The last days of Trump were filled not only with controversy at home but also with a possible war hanging in the air. It was supposed by many sources, American, Israeli and Gulf channels alike that Trump might start a war against Iran in his last days. And that would not have been uncharacteristic of him, given a year before he brought the region to the brink of total war following the assassination of Iran’s most celebrated hero, Qāsem Soleymānī. The aim, suggested by many at the time, would have been to leave a difficult legacy to his successor Biden and bring his administration’s legacy, the total antagonism with Iran, to the absolute fulfillment. Iran thought of being cautious, took the threat seriously, and responded with the most extensive military drill all around the Persian Gulf to show force and prevent any ill-advised provocation.
Trump left, and the war hasn’t come yet. But with the ascendance of Biden, will it ever come? Or has the equation changed totally to the level that Washington might return to the nuclear deal? After all, Biden was Obama’s Vice President and most of his crew had served already in the previous Democrat government.
As for the Middle East, many indications suggest that indeed new times are coming. Signs all over from Yemen to Syria and from Iran to Israel show that the new administration has a fundamentally different take on the region’s matters.
Most of these notions raise expectations that after four years of constant escalation finally, a period of calm and compromise would prevail. Biden has already indicated that he is willing to end the war in Yemen, might have a more conciliatory approach towards Syria, froze most of the arms deals in the Gulf and at the top of all, already in the election campaign signaled that he might be willing to return to the nuclear deal with Iran. And the most surprising of all, Biden showed surprising disfavor for Tel Aviv. The messages can be seen for Israel as a state about the Syrian case, and for Netanyahu personally.
Yet can it be that the overall aim did not change, only the way Washington is pursuing the same goals? After all, most of the wars and conflicts Biden is willing – or at least hinting – to end were started, when he was the Vice President. And most of the signs celebrated by many now, might not be so reassuring at the second glimpse, having viewed the details.
Where will the following period and in general the next four years take the Middle East? A new calm is coming, or simply the Americans exchanged their stick to a carrot, but for the same aim?
The deal is on or not?
About the Middle East, one of the most anticipated change is that America would return to the JCPOA, the nuclear deal with Iran. That was hinted several times during Biden’s election campaign and it is a very plausible scenario, given that this is the most notable foreign policy achievement of the Obama era, which was so full of wars. And now practically the same staff is back in business, which reached the deal back in 2015, while in Iran the same government is still in office. Thought only until this summer, which is tight time pressure.
Yet this small window is a positive factor now, and it pressures the present Iranian leadership as well. When President Rōḥānī took office back in 2013 one of his main goals was to hammer out a deal, which lifts most of the sanctions, and the economic revival can be channeled to social welfare programs to improve the living conditions. Along with a policy of internal moderation after the troublesome Aḥmadinežād year this was a very appealing program. And it made Rōḥānī very popular, despite the heavy criticism from the more headliner circles of the Iranian politics. The fact that by 2015, well before the re-election campaign in 2017 a promising nuclear deal was reached in the highest level of international diplomacy was a major achievement and suggested that the strategy is working. This gave immense popular support to Rōḥānī, and even if the deal eventually broke down, at the time of his re-election Trumps policies were still not felt. But the subsequent sanctions, threats of war, and confrontation leading up the General Qāsem Soleymānī’s assassination obliterated this political program. By now not much has left from the former popularity of Rōḥānī’s group, and he is about to leave office in the summer as possible the most unsuccessful and unremarkable president in the history of the Islamic Republic. This is not only his and his team’s direct failure, the end of their political career, but the defeat of a political approach. A trajectory many in Iran still want to save to prevent another era of antagonism.
If Tehran could, in any viable form and fashion resuscitate the nuclear deal, it could still salvage this policy and the Rōḥānī team could carry on under a new president. It should not be forgotten that the nominees for the next Iranian presidential elections are still not announced, and there can be surprises.
This sense of mutual anticipation, however, has already raised the stakes. Biden can not afford to seem weak, especially now, still being weak, by simply “giving in” to Iran, after most of Trump’s camp feel and claim that Iran has been brought to its knees. Therefore Biden suggests now that Washington will only return to the nuclear deal, if that is renegotiated and is more comprehensive, including stipulations on Iran’s missile program. Yet this is more hinted than expressed, as the White House also communicates that Washington is willing to return to the deal, in case Tehran fully implemented its vows in the JCPOA.
