Last week we saw that the dilemmas of Saudi Crown Prince Muḥammad ibn Salmān are growing and there are many signs that he is desperately trying to reshuffle his cards. He lost his biggest gamble hoping that Trump would stay in power and thus he is about to lose his biggest supporter.
The most likely route for him to survive seemed to rearrange his own camp, increase his grip on power and look for a security guarantee that could grant him immunity from a possible American attempt under Biden to sideline him. This led him to a still heavily denied meeting with Netanyahu in his personal theme park city Nayūm, which caused an unanticipated uproar even within the Saudi court. Not that much for the trajectory, as Riyadh, in general, is not at all against the Emirati approach to join forces with Israel against Iran, thus securing long term American favor. The problem was much more the naïve nature of Ibn Salmān conducting this policy, as the Israelis made this highly sensitive meeting all too public for the Saudis to bare.
So in this week with a sudden move, Riyadh seems to take a 180 degrees turn. It is less known whether the Crown Prince himself, or the still more rational circles, but the Saudi leadership suddenly turned its back on the Israeli friendship – at least for now – and took a completely different approach. Taking advantage of some Gulf allies’ mediation and one of the last desperate attempts by Trump’s circles, especially his favorite Jared Kushner, Riyadh signaled that it is ready to end the crisis with Qatar and completely restore relations to the levels before 2017, or even to the pre-2013 level. That is not all that surprising, given the Cold War against Doha was never really a Saudi project, and there were previous small attempts for reconciliation. But the way this process is made is indeed surprising. And if it goes through it can be a game-changer in the regional dynamics.
Regardless of how unlikely, this is still a major move. The notion itself that the idea was floated is a sign of either an upcoming huge rift between Saudi Arabia and the Emirates or the major crisis in the Saudi leadership.
Either way, time is definitely not on Ibn Salmān’s side, as the normalization process, slow as it is, has already started to show signs of cracks. And the war in Yemen also closes to a disastrous end pushing Riyadh and Abū Zabī away from each other like never before.
Israel turned down?
The news last week about Netanyahu’s visit Nayūm and his meeting with Ibn Salmān caused shockwaves. Seeing the political debate all over the Arab media it was very apparent that even the most loyal Saudi commentators did not try to hide behind the denials of the Saudi Foreign Minister, but were rather embarrassed how to comment on the events. Several facts made it very embarrassing and very risky to follow this path. It was only later revealed that most likely not only Netanyahu but also Director of the Mossad Yossi Cohen was in Nayūm, giving the impression that the main aim was a security and intelligence cooperation even before a formal normalization. That, however, embarrassing as it was, happened at the same time of the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Moḥsen Fahrīzāde. Along with the Israel fanfare that they now have inroads to the Saudis as well it made an impression that the Saudis were active co-conspirators in the assassination. Though Iran did not openly accuse Riyadh, the Saudis had good reasons to be afraid.
And then suddenly Riyadh blocked this channel and canceled a high-level security meeting, which was supposed to be held with the Israelis in Saudi Arabia. So it seems that the Israeli-Saudi honeymoon came to a sudden end. It is unlikely that Ibn Salmān, given how desperate he is now, got cold feet, and safer to assume the given the circumstances the more rational elements, the traditional camp in Riyadh convinced King Salmān once again to alter course.
This does not mean that the roads to a Saudi-Israeli alliance or Saudi Arabia’s joining to the normalization process are closed. Ibn Salmān is definitely the man for this project and much of his political career points to this direction. But those who want another way – and they may have to find the right substitute for the Crown Prince for that aim – made their best to block this approach, giving an alternative, but also putting as many blocks ahead of the Crown Prince as possible. Because the alternative, Qatar, recently made it very clear that it will not join the normalization. In other terms, it will not mend fences with the Emirates in a way, as it would be a surrender. Meaning a consolidation between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, especially if it made in the expanse of the Emirati-Bahraini relations will block the Saudi normalization. But can such a route be taken?
A sudden turn
All the past week there were rumors about a possible reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The first motion came from the Americans on 30 November, as Trump suggested that a possible deal is about to happen. Which is a major step, as the two states have no direct diplomatic contact since the summer of 2017.
