On 1 May 2024, Iran held the first round of parliamentary elections. This came at a time of both great friction within the political elite and the society and highlighted regional tensions. After years of renewed economic sanctions, the inability to revive the nuclear deal, and a series of protests it was a central question how the elections would turn out. Especially in an era of once again more hardliner leadership following the tenure of the reformist President Rōḥānī.
The matter is even more important for the government on the international stage, as at the same time Tehran wages a clandestine war with Tel Aviv with its eyes on Gaza, but at the same time achieves noticeable breakthroughs with its neighbors in the Gulf.
There were many deliberations on whether the ruling elite would allow significant participation by the more moderate, reform-minded figures and give them the chance to rule the Parliament, or following the trend of the more hardliner government a similar-minded assembly would be pushed for. The question was not as much about the results, but much more about the turnout and what would that signal. Because much more than the results indicate how much the spirit of the Islamic Revolution is still alive, or the winds of change started to show.
So far only the first rounds were held and no doubt until the second round major steps are to be expected. But the results are quite contradictory. Nor the staunch supporters of the system, nor its hardline enemies can be entirely happy with what the numbers show so far.
What the elections are about in 2024?
In Iran, the parliamentary elections usually gain less attention than the presidential. The reason is that while in most Western-style parliamentary systems the party, or parties that gain the majority in the parliament nominate the head of the government, and thus set up the government, in Iran that is not the case. The Iranian government is put together by the President, who in Iran is not the head of state, that is the Supreme Leader, but the head of the government, the leader of the executive power.
That, however, does not mean that the parliament is without importance, as the government, every individual member of it has to be approved by the parliament, and is held accountable by its committees. Yet it is true that once the government is approved, the Iranian government has a wider space to maneuver than most of the West, as even without clear majority support, it can survive. And since the Iranian government has wider executive powers than most familiar ones, it has less trouble with a potentially unfriendly legislature.
The logic behind this is that there is more control over the government this way, as while in the West once a party wins in the elections it has free movement for four years, in Iran just because a president won, his government is constantly held under control by the parliament, which is elected in a completely different way. Also in most parliamentary systems if a party fails to gain a majority and has to form a coalition, such coalition governments can prove very unstable. However, in Iran, there are no such instabilities. The general idea is that once a government is elected, it has a free hand to conduct policy, but it is constantly held accountable by the legislature and its committees. Which in certain times, like when the nuclear deal was adopted by the Rōḥānī government, can be very fierce.
As a result, a president and his government can survive, and can even be successful with a parliament where his own party, or even his political camp has no majority, but no doubt it is more favorable to have such backing.
There is a plethora of political parties, they are less significant and deep-rooted and mostly serve as legal frames for notable political figures. They are more important in signaling certain tendencies, like reformists, or hardliners, or showing allegiance to certain ideological camps. The party system is even less important, as in Iran MPs are elected directly in the individual constituencies, which are either single or multi-member ones. There are no separate party lists. The party only gains some importance once the parliament is elected, so along the party lines, the MPs form relatively loose factions.
In case a candidate can achieve at least a 25% majority he wins, however, failing to do so results in a second round. Out of the 290 MPs, 285 are elected this way, while 5 members of the religious minorities (3 Christians, 1 Zoroastrian, and 1 Jew) are elected separately.
That is not, however, the only thing Iranian citizens voted for this year. They also voted for the 88 members of the Assembly of Experts, a unique political body that is tasked with the supervision of the Supreme Leader, and thus indirectly fulfilling the role of public control.
The results for far
The first round practically set the stage, though 45 seats are still vacant to be filled in the second round in May. So far four parties established themselves in the upcoming legislature, and all of them belong to the principlist, or hardliner branch.
This result is less surprising, as both in the parliamentary elections and of the Assembly of Experts many known reformist figures were not approved by the authorities. The probably most notable example is former President Ḥasan Rōḥānī, who was not only president but had been a member of the very same Assembly of Experts before. Still, he was found unfit to be a candidate for the Assembly. Such steps resulted in a campaign of boycotts, not only by reformists but by many critics of the whole establishment. Which in result will likely cause not only the loss, by the total absence of the reform camp for the next four years. Giving a smooth tenure for President Ra’īsī, but raising doubts about the stability of the system.
The game of numbers
So far we only have the results of the first round, and thus these numbers can still somewhat shift. Nonetheless, the main trends are quite obvious. Much less what they are saying.
According to the official results the turnout was 40.64% with some 25 million voters participating out of the more than 61 million eligible. Most Western sources rushed to point out that this was the lowest turnout ever in the history of the Islamic Republic. That is true, however, shortly before the elections even government polls expected a lower result of around 38%. This is only slightly lower than the results four years earlier, as in 2020 the turnout was around 42%. Furthermore, the elections went down completely calm, with no major protests, or turmoil.
This would mean that despite the series of protests, especially those after the infamous death of Mahsā Amīnī, and recent terrorist attacks in Esfahan and Kermān did not seriously lower the support for the state ruling system. Much to the bitter surprise of Washington and Tel Aviv expecting major turmoil. Looking at the absolute numbers the turnout was one of the highest since 1979, and especially the number of candidates was high. Thought that is largely due to the rapidly growing population of the country. This would mean that even though the ratio of supporters is somewhat dropping, the government still has significant support and can keep past with the newer generations, while the average age of the ruling elite is growing. So despite the high age of the revolutionary political generation, which is slowly leaving the scene, there are still good numbers in the cadres to fill the gaps, interestingly even