Libya, which recently was leading the headlines with a possibility of open war between Turkey and Egypt, largely disappeared from the news. Regardless of that, however, while the frontlines are still and the ceasefire agreement signed on 4 November 2020 is still holding, there is promising progress.
On 22 January 2021, after intensive talks and a partial agreement in Egypt, the new round of negotiations between the two main Libyan parties have started once again in the Moroccan city of Būznīqa. The same city, which held the groundbreaking first negotiations in September 2020. In this last two days meeting singing the final statement on Saturday 23 January 2021, the sides agreed on how to share the key positions in the state, set up an interim functioning state authority, revise the constitution and finally hold a general election on 24 December 2021. A date that might seem far away, but in fact is a very ambitious plan and is a positive indication that things finally started to move towards a solution to the Libyan crisis.
Many things can still go wrong as several key questions are not yet addressed, but the very fact that there is progress shows that after more than a year of heated tension there is a general de-escalation. And that is a very positive sign to the whole region, well beyond Libya.
The very factors which were pulling Libya apart even a year ago seem to have changed, even reversed, and now act a very similar way, but stimulating a solution.
What happened in the last round of negotiations in Būznīqa? What is the new roadmap the sides have agreed upon? And what regional changes have stimulated this transformation?
Returning to Būznīqa.
The first round of negotiations in the Moroccan town of Būznīqa in September 2020 was groundbreaking. Either because of the absence of the main Libyan leaders, or simply regardless of that, but the 13-13 model – 13 representatives from both major sides – brought progress and seem to be functioning well. The negotiations in Geneva under U.N. mediation in October and December were met with similar ones in Egypt in September and in Tunisia in November 2020.
These negotiations outlined the main economic and administrative goals in the process and agreed on the key steps of the political solution. Yet the main achievement was simply the fact the process built trust and did not fall apart on minor disputes, nor was the whole matter covered in a vague agreement, like the one signed in aṣ-Ṣuhayrāt in 2015, which failed to permanently settle main problems. This time the timetable seems to dominate the negotiations, more than the desired goals. The general approach was changed. While before the settlements aimed to share power between the top leaders and viewed the administration as secondary, this time the idea is to set up a new government structure having sufficient power on the ground. And all major reforms would come after that. From the top-to-button approach before, the new model shifted to the reverse. The key state functions would be agreed upon, before the selection of the political leaders.
So far this formula seems to be working, and that is how the sides have returned this week to Būznīqa after intensive negotiations, as they agreed in September 2020. And this round promises the final outline of the transition.
The new roadmap
According to the final statement of Būznīqa signed on 23 January 2021 the sides agreed to form joint committees to elect professionals to the seven key positions of the state, and – though somewhat unofficially – spreading these amongst the main parts of the country, Tripolitania, Fazzān and Barka. These key posts are the Governor or the Central Bank, Head of the Audit Bureau, Head of the Administration Control Authority, Head of the Supreme National Election Commission, Head of the National Anti-Corruption Committee, the Attorney General, and the Head of the Supreme Court. Upon selecting these the main candidates, the joint committees would elect members to these posts, and these would be ratified in future meetings. These posts would be held until the general elections already scheduled to 24 December 2021.
So far “only” the criteria was agreed upon, how to fill these positions, but that goes along the general roadmap. Once these institutions are set up and sufficient power-sharing goes well among the different regions of the country, a general revision of the constitution can start. The revised constitution would be put into a referendum in the summer of 2021, and upon that new elections could be held. After the new elections have resulted a new government would be put in place, all key functions revised once again, and only after that, all previous international agreements would be revised.
The process and the agreements have many positive signs and are going well so far, but they also have several weak spots. Two main former problems seem to be unaddressed. Though all sides agree that foreign troops, especially the mercenaries would have to leave, the exact mechanism to achieve that is unclear. So is the fate of the former leaders in all sides and their future accountability.
A solution insight
It is easy to understand why the negotiations at Būznīqa attract little attention. Not much has been concluded yet. We don’t have a new government, we don’t have a definitive answer to the key issues, like the influence of Egypt and Turkey on the country, or the fate of the mercenaries, and nothing is so far final.
Still, the negotiations are significant. All other forces involved in the conflict seem to support this process now, and their disputes don’t really manifest. The fact that Morocco normalized its relations with Israel could have been a major source of the problem, in case several Arab states would have raised objection to Rabat now, but that also did not happen. In fact, the dealings of Morocco both in Western Sahara and with Israel seem to have no influence at all on the negotiations.
And most importantly, all involved Libyan parties seem to go along the process well. There seems to be a readiness for the final solution.
A positive atmosphere?
Seeing the relative calm surrounding the negotiations and apparent progress we can see that this process now bares support not only from the big powers but also from the two main contestants in the conflict. These being Turkey and Egypt. And that cannot be separated from the changes the al-‘Ulā GCC Summit caused recently.
In al-‘Ulā Qatar was readmitted to the GCC fold and the blockade around it since mid-2017 has ended. This marks two major changes. The most direct is the victory of the Turkish-Qatari alliance in the regional rivalry, primarily over the Emirati-Egyptian-Saudi block, which is now falling apart. That was caused by a change in Riyadh’s behavior deviating from the Emirates and pulling closer to Qatar and even directly to Turkey. There are subtle hints that Saudi Arabia is attempting a major rapprochement with Turkey.