At that time mainly four states, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt accused Qatar with close contacts with Iran, meddling in other states internal affairs, and supporting terrorism financially and ideologically via the al-Jazeera media network. Saudi Arabia did its most to enlist other states as well, but that never really happened and the crisis stayed practically a four against one struggle. Which was very close to war, as Riyadh and Abū Zabī was lamenting on a military invasion on the basis of the Bahraini model, yet this was thwarted by Turkish and Pakistani military presence. The result was a set of accusations and demands, which was followed by a total economic and transport blockade. For a brief time, this seemed absolute and was only broken by swift Iranian help to Qatar. Tehran provided the corridor for Turkey to help its ally, but it also opened its own ports and markets for Doha.
This Cold War, from which Oman distanced itself from the beginning and Kuwait tried its best to solve with mediation still goes on, but after the first hard month, Qatar managed to cope well with the situation. The crisis, which meant to break Qatar, never really achieved its aim, but crippled the GCC beyond repair. Riyadh was in the forefront of this war, but by now it is proven that it was Abū Zabī’s project for a number of economic, hegemonic, and personal reasons. As long as the overall equation was behind the Saudi-Emirati axis, there was Trump enthusiastically supporting them and there were no reasons to change Riyadh had no motivation to end the crisis, though it did not wish to sacrifice much for success. With Trump losing, however, Ibn Salmān has just run out of time. In the hurry to brace itself for the change Saudi Arabia started to close open matters. The first of it is this crisis with Qatar.
The reconciliation for a fact became official on 4 December after the announcement of Kuwaiti Foreign and Information Minister aš-Šayh Aḥmad Nāṣir Muḥammad Āl aṣ-Ṣabāḥ that during the previous days there have been fruitful negotiations with Kuwaiti mediations between all sides and that an agreement was reached. Important, however, that even this statement directly mentions the American support and the name of Jared Kushner in the matter, which makes it very curious where things are heading. Yet all reports suggest that this was primary his achievement.
This announcement by the Kuwaiti side was soon confirmed by his Saudi and Qatari counterparts. Though these communiques were more cautious, only talking a very close chance of an agreement. By Saturday 5 November we came to know for a fact that there is an agreement from the first leaks, but all assessments are just guessing at this point, with no document at hand.
Though the agreement is not public yet, what has openly stated is that Saudi Arabia will end the blockade in every way, opening its airspace and land routes, reopen financial links, and the freedom of movement between the two states. Though we curiously hear little what Qatar is giving in exchange, which makes it very much like Riyadh simply gave up its quest that is not the most interesting part. Suggestions were indeed made that in exchange Qatar could give three concessions. Shutting down al-Jazeera, closing the Turkish military bases in Qatar, and breaking all ties with Iran. With the first two Qatari acceptance is extremely unlikely, as these tools are not only very successful enterprises, but also in 2017 proved to be vital to save the leadership. And as Qatar cannot truly trust the Saudis, especially not its erratic Crown Prince, it would be nothing less than suicide to give in. As with Iran, we actually have proof that Doha is not planning at all to distance itself from Tehran.
What is very curious that Saudi Arabia takes this decision unilaterally, meaning that it practically abandons the other blockading member states, the Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt, and makes a deal – whatever it really holds – for itself. This makes the blockade totally pointless from this point on. Qatar had no real trouble to survive even against Saudi Arabia, but from this point on the blockade will be nothing more than a slight irritation. And in this context, it is very clear that the Saudi desertion of the blockade camp seriously damages its ties with the other three countries. The shock and irritation is very clear, as three days after agreement and a week after the first notion there is still no official response from Cairo, Manama, or Abū Zabī.
In the case of Bahrain Riyadh can afford itself to disregard the interests of Manama given the disparity in their capabilities and the fact that it largely occupies the small country excluded. More surprising to see that Egypt was included, or at least sufficiently informed about this decision. It would only be logical that Saudi Arabia now at least take some allies with him on this path. The fact that Egypt was not involved in this move suggests that either those who took this decision in Riyadh now don’t trust Cairo, or that they simply don’t care, because they have much bigger aims. And finally, that is very curious how could such a step have been made without Abū Zabī, knowing that the whole crisis is practically an Emirati project. That is in fact most surprising by the fact that this cannot be understood otherwise than a clear message from Riyadh to Abū Zabī that the relations have changed. Riyadh will not tolerate every Emirati move and its total disregard. But who sent the message, and for what aim? Knowing how close the two Crown Princes in Riyadh and Abū Zabī were and that Muḥammad ibn Zāyid has been so far a practical mentor and caretaker of his Saudi counterpart, it is very unlikely that this link broke. Which suggests a Saudi internal reason.
