding Russia anymore paralyzed by internal turmoils and a weak leadership, but a strong and internally restructured and stabilized country, which once again started to appear in the global scene.
And here a very vivid comparison can be drawn. After 1991, when Yugoslavia was falling apart Moscow had a hard time to accept the changing equation and even suggested at one point to send military forces to Serbia in a peacekeeping mission. Which was to serve as a shield, not to let Serbia totally disintegrate and fall far from the Russian orbit, as it was a particularly sensitive area for Russia. Yet eventually Moscow proved to be incapable to force it will and had to accept subsequent Western military missions in the former Yugoslavian territories. It did deploy peacekeepers and managed to counter certain NATO moves, at the end could not prevent the disintegration of Serbia.
In 2014, however, when another key Russian partner, Syria was in danger to fall and be restructured by Western demands, once again Russia found itself at the crossroads to accept being squeezed out from this region, or to take action. And somewhat surprisingly at the time, Russian did not only directly intervened in Syria and helped to the Syrian state to repel the foreign attempts for a “regime change”, but its involvement proved to be long lasting until this day, and only gets deeper.
Russia was deeply involved in the support for the Syrian government since 2011, but was steadily walking in a path of direct support from the beginning. The question that sooner or later Russia has to protect its interests and its ally in Syria directly was in the air since early 2013, but in early 2014 fundamental changes erupted in Ukraine shifting this state from the Russian orbit towards the West. As mentioned before, it directly jeopardized vital Russian strategic interests. Moscow had to give priority to this matter, well before any other considerations around the world. Which possibly prolonged any other strategic missions around the world. Yet once Crimea was annexed in March 2014 and the war in Eastern Ukraine came to a fragile ceasefire by February 2015 Russia felt the situation stabile enough to commit itself to a military action in Syria.
It was viewed even at that time in the Middle East that the two fields of confrontation between the West and Russia are connected. True, whenever the fighting got intensified in Syria the conflict in Ukraine subsided, and the same was true to the other way around. Gradually it became clear that all details in Ukraine and Syria are at the same negotiating table between the West and Russia, where neither side is clearly winning, but both firmly secured their positions.
In Syria the joined Russian-Syrian actions liberated the majority of the country and foiled all attempts to depose the Syrian government, but the U.S. built a number of illegal military bases in Eastern Syria and at at-Tanaf from where it extracts oil and still launches military operations to other parts of Syria. The informal front lines uneasy as they are, became solidified and neither sides try to engage the other. Ukraine shows the direct opposite, where the government became a stabile ally of the West with negotiations well on the way for Ukraine’s incorporation into NATO and even to the EU. Regardless the resistance by certain EU and NATO members states to incorporate Ukraine, the matter is not off the table and Kiev receives massive military and political support from the West. However, Russia firmly controls Crimea, and has strong allies on the ground in Donbas and Luhansk, where the local entities would be unsustainable without firm Russian support.
So it seems that no solution can come to any of these two matters, without solving the other. Even though the two problems are of very different considerations. While the U.S. is keen to reduce its presence in the Middle East and leave positions to its allies, its economic interests in Europe are growing. On the other hand Russia has huge economic interests in Europe, in its energy partnership with Germany most of all, its presence in the Middle East is only growing.
And it is still connected
The world saw that after years of relative calm in the Ukrainian front since late 2021 the problem was escalating. At the same time disappointment in Syria with Russia’s role there and the protection it provides started to seriously grow. Especially after the Israeli airstrike on Syria’s most important port Latakia on 28 December 2021. Since then, however, something changed. Israeli reports complained in late January that Russian air defense installations jam Israeli commercial planes’ systems flying in from the West. No such complain was ever raised before, and it is most probably connected to Russian measures limiting the Israeli striking capabilities here.