The Gulf reconciliation and the end to the blockade against Qatar were only reluctantly accepted by the three other participants in the blockade, the Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt. While the Emirates and Bahrain enjoy some benefits of this and are part of the GCC fold, Egypt was largely left alone with this development and understandably somewhat feels alone. That is why Egypt also had to reevaluate its positions vis-à-vis Qatar, and even more importantly Turkey. That is what Egyptian President as-Sīsī now does, and now conducts his own policy with Turkey.
One of the main lessons of the blockade against Qatar and its total failure is that after years of Cold War Egypt cannot overpower the Turkish-Qatari block, even with its allies. That was so far much more than a quarrel on strategic, or even ideological grounds, but was viewed as an existential threat to the current Egyptian leadership. Ever since as-Sīsī’s coup in mid-2013 Turkey and Qatar provided huge support to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and worked on countering the coup. In a very similar fashion Cairo also supported all attempts to undermine Ankara and Doha. The result of al-‘Ulā is, however, that Cairo has become increasingly isolated in this rivalry and cannot turn the tie in most regional disputes. Whether it is the Mediterranean influence, Gulf relations, or the matter of Libya.
That is why we see no signs for a total turn in the Egyptian policy on ways so far seemed to be impossible. Impossible, because the very ideological foundation of the Turkish-Qatari alliance, that of the Muslim Brotherhood, is an existential threat and number one enemy of the Egyptian government now. But since the policy of animosity suffered a major defeat, now Cairo tries to find ways for agreement and even cooperation. In exchange for Qatar massively scaling down the ideological and media support for as-Sīsī’s opposition and Turkey cutting funds Egypt is ready to compromise on several key issues. That approach has so far found good reception in both Doha and Ankara. Doha is still very busy with the results of al-‘Ulā and balancing in the new realities in the Gulf. Turkey also has a number of regional issues, mostly with conflicting agendas with Russia. These are the conflict in Syria, Iraq, and Azerbaijan. Therefore a compromise securing some gains in a relatively smaller matter, like Libya is advantageous, just as a general compromise with Egypt can be. For that Libya is an ideal testing ground. The goodwill shown here by all sides can be the first major step for settling other pending issues. That is the most probable reason why Egypt was given a major role in the Libyan negotiations, which is not contested by Turkey.
That, however, is not the only major reason, why negotiations go relatively well so far. It is true that the two main powers, Turkey and Egypt, which were fueling the conflict agreed to de-escalate, but there are no other main parties either to disturb this process. Tunisia, which is primarily interested in a comprehensive settlement in Libya, was also given a role in the process, and now experiences worrying disturbances. All parties concern about Tunisia, most directly Algeria, can understand that while Tunisia sinking into a major turmoil can set up a chain reaction starting the Libyan war once again can also see the benefit in a solution in Libya. Because solving the Libyan matter can have positive effects on the Tunisian situation as well.
Algeria, which also very actively mediated in Libya, is also taking the process with a positive attitude, though largely ignores it. While the fact that Morocco is the main mediator now in Libya is somewhat disturbing Algiers have way bigger matters now. President ‘Abd al-Mağīd Tabbūn returning from Germany after almost two months is still very weak. After a brief stay in his country on 10 January Tabbūn returned to Germany to “continue his treatment”. Thus leaving the county once again in the hands of the army leadership. Which is busy with the developments in Western Sahara and the growing Polisario activity. On 18 January Algeria started a huge military drill along the Moroccan border as a clear attempt of intimidation, even testing its famous Russian manufactured Islander ballistic missiles. A very modern missile, which apart from Russia has only been deployed in Armenia. Also, there is a very troubling political transformation in Algeria, where the “old guard” seems to re-emerge and gradually take back the country. Within these realities, Algeria simply does not have the power to counter the Moroccan mediation, nor to present an alternative, while the general process of a Libyan solution is beneficial.
Overall, all the factors which were triggering the conflict before and bringing Libya to the epicenter of a possible regional war a year ago now all reversed. While a year ago Libya was an ideal testing ground for the political prowess for conflicting agendas in the region, now it an equally good ground for probing the limits of compromise. The same realities still apply, but now they stimulate a solution and an agreement over the spheres of influence over the country.
That is where the main problems of the current process lie. So far it is unclear whether the central authority will return to Libya, or it will be at the end a relatively weak federal state. If the latter happens, the influence Egypt and Turkey have on their respective protégées in Libya stay alive. Also, we hear very little about the fate of the main Libyan protagonists of the conflict, General Ḥaftar, ‘Aqīla Ṣāliḥ and Fāyiz as-Sarrāğ. Not only their future role in the new leadership but also about their possible accounting after the new authorities are put in place. This is important, as personal ambitions so far proved to be a major factor in the Libyan crisis.
So far the indications are very good and there seems to be a supportive atmosphere around the negotiations. More so than ever since 2014. But so far the desired general election is far.