The problem is that until the Iranian elections in the summer that is not possible. During the
Trump year Iran took the careful approach not to withdraw from the JCPOA, but while formally staying in it, started to implement its stipulated measures to once again enrich uranium and fulfill its nuclear program to its full potential. At early January 2021, Iran has already started to produce 20% enriched uranium in its most significant installation at Fordō, which is a major step from the limits stated in the JCPOA. And it has produced a significant quantity of enriched uranium. Now, these measures can be reversed, but that would be not only mean the halt at the centrifuges but also to transport the stockpiles abroad once again. This would mean that all the measures are taken in the previous years and all its achievements would be annulled. Thus turning Rōḥānī tenure indeed to a total failure. So for Iran, the return to the full implementation needs both times, and very considerable political risk, for which the return by Washington can only come after, and its results cannot be felt before the elections.
There is a very serious will in Tehran to take the offer, but in its current form, this cannot be done. And at this point, while on several international forums Iran scored diplomatic victories against the American it is not even that tempting. To make the deal happen Washington would have to take the first major step by lifting some significant sanctions to show goodwill. And here no one has even talked about ramifications for the economic damages Washington caused by breaking the JCPOA. But also at the current stage, this cannot be done, as Iran has significant quantities of enriched uranium. Which is a deadlock.
Now Iran tries to break this deadlock rather desperately with a risky gamble. On 9 February Iranian Minister of Security and Intelligence Maḥmūd ‘Alawī warmed the West that his country might pursue nuclear weapons in case the pressing sanctions are not lifted. This is most probably a bluff trying to put pressure on Washington to act fast, so the deal could be exploited in the election campaign. But it can also be internal sabotage, as ‘Alawī belongs to the hardliners’ group, which can see benefit from a firm approach in the campaign.
The potentially catastrophic aspect of this warning is that so far Iran heavily maintained the policy that it has a binding religious decree – more bind than the constitution itself – not to pursue nuclear weapons by any means. So far all Iranian accords and vows were criticized on the basis that Iran cannot be trusted and in the end, with any possible chance Tehran will jump to gain such assets. All that Rōḥānī was doing in the past years was to build trust. That might have brought little success in America, but was on the right track on the international forums, most significantly at the IAEA, which’s reports supported the Iranian policy. Suggesting that Iran might develop nuclear weapons puts the value of the prohibiting religious decree void and undermines not only all previous statements but also the work of any later conciliatory governments.
That is why Iran also urges its Arab neighbors for direct peace negotiations. The message here is also not intended to these states, most of them already showing signs of readiness, but to Washington. Meaning that indirectly small steps can be taken in the right direction. So Iran also uses its own “carrot and stick” policy, now mirroring the Americans, but with less card up at the sleeves.
Yet this “carrot” policy has its promising signs. After the GCC summit held in al-‘Ulā in Saudi Arabia, in which Qatar has readmitted the GCC fold and the blockade against it was lifted after four years on 19 January Qatari Foreign Minister Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān Āl Tānī suggested that Qatar is ready to ease the negotiations between Iran and the Gulf states. Yet at the same the time the very mediation was offered between Iran and the US. While Washington hasn’t responded to this yet openly, there are signs that Saudi Arabia is ready to take on this offer. And given that the same mediation shortly before between Riyadh and Ankara was successful this is a serious offer.
What can be deducted from this is that while both sides are raising the stakes now, they both started to probe each other via their key allies for a possible settlement. And so far there is no breakthrough.