The Israeli aggression carried on 9 February also showed a changing pattern. The attack, unlike almost all former ones, was only partially carried out from the air, and the first volleys were launched by surface-to-surface missiles. The missiles that were launched from the air were ignited from above Beirut, which is beyond the Russian-Syrian air defense’s responsibility, yet it was suddenly halted after the Syrian air defense launched missiles anyways against the Israeli bombers. And some of these missiles arrived at Israeli held territories. Either Syrian air defense missiles went astray, or it was an intentional warning message by Damascus, it has been some time Israel experienced any consequence for its aggressive behavior. What’s more, recently Ḥizb Allah in Lebanon in a series of statements announced that it has the capability to produce precision missiles and drones, and it already has such weapons in large quantities. To give weight to these threats on only days later, on 18 February the organization launched a reconnaissance drone to Northern Palestine and the Israeli army had to admit that it had no success shooting it down. With all likelihood the drone returned safely to Lebanon. We have recently dealt with the details about this incident. Given the strong cooperation between Ḥizb Allah and the Syrian government, the two cases are hardly inseparable.
It is really telling that the Israeli aggression on 23 February against Damascus and its surroundings though caused the death of 3 Syrian soldiers, were only carried out by traditional surface-to-surface missiles from a relatively short range. Areal strike was not even attempted. So no matter how much Tel Aviv tries to hold on to its capability to initiate, it seems to loose the momentum.
That does not necessarily mean Russian involvement. After all the relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv with all their complications are good. Even the airstrikes, at least until Latakia caused no sparks between the two sides. However, as we saw, Israeli complains started to arise after this incident showing dissatisfaction. On 20 February Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid announced that “in case a war broke out between Ukraine and Russia, Israel will stand by Washington”. Previously Israeli circles said that such a war “will have huge strategic consequences for Israel as well”. Given the sizable Jewish diaspora there it is somewhat understandable that Tel Aviv is concern about Ukraine, but it is hard to misinterpret these messages. Tel Aviv is dissatisfied with the Russian steps in Syria and its position of the Iranian nuclear negotiations. It could have chosen a more neutral position, but it is understood that a major war will have its fronts in the Middle East as well.
Also, Russia recently started to warn about American actions in Eastern Syria, claiming that Washington and London release hundreds of Dā‘iš terrorists, only to carry out terrorist acts in areas under Syrian control. And one such attack did indeed happen on 15 February in Damascus attacking a Syrian military carrier, killing one soldier and wounding 11 others.
In this aspect it is important to note that recently Russia slowly, but steadily increased its military presence in Syria, including in the areas right next to the American presence.
Either connected to these developments, the escalation in Ukraine, or by other considerations also on 15 February Russia deployed MIG-31K fighters with hypersonic missiles and long range TU-22M strategic bombers to Syria. Officially that move was reasoned as these planes take part in a major military drill conducted in the Mediterranean, but with no doubt they are to stay. At least for the time being. The mentioned drill was itself a very strong message. Not only became some 140 vessels took part in it with the participation of at least 10 thousand Russian soldiers, but also because at the same time a similar drill was carried out in the Black Sea.
Given the circumstances naturally we could assume that the drill in the Black Sea right next to Ukraine was more important. After all that is the theater where was about to erupt at any seconds. Yet on 16 February Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoygu arrived in Damascus to hold consultations with Syrian President Baššār al-Asad. A very odd decision, given that at that time most Western diplomatic circles talked about an imminent full scale Russian invasion against Ukraine at any second. Since those predictions were correct, it is hard to explain why at this very moment the Russian Defense Minister would go to Syria, a relatively secondary concern by this time. Or is it?
Noticeable that Shoygu did not hold extensive negotiations with the Syrian Army Command or leading Syrian generals, but with the Syrian President only. Indicating a political reason for the visit. Only days before the Russian recognition for Donbas and Luhansk, and the Russian offensive in Ukraine.
