After 49 days of relentless destruction, the war in Gaza came to a temporal halt. The longest war between Tel Aviv and Gaza since 2014 left behind roughly 20 thousand deaths – the overwhelming majority being women and children in Gaza -, the shocking devastation of the Gaza Strip, the military occupation of a significant portion of the strip’s northern section, horrifying human rights violations including the conscious and targeted shelling of schools and hospitals and plans for even more menacing crimes than threats with the total depopulation of the area. In other words, after killing a shocking number of civilians and intentionally depriving the zone of every possible means of normal life the fighting came to a temporal four-day pose, but with plans to depopulate the area.
It could be asked how the international community allowed this all to unfold, but that is not only related to the broader question of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but could be equally raised about similarly shocking examples around the world, or even just the Middle East.
The more poignant question is: what has been achieved? The nature of politics is such that now both sides, and even the mediators who brought this fragile ceasefire together claim themselves the victors. On the one hand, Ḥamās and the other Palestinian armed resistance organizations claim that they won, as not only, in the beginning, they managed to surprise their enemy and cause painful losses, but in Gaza stroke, severe losses to the Israeli war machine and kept its capacity to launch precision missiles until the last hour. And eventually forced the enemy to stop. On the other hand, Netanyahu’s government can claim that it successfully hit back, took revenge, managed to go into Gaza, and forced Ḥamās to start releasing its Israeli prisoners. Also, mediators, like Qatar, Egypt, or Türkiye can celebrate that their hard efforts finally brought peace, if only temporarily.
So, it would seem that despite the total devastation of habitat for around 2 million people and the death of 20 thousand people everybody won. There is nothing new about this, looking back to the aftermath of the same war in 2014, the statements of all sides could be copy-pasted to today.
The sad nature of war for long, however, is that behind the slogans it is always business. Business in its most direct financial sense, but just much the business of politics. Politicians and agendas advance their goals and their long-term winning strategies on local and regional boards. Thus, when asking who won, we have to face the reality that civilians on both sides, especially the Palestinians suffered immensely, some agendas won, while others lost. And to understand how and why this month-and-a-half war played out, we have to see these strategies and the role Ḥamās most especially played in it.
The lack of solidarity
That is long understood that the whole question of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is viewed completely differently in the various parts of the world. The West in broad generalization has a bias towards Tel Aviv in a sense of indebtedness to the Jewish people for the atrocities of the 1940’s. The regions from South America to South Asia where the West, especially America is viewed critically are looking to the conflict as humanitarian injustice, yet another example of Western injustices, like the ones they suffered. And thus in these regions, the bias favors the Palestinians.
The bigger question is, however, pressingly visible in this case is the apparent lack of solidarity by the Arab and Muslim countries, despite the popular uproar and harsh rhetoric. In some cases, like Syria, Iraq, or Lebanon one can understand that these states being under American occupation themselves are simply not in the position to enter a direct war on the side of the Palestinians. But in many other examples, the explanation is more lacking, as even economic pressure was not really utilized. In other words, as many Palestinian organizations and pro-Palestinian groups brought up, much could have been done, while the general appearance is that the Arab world looked idly and restricted their reaction to two emergency summits and harsh condemnations of the clear human rights violations.
But why is that? How come that even states like Columbia and Chile – former strong allies of the US – expelled the Israeli ambassadors and Bolivia even cut all diplomatic ties, or states like South Africa did the same, no Arab states went so far. Moreover, economic pressure was hardly even discussed and the idea of a military retaliation was not even brought up. The response in the Arab world’s politics remained humanitarian, like Kuwait adopting a policy to set up a fund unilaterally to totally rebuild Gaza after the war, or was manifested by non-state actors. Like Ḥizb Allah launching a war of attrition along the Lebanese-Palestinian border, or Iraqi resistance groups systematically attacking the American bases in Iraq and Syria. To understand this contradiction one has to understand the very complex dynamics of the equation both in the region and beyond. And even more importantly, what role Ḥamās itself plays in them.
A most sensitive equation
Armed Palestinian resistance against the Israeli presence is far from being a monopoly of Ḥamās. Even within Gaza itself, there are other “traditional” movements, and in the West Bank, a new generation of grassroots organizations are rapidly gaining control. But given the influence it has on Gaza, and thus on the overall Palestinian field and its extensive web of regional connections Ḥamās has repeatedly managed to prove itself to be the dominant player on the Palestinian side.