Tension in Riyadh
We suggested last week that Muḥammad ibn Salmān has many reasons to worry. Much of what he does is built on the calculation that Biden will take over the White House, his personal links to Washington will be lost and the Americans might support a step to remove him. For that aim, he tried to make a deal with the Israelis – which is widely reported to be his personal desire – and tightened security around his most probable rivals already in custody. It seemed for many months now, that regardless of his growing – not unfounded – fear and the opposition against him Muḥammad ibn Salmān was firmly in charge of the situation. But is that so?
It is only wild speculation, but what if those powers still having access to the aging old king and have some influence over him finally had enough? Those of the old guard who have no problem with silent cooperation with Israel, but always avoided any firm alliance policy – apart of that with the U.S. – leaving the options always open felt that the normalization went too far? That the Crown Prince takes the state to a place where it can collapse by internal outrage and outer criticism? There is a clear sign for this dissatisfaction and the re-emerging activity of the old guard, which seemed to have been replaced. In the 16th Regional Security Summit held in Bahrain between 4-6 December 2020 – otherwise, known as the Manama dialogue – the 75 years old Prince Turkī ibn Fayṣal lashed out against Israel in the old-fashioned velocity. The criticism, as many analysts pointed out, was very directly articulated by the Mossad director’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia.
It should be noted that Turkī ibn Fayṣal is possibly the most educated member of the Saudi Royal House, a cool and cunning character, who led the Saudi General Intelligence for more than two decades, more than anyone else in the country. Since his return from his ambassadorship in Washington in 2007 he was practically in retirement, rarely taking a public stance, and even less on international matters. Therefore it is safe to assume that his criticism was less meant to Tel Aviv, and much more a signal saying that this process will be blocked.
But if there are circles in the kingdom who wish to block the Saudi normalization they have to find an alternative to Muḥammad ibn Salmān, as he surely will fulfill this project upon ascending to the throne. And we could see that he is aware of that, arresting or removing all possible alternatives. So it would seem that there is no one to replace the Crown Prince. But what if there still is such character?
It is lesser to know if there is, but at the end, the Saudi House is full of princes. It is enough to have a puppet master, who can arrange a change in power. And recently such a name came up very openly. He is Sa‘ad al-Ğabrī, a long time right-hand man of deposed Crown Prince Muḥammad ibn Nāyif whom Muḥammad ibn Salmān fears the most. Al-Ğabrī was a top intelligence commander and the most direct link with Western services. He was dismissed in 2015 but stayed close to his mentor until his arrest. Upon Muḥammad ibn, Nāyif’s arrest and detention al-Ğabrī fled the country and took refuge in Canada, where he still lives. Since then in his home country, his children and even his brother were detained and charges were filed against him for corruption. Though he is not a well-circled name, he was in fact so important that in 2018 right along Hāšuqğī he was on a list of targets to be assassinated and a hit squad was allegedly sent to Canada. In the summer of 2020, a group of U.S. senators openly pressured President Trump to secure the release of al-Ğabrī’s children. This shows that al-Ğabrī is thought of and has far wider connections than a simple former intelligence operative. And given his status, the next possible replacement might still be Muḥammad ibn Nāyif.
Now, if there is something in motion against current Crown Prince Muḥammad ibn Salmān it is important to weaken his power and so far his biggest asset was the support he got from the Emirates. The reconciliation with Qatar is an excellent tool to severe these relations. Because in this case, Abū Zabī cannot be but critical about this development. And so far every such setback or open criticism against the Emirati policies triggered harsh responses. Which might just be the thing some await in Riyadh to push this provocation to the level of open animosity, and in the midsts of this fight weaken and eventually remove the Muḥammad ibn Salmān.
Would Qatar yield?
Apart from the Saudi infightings, however, what does such a deal, the reconciliation mean to the region? It surely signals a growing frustration between Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, but what does it mean for Qatar? Can Qatar truly mend fences with Saudi Arabia? Can that be the end of the Turkish-Qatari axis, one of the three powerful power blocks in the region? Or the contrary, would they welcome Riyadh on board?