Again, it is hardly a coincidence that only a day later, on 17 February Syrian Foreign Minister al-Miqdād arrived in Moscow to hold extensive negotiations and show support for Russian in the Ukrainian crisis. And al-Miqdād stayed for several days up until the Russian move in Ukraine, while during his visit Moscow not only talked about finally boosting the Syrian economy, but also how to “counter Western coercive measures”. Once again very peculiar messages in the middle of the Ukrainian crisis, only one day before the Russian recognition for the two separatist entities, and the consequent offensive.
The Russian recognition itself already drew the attention of Syria. On 21 February al-Miqdād announced that Syria is ready to support the Russian recognition for Donbas and Luhansk. A day later, on 22 February the Syrian Presidency not only acknowledged the Russian recognition, but also that Damascus is ready to build relations with the two “states”. Given Syria’ position at this point it might mean little. But it does indicate two things. First, at least in the Middle Eastern mindset a war means war in the Middle East as well, with all its consequences. Second, the matters of Ukraine and Syria are connected, and not only because of Russia.
The French connection: Mali
Syria, however, is not the only place in the Middle East, where recently the West and Russia clashed. A very similar thing happened in Mali as well, though far less conflicts have arisen from its so far.
On 17 February – the timing is interesting once again – France announced that Paris and its allies fully withdraw from Mali, yet only to continue its anti-terrorist activities from the neighboring Niger. France is involved in the military operations in Mali since 2013 and recently planned to expand its mission involving other allied states. The reason for the withdrawal was not hidden at all, it was reasoned by the actions of the Malian military regime and the presence of the Wagner Company, as Russian semi-state military contractor, similar to the American Blackwater. Thus suggesting that in a limited operation, considering Moscow still hasn’t committed its official military capabilities here, swept aside France with all its interests and moved in to take its place.
This comes after a similar clash in Libya in recent years, where among many other sides the Russian Wagner was involved and that caused tension between Moscow and Paris. The matter still causes tension today. No wonder that it was France, aside from the Czech Republic, which rushed to send arms to Ukraine amid the current war conditions.
Yet Mali is of very little consequence for Russia. The matter is important in a very different angle and that is Russia’s growing partnership with Algeria. A state, which recently also heavily clashed with France and its most trusted North African partner, Morocco. A Russian military operations, even such a covert and limited one, could not be sustained in such substance without a secure support corridor. That is what Algiers provided in XXX 2021, giving a green light to the mission. Considering Algeria was already concern about the intensive French military operations along its southern borders, and the broad coalition it forged in the region, the move is understandable.
Russia is Algeria’s biggest military partner. For years the Algerian navy is being boosted by number of new vessels, which are bought from France, Italy and even Turkey as well, but the biggest provider is by far Russia. Algeria even in 2020 applied to buy 14 new SU-57 fifth generation Russian planes and asked Russia to supply with other modern warplanes. SU-57 bombers are not commonplace even in the Russian Army. The deal was cut, and though so far no delivery was made, it shows the trend Algeria once again moving closer towards Russia. In April 2021 it was heavily advertised that Russia is willing to set up a new naval base in Algeria right along the Moroccan border, which Algerian sources reasoned as a counter step to the American activities in the Sahara.
The world is changing
Once again, this is just one small indication that Russia by now is not restricted in its intentions to Syria, or certain economic positions in Egypt and the Gulf. There are a number of other matters, which all show that Russia is far more integrated into the Middle Eastern board than it was some twenty years ago. The recent Russian action in Ukraine suddenly revealed that Russia is far less isolated than it was thought. The world is changing.
Right at the very day the Russian offensive started Pakistani Prime Minister ‘Imrān Hān visited Moscow. Thought he denied that the trip would be connected to the crisis in Ukraine, it is noticeable that the Islamabad did not cancel the two days visit either in light of the Russian offensive. And it was not highly advertised, but Islamabad indicated that it is ready for extensive energy cooperation with Russia even now. Meaning Pakistan is ready to buy Russian energy supplies, even if Europe was gearing up for a total boycott. And Pakistan is a country which is not only historically on wrong terms with Russia, but even used to counted as a key American ally. At least until few years ago.
Also interesting that on 22 February, the very day the Russian offensive started, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev arrived in Moscow to sing a Declaration on “Allied Interaction between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation”. Azerbaijan is not only a key ally to Turkey, which has very complicated relations with Russia and even showed extensive support for Ukraine, but recently fought a destructive war with Armenia. And Armenia is the key Russian ally in the Caucasus. Once again, mostly for economic reasons, Russia plays a pivotal role in the region. More than its rivals.
Though it is hardly a surprise, Iran also expressed support for Moscow’s decisions in Ukraine, though in a traditionally diplomatic fashion. Much more noticeable is the latest UN. Security Council session on Ukraine. On 26 February a joint American-Albanian initiated U.N. Security Council resolution was proposed condemning the Russian offensive in Ukraine. Russia, of course, vetoed. But along with China and noticeably India the United Arab Emirates also abstained. A very curios move by another key American ally, which lately tried to tighten the military cooperation with Washington in result of the recent Yemeni airstrikes. The world is changing.
Indeed, what is happening in Ukraine today in unprecedented for at least 30 years. Not only Russia, but also China, Iran and number of significant states indicated that the matter in not a unilateral and unreasonable Russian aggression. A long series of Western-NATO provocations led to this. The series of “colored revolutions” from Georgia to the “Arab Spring”, the regime change in Ukraine finally succeeding in 2013 and last in Kazakhstan. The very idea that Ukraine would ask for nuclear arms to return to be once again a nuclear power was the last straw, and Russia moved in to change the course of events.
With this a new world is about to born. Since 1990, when American became the sole supreme power in the world, no non-NATO state ever took military action to counter an American-NATO move the change the world equation. And with success, we can say, as despite all the declarations and sanctions, no direct military help is going to go to Ukraine. As President Zelensky said “Ukraine is left alone”.
Meaning that the day came, when America and its Western – or given the situation its regional – allies cannot do as they please, change governments as they please, rearrange regions as they please. Actions was taken to counter that. And that they had to come. However, if a new multipolar world is about to born today, the process did not start at all here. The trend started with Syria, where a Western regime change operation by the Yugoslavian recipe was fended off. Though it had no repercussions for the West, as America in the form of massive arms deal happily advertised by Trump eventually made its Gulf allies to pay the bill. The next turning point was the Iranian retaliation to the American assassination of its top General Qāsem Soleymānī. On 8 January 2020 Iran launched airstrikes against the American ‘Ayn al-Asad Base in Iraq. Unprecedented since 1990 that a state officially launched an attack against an American base and got away with it. And finally Kazakhstan, the last chapter of the “colored revolutions” was not only spotted in time, but with joint and immediate military action it was immediately foiled and turned around. And the West had nothing to do against it. That long process came to its sad end in Ukraine. This is not a passive reaction anymore, but an active counter measure. The road started in Syria finally came to a full circle.
A bigger war means war in all fronts
Despite how it is generally perceived in the West, if a full blown total war breaks out from the Ukrainian conflict that will inevitably lead to war in the Middle East as well. Turkey took a firm position against Russia now. But taking any step further will mean retaliation against the Turkish troops in Syria. Idlib will be liberated in short time. And since no other state, even American did not approve the Turkish military presence in Syria, if that happens no NATO help can be called.
But much more, if a total war starts that means confrontation in Syria as well between the Russians and the Americans. In such scenario a war will erupt between Syrian, Ḥizb Allah and Iran on one side, and Israel on the other. It is a sobering, though thus far only symbolic message that for the Israeli complaints about Ukraine Russia responded that it does not recognize the Israeli presence in the Syrian Golan Heights, which it views as part of Syria.
So it might seem that the current conflict is only about Ukraine, it is much more than that. It is about a new paradigm to be born. In this the Middle East is a key matter. But also opens the door for a number of questions, which were for long dominated by the West, but might be soon challenged, like Taiwan.