The only real alternative, especially politically the PLO (Fataḥ). But the long years of ineffective security cooperation with the Israeli side, the lack of clear political vision, and the rapidly vanishing personal charisma of Palestinian President Maḥmūd ‘Abbās totally undermined the PLO. It has little significance that internationally “everyone” agrees on ‘Abbās being the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian Authority. It is clear that when matters boil to conflict or major negotiations, like it or not, Ḥamās is the side all has to deal with and take it into consideration. That is the only Palestinian organization that has any significant power to force Tel Aviv into concessions, and more significantly, it can act alone on the Palestinian side, unlike the PLO. The recent conflict showed perfectly well that Ḥamās managed to thematize the war into a Palestinian-Israeli war, and not a Ḥamās-Israeli war and rally massive support even in the Western public opinion behind its cause, despite the fact that is regularly labeled as a terrorist organization. On the other hand, the PLO not only could not manage to help this cause, or politically exploit the situation in any way, but even Palestinian public opinion turned against ‘Abbās so bad that allegedly on 8 November he faced an assassination attempt. Thought that was heavily disputed by the PLO.
However, because ‘Abbās and the PLO are the official representatives of the Palestinian side and Ḥamās is labeled a political pariah both in the West and in the region, while there is a need to keep contact with it, the mediators, who can effectively negotiate and pressure this movement have immense influence. And because the Palestinian question is always a central one for the Arab and Muslim world, it is a lucrative influence.
The other very important factor is that Ḥamās is not only the most potent armed Palestinian movement but the main – practically the sole real – local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. A political-ideological network that had greatly benefited from the so-called “Arab Spring”. Though the Brotherhood largely failed to keep the influence it had around 2013, it is still a vast network. Which has its benefits for Ḥamās, but also its limitations in its regional and international relations. Nonetheless, it is a crucial factor in this equation causing much of the contradictions.
In the Middle East, the Brotherhood still has two main state supporters or pillars. Türkiye and Qatar, which two states form a regional block, one of the three. After all, the decision-makers of the Movement, like Political Bureau Chairman Ismā‘il Haniyya are all residing in Doha. It is not a coincidence at all that eventually the ceasefire was achieved largely by Qatari mediation, though seemingly Doha has way smaller inroads into the Palestinian field, as others, like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Jordan. And thus, whoever wants to deal with Ḥamās, has to go through Qatar and Türkiye. Also, any political victory for Ḥamās means political victory for Qatar, any step, any support or settlement benefitting Ḥamās will benefit Doha and Ankara. And that is where regional power plays start to overshadow actual “on the ground” considerations about Palestine.
There are currently three major ideological, and political clusters and power blocks in the Middle East on the Muslim side. The first is the mentioned Muslim Brotherhood-Qatar-Türkiye block. The second used to be the Saudi-Emirati tandem, with equally good Western connections and overall a similar ideological approach, but at the core antagonistic to the Brotherhood ideology and motivated by the age-old Qatari-Emirati rivalry. This second block, however, has in recent years shown cracks. On the one hand, the new leadership in Riyadh is slowly distancing itself from the policies Abū Zabī is formulating, while on the other hand, Saudi Arabia is also showing a willingness to reconcile with the third group, the Axis of Resistance, in which Iran is a major player. And while Riyadh is rather leaning towards a compromise, or a manageable coexistence with Iran, Abū Zabī – though it has no major problem with Tehran – paved the way towards reconciliation with Tel Aviv in the form of the infamous Abraham Accord. A path that allegedly before the Flood of al-Aqṣā Riyadh was willing to follow Abū Zabī, but now this has become an impossibility. The third block is the so-called Axis of Resistance firmly built on the political alliance between Syria, Iran and the Ḥizb Allah in Lebanon. This third block was largely built on the ideological basis of self-reliance and resistance to Western/colonial interference in the region, to which “Israel” is viewed as an extension.
There are of course many states in the region that cannot be clearly listed to any of these blocks and their behavior toward any of them may differ from one matter to another. States, like Kuwait, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, or on very different ways Morocco. But only these three blocks are capable to formulating regional policy and giving agenda. And when it comes to the Palestinian question, all channels must flow through one of the three main blocks. Therefore actors independent of the three main blocks have little bearing on the overall equation.