As we pointed out, Qatar cannot give concessions in the most important demands. It cannot close down al-Jazeera, a multi-billion project, one of the biggest media networks around the world only second to BBC. Not only financially, but because the publicity it made was one of the key factors that defended Qatar from a Saudi invasion and eventually managed to turn the tide. The same is the case with the Turkish bases in Qatar, which secure Doha’s integrity and are the key bases for most regional activities from Libya to Ethiopia. Had Qatar agreed to these terms it would have surrounded its sovereignty. Therefore it is not surprising that we hear nothing from these demands now.
What about weakening ties with Turkey? After all for quite some time now we hear from the Gulf media that in their eyes the Iranian and the Turkish “threat” are equally grave and existential. So can at least Qatar be distanced from Turkey, even if the military bases stay as a safety guarantee? In fact, recently we could witness the opposite.
Since 2013 by Emirati and Egyptian wishes there was a cold and bitter halt in the Saudi-Turkish relations. Though not as harsh as with Egypt or the Emirates, Riyadh and Ankara were clearly at odds and on 6 October this year, the Saudis started an unofficial trade war against Turkey. This, however, by late November rapidly turned around and on 21 November the Saudi king telephoned President Erdoğan starting a comprehensive reconciliation. Surprising as it was, Saudi Arabia practically announced that it ends the “war” with Turkey, and the first fruits came quickly as Riyadh cut the funds and support for the Kurds in Syria to appease Ankara. And this line was carried on with Qatar, meaning that it is much less a sudden turn as it would seem.
One other demand from the very beginning was that Qatar should pull farther from Iran. Though Doha always claimed that it has no special relations with Iran and indeed the Emirates have much bigger trade with Tehran, Doha could not cut its Iranian ties under the blockade. Iran granted the lifeline of support. Without Iran, Qatar would have starved and would have had to yield to the Saudi-Emirati demands. But can it change now? Will Qatar change its policy with Iran? Actually, that is the only thing which we can see very clearly. Qatar is winning this conflict. On 24 November, when so when there were already Saudi-Qatari reconciliation talks, Qatari officials in Isfahan signed a major cooperation agreement in trade and energy. Qatar even appointed a special trade representative to Iran, which it had only done previously with the US, the UK, and France. So Qatar is openly moving closer to Iran, and no farther, and gives a link of revenues to the Iranians. So it is clear that severing relations with Iran cannot be the price of the Saudi deal.
In fact, the only thing that was openly mentioned that in exchange for ending the blockade Qatar would drop the lawsuit demanding reparations for the blockade. In the summer Qatar has already won the lawsuit and by now only the amount was in question. No doubt it was about a serious sum, but that could hardly be a reason for the Saudi backtracking. Meaning that Riyadh has indeed simply surrendered. It would be hard to say if the Saudis would aim to join the Qatari-Turkish Axis, that cannot even be implemented, but by pulling closer to them the move is more against the Emirates. And there are good reasons for that.
Warning signs
Recently two things showed very clear signs that rushing with the normalization might just not be such a good idea. That Riyadh should wait, at least until the elections in America bring a clear result. As we saw last weak the war in Yemen is coming to the end. After repelling a Saudi relief operation the Yemeni forces completely surrounded the city of Ma’rib. This comes at the time when the Saudi forces also face insurgency in the south of Yemen, which was so far relatively more firmly under control. Meaning that while the Saudi forces are being grounded by the Yemenis, now both in the north and in the south, the Emiratis do practically nothing, only support their vassals to take the south under control.
The other warning sign came from Sudan. This week the Sudanese leadership openly warned Secretary Pompeo that Sudan would not normalize with Israel and cancels its agreement unless Congress passes a law for Sudanese immunity over the 9-11 charges. That might sound as only a maneuver, but Sudanese set a deadline for that with 31 December. This is practically impossible, knowing the speed of the American legal process, the closing of the holidays, and the fact that it is still not clear who will be the next American President. Meaning that it is very likely that Sudan is out and will not normalize with Israel. Further proving that this is not such a winning current now as it seemed two months ago.
When Sudan made the deal we already suggested that the game is not over. But at the same time with the Saudi-Qatari reconciliation – which can hardly be a coincidence – this is a clear indication that the normalization is not that certain and the Emirates is not necessarily winning all debacles.