The first fruit: Yemen
The first real “bomb” of Biden’s foreign policy came in Yemen. On 4 February National Security Advisor Jack Sullivan announced that the Biden administration stops all support for the attack operations in Yemen. At the same time, the White House suggested that it is willing to remove the Anṣār Allah Movement, the political organization of the al-Ḥūtīs from the list of terrorist organizations. Which was only put on the list in the last days of Trump. The idea was highly welcomed in Sana’a, though it clearly showed the absolutely political nature of such lists and designations. All that was presented in a fashion that Washington tries to end the war in Yemen. The government in Sana’a announced that it would welcome such a move and is ready for negotiations, but raised concern. Yet the overly optimistic atmosphere, in the beginning, was somewhat misleading. As it was soon pointed out, Washington did not stop all its support for Saudi Arabia and the Emirates in Yemen, only the “attack operations” were not supported anymore. And there is a big difference, as – at least openly – Washington was not pressuring Riyadh to end the war, and casually acknowledged Abū Zabī lightly covered excuse that it had already withdrawn from Yemen. And the skepticism about Washington’s true intentions was proven right days later, when on 8 February State Secretary Bliken called upon Sana’a to cease all military operations against Saudi Arabia, even against its forces in Yemen. Clearly stating that America will still protect Saudi Arabia from the Yemeni drone strikes, and gave no indication that Riyadh should stop its operations.
So where does this leave us? Well, it should be kept in sight that at the very same time the Saudi forces are in a very desperate situation in the Yemeni province of Ma’rib, where the capital of the province is on the verge of falling into the hands of the al-Ḥūtīs. The Saudis still ship in supplies and some fresh troops, but its lines are collapsing, while at the same time the airstrikes against key Saudi installations at home are going on and cannot be prevented. Once Ma’rib falls that would be a devastating blow to the Saudi war effort, while Riyadh cannot prolong its two-front struggle against both the al-Ḥūtīs and the southern separatist being supported by the Emirates. And as we suggested before, the Saudi leadership has already taken measures to end this costly military engagement is a face-saving solution. But before that how can a shameful defeat be prevented? With an at least temporal ceasefire for negotiations, which can be the prelude for a more comprehensive peace process.
That is exactly where Bliken’s offer – if that can be understood in such a way – came into the picture. To help Saudi Arabia, much more than to abandon it, Washington took one step and signals that it is willing to end the war if there is a readiness for a compromise. In case the al-Ḥūtīs stop at the gates of Ma’rib and the strikes against the kingdom America can offer some sort of a deal. The first token of goodwill was given waiting for a response.
The response soon came indeed. On 10 February the Yemeni forces loyal to Sana’a announced that they have once again successfully bombed the Abhā airport in Saudi Arabia. The message is clear. Sana’a is not dealing with offers and promises and continues the war effort unless something substantial is given. Considering that this zealous resistance kept the al-Ḥūtīs in power during all these years and the result of this very same resistance is pushing Riyadh to the negotiations it is understandable that at this stage Sana’a has very little to lose, but much to gain from fighting. Yet the readiness for talks at this stage, which was expressed several times suggests that the overall offer by Washington was less given to Sana’a and much more to Tehran. And Iran is ready to listen, even if not for long.
The skepticism is understandable. The war on Yemen started when Biden was already Vice President and he never expressed any problem with that. That is why his peace initiative is quite hollow now. Nonetheless, Yemen is an important bargaining chip for the new administration. Both for Iran and for Saudi Arabia. Once again, this is not a turn, just a well-branded course correction.
Unnerved friends
The most significant change compared to Trump came with the treatment of the most important allies. Washington froze all arms and supply deals for Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. Even more, the biggest deal, the sell of F-35 jets to the Emirates was put to a halt. These deals are officially not canceled, just put on hold for revision – meaning money is not refunded -, but that is a very significant change. A sort of punishment for these states being so prime allies of Trump, as it was expected.
Yet it was more surprising how Biden treats Israel now, which was always a key matter, well above all internal American politics. After almost a month Biden still hasn’t talked to Netanyahu, while such direct talks used to happen in the first few days. So far Netanyahu has no access to him. This can also be attributed to the fact that Netanyahu was openly supporting Trump, and also that his political career might not last long facing corruption charges. It might be better for Biden to wait for the new Israeli PM to have a fresh start with him. But this is not the only point, where the formerly perfect relations seem to be weakened now.
After several suggestions on how much the new administration would reverse Trump’s Middle East policy Bliken openly acknowledged that the embassy will stay in Jerusalem, but about the Golan, he was much less clear. Trump previously breaching all international decisions recognized Israeli sovereignty over the occupied Syrian Golan Height. On 09 February in a press conference, Blinken deflected the question about the Golan not saying clearly anything. But while he acknowledged that this is an important matter for the Jewish state, he also suggested that the legality of Trump’s recognition may not be supported. Thus hinting that the US may reverse this recognition. This changes little since even with a revoked recognition Israel will not withdraw from this occupied land and Washington will not criticize it for this, but the policy change is big.