All of these blocks have major influence and interests in the Palestinian matter, and specifically with Ḥamās, but in very different ways. The Brotherhood sees the Ḥamās as a bridgehead in Palestine, a source of legitimacy and control over a central issue in the region. The Saudi-Emirati block for long saw the Palestinian question as a way to act as a chief mediator between their allies in the West and the majority of the Arab-Muslim countries. Given its antagonistic relations with the Brotherhood, however, the rise of Ḥamās undermined this role, and thus Abū Zabī put huge efforts into building up a more viable alternative to Palestine. A project seems to bring little yield by now. The Axis of Resistance, however, had on the one hand a much broader approach to the matter, seeing Ḥamās as a potent form of resistance, and on the other a very practical one. Ḥamās has the potential to achieve something and is willing to accept practically any support and thus it can and should be supported, though with limitations.
How the Flood play out?
So in the end, all reactions to what happened on 7 October and ever since then eventually boiled down to the rivalry between the blocks and the sensitivities within the blocks. For the Saudi-Emirati block the Flood of al-Aqṣā came as a very inconvenient surprise, much more so for Abū Zabī. Because of the suggestions are correct, Riyadh was very close to joining the normalization process started by the Emirates. That would have given a huge boost and would have retrospectively once again “legitimized” the Emirati policy. But after 7 October the Emirates practically stayed alone with this agenda and has had a very hard time ever since to defend it. Though Riyadh could conveniently backtrack on this alleged normalization with Tel Aviv that once again poured sand into the Saudi-Emirati tandem, preventing them from acting cooperatively.
The Brotherhood, especially Qatar saw the events as a golden opportunity. The initial success of Ḥamās and the completely foreseeable carnage that followed totally undermined the normalization process and thus scored a huge victory against the agenda of the Emirates. And as we saw, it could eventually become an influential power player, as even Egypt, which otherwise has a less-than-perfect relation with Qatar, had to negotiate with the Qataris to achieve a ceasefire. Because the Israeli “solution” of forcing the total population of the Gaza Strip into Egypt and Jordan has detrimental consequences to the Egyptian economy and society, and thus to its national security. Tel Aviv officially offered Cairo to arrange a total debt clearance at the World Bank, if Egypt allowed to total population of Gaza to settle in the Sinai Peninsula. An area that is otherwise unsuitable for this project, not to mention the fundamental immorality and illegality of such forced exodus. Cairo had to stop the bloodshed as soon as possible to prevent this from happening. And while it has some influence over the American and Israeli decision-makers and completely rejected the “deal”, even denied that it was ever offered, it could only make Ḥamās accept a ceasefire through Doha. However, Doha was also on a tightrope not to overplay this influence undermining its reputation, and also had to respect the sensitivities of its Turkish ally. Overall, Doha played this political game with success, as now gives an appearance of a successful mediator, rather than a culprit, or ally of Ḥamās. And that is why political support was given, Qatari Emir Tamīm met with Haniyya expressing solidarity, and Haniyya could broadcast his communique with impunity, but there was no doubt that Doha would never give weapons, or substantial funds for weaponry.
As for the Axis of Resistance, the events were probably less of a surprise, but still a very delicate matter. Iran on the one hand had long advocated for the liberation of Palestine and makes no secret that Tel Aviv is a clear enemy. So it would have been logical to fully support the war effort, might even go to war. The Iranian foreign policy repeatedly hinted this, when it states that the war “might spill out” at any moment. But the matter was very delicate. First of all there are logistical limitations for such support, as it has no direct access to this conflict zone, and thus any direct military support would have to go through Arab countries, which would probably not like to commit themselves to such a gamble. Most states in the Gulf have, for the moment, good and progressing relations with Iran which would be unwise to jeopardize. Syria is not in a condition at the moment to take part in such a project, as the American occupation on its soil is a way more pressing problem. But even beyond that, Ḥamās had a huge role in the war against Syria since 2011 actively supporting the forces fighting against the government. Though since then Ḥamās tried hard to put this chapter behind, in a recent interview with Syrian President Baššār al-Asad it was made clear that “things happened” between the Syrian state and Ḥamās that cannot be reconciled in the foreseeable future. Also, Qatar is still the number one Arab state trying to block the return of Syria to the Arab fold. Eventually, Iran chose to rally as much support as possible, but it could not antagonize its relations with Damascus. And thus chose a middle ground. It gave a green light to its allies in Iraq to hit American positions in Syria and Iraq, and they indeed hit hard. It also gave green light to its allies in Yemen to show some of the missile and drone capabilities hitting Israeli positions. And also supported Ḥizb Allah to start a limited, but very effective border skirmish with the Israeli forces. Which made them evacuate the whole border region 5 km deep.