The even bigger clash, however, started even before with the bombastic announcement by Israeli Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi on 26 January that Israel might start a war on Iran and bomb all its nuclear sites, even if it has to do this alone. This is of course is a bluff. It would be extremely unwise to announce such a major operation in advance, and we can see that when the Israelis indeed commit such aggression, like almost daily now in Syria, they don’t feel the need to warn.
The message is that Tel Aviv does not want any policy change by the US, and especially opposes a return to the nuclear deal. Even if it has to sabotage it alone. And the timing is important because whatever the Israelis are trying to find is Syria with their escalating bombing campaign, they are not finding it.
The recent re-emerge of Dā‘iš in Syria, the growing aggression of the American supported Qasad organization and newly built American bases in Syria suggest that Washington hasn’t changed that much in its relations with Syria. And there are no words of lifting any sanctions either.
So what we see is that there are minor tokens of goodwill, but now the new administration wants direct dealings with Iran and does not wish interference from its allies. Even by the most respected Israel.
Is that all so clear?
Seeing all these details the overall reading so far is not reassuring. And it is obvious from the reactions. Tel Aviv is surely not celebrating now, but the Israeli leadership is far from being overly critical, despite all the indications of a policy change. There are surprisingly few reflections from Tel Aviv after all the possible changes in the American policy in the region. On the other hand, Iran is equally cautious. We don’t see jubilation from Tehran and the tone hasn’t really changed. Understandably, the Iranian leadership does not trust Biden. And that is emphasized at every remark demanding action, not promises.
And who could blame them? Most of the wars Washington is willing to end were indeed started by the same crew that just came back to power. Because Biden’s administration by large is that of Obama, and it is clear that the president is not much in charge. Biden was not only Vice President when the war on Yemen started, but he was in the same office when the whole so-called Arab Spring was launched. Which has devastating effects on the whole region. Yet we never heard critical views from Biden – is Vice President at the time – about the American policy on Syria, Iraq, or Yemen. So is a total change really credible? Or is it more likely to be a reposition, masking most of the current problems on Trump, who with all his vices did not start, but only inherited these crises?
Looking back at the last years the pattern is clear that the biggest obstacle for Washington in the Middle East was the so-called Axis of Resistance, the political block made up by Iran and its allies. Under Trump, the policy was a somewhat more lenient approach towards Tehran’s allies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. After all, Trump did indeed tried to pull out from Syria, which was only prevented time and again by the military-security-foreign establishment. And with all the problems the Trump-Pompeo duo caused, they indeed could have done much worse. In exchange for the vision, most likely Jared Kushner’s vision was to nurture the build-up of an equally capable and wide-spread alliance, which can thwart the Iranian-Syrian block on local levels. The concentration on the allies was abandoned in favor of pressure put on Iran itself. Gambling on the idea that if Iran breaks, or leans to a compromise, its allies will fall easily. Or at least will be left in a state in which they pose no real concern.
That has obviously failed. But does that necessarily mean that the same goal is given up? We should not be so sure of that.
So far what is more likely that two changes are happening, both suggesting a transformation in form, not in substance. The pressure on Iran is decreasing, while more emphasis is given to its allies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The recent activity by Dā‘iš both in Syria and Iraq, the contradictory steps in Syria, and the peace deal in Yemen suggests that the change is not at all absolute. It is more likely that if Tehran is willing to make concessions at the expense of its allies a suitable deal can be achieved. And here lies the second change. The more blunt “stick” approach of Trump constantly threatening with war and imposing sanctions is exchanged to the “carrot” policy or deals, negotiations, and vague promises.
But that is the same “carrot and stick” policy. Trump’s stick is no exchanged to Biden’s not too tempting carrot, but the mechanism behind them is the same. A change in the model does not mean a change in the goals. For that to see, as so many hope, we still need to see achievements. And so far none of the Biden initiatives are suggesting that such a breakthrough is close. But there is a readiness for a policy change. That is what we are seeing from Sana’a, Damascus, Baghdad, and Tehran.