The real answers
So, why things played out as they did? Public opinion in large agreed that the carnage in Gaza must stop and whatever Ḥamās did, or did not do, two million people in Gaza and millions more in the West Bank cannot be punished for that, especially not in such a brutal way. The humanitarian understanding of war is clear. But the political one is much less. Why?
Because there is no way to help the Palestinians, and Gaza in particular without helping Ḥamās. Helping Ḥamās means legitimizing Ḥamās in one way, or another, setting aside all other considerations. That in itself is very problematic for most Arab states, from Syria to Egypt, for very different reasons. But helping Ḥamās also means support for the Qatar and Türkiye, and their agenda. That is even more impossible. That is why Syria, while it has always been firm in its position to help the liberation of Palestine, could not stab itself by furthering the Brotherhood agenda, against which it fought a very costly war in the last decade. That is why Jordan and Egypt had a hard time to deal with the situation, as while the Israelis expelling millions of Palestinians to them is a fundamental threat, they cannot antagonize their Western relations by effectively supporting a militant organization. Against which the very same Israeli state is fighting a war, with which they made peace with. And because helping Ḥamās means giving a favor to Qatar, most Arab states faced an unsolvable dilemma.
These are the very same reasons, why Latin-American states, or South Africa could take a much more clear and direct stance on the matter. Because they can consider the matter as strictly Palestinian, without deliberations on other implications. Because Ḥamās poses no direct, or ideological threat to them. They don’t have to choose one Arab state over another, one agenda over another. They can view the help for Ḥamās and help for Palestine as one and the same. For most Arab states, however, helping Palestinians is one thing, but helping Ḥamās, the Brotherhood and Qatar is totally different.
Winners and losers
Seeing the shocking aftermath of this 49 days of senseless massacre it is hard to imagine that any side could claim, or even secretly consider itself as triumphant. Yet the brutal nature of high politics is such that the “victors” are more than the victims. Yes, thousands died, or were paralyzed, but tragically there is nothing new in this. Ironically the Ḥamās leadership far from the frontlines knows as well as Tel Aviv that the images that shock the world today will be soon forgotten. But until then there is much to gain from this suffering.
Haniyya and the rest of the Ḥamās leadership conveniently residing in Doha can ask favors from Qatar and Türkiye, as they stopped the normalization process. And thus financial support is beneficial. They can also signal to Tehran that they once again showed that they can be an effective tool against Tel Aviv, and thus political and military support should continue. And soon after the war, whenever it comes, humanitarian aid will start to flow into the Gaza Strip. New districts, hospitals, and schools will be built, which is a huge business. Which will have its beneficiaries on the ground.
Tel Aviv has equally much to gain from this, though its timeframe is very limited. It has the pretext to speed up the explosion of Palestinians and the settlement policy. That benefits the most hardliner settler parties in Israeli politics, which form the core of the current government. Though the situation is likely to end the political career of Netanyahu and thus bring about an even bigger political crisis than the last one until 2022. He is possibly the biggest loser of this conflict, as his main agenda suffered a major blow by failing to achieve normalization with Saudi Arabia before the next American elections.
And even the Axis of Resistance has its fair share of glory. It can demonstrate that supporting Palestine in any way is just in light of the recent carnage. It can also state, with some truth that it was the only side that took effective steps to decrease the pressure on Gaza and started a limited military engagement with the American presence in the region.
Overall, as we can see, what has just played out in Gaza in the last month and a half is a very complex power play behind the horrific carnage. And in that for the Palestinians, Ḥamās is both a solution and a detrimental curse. It keeps the resistance alive and supported, but at the same time makes the solution practically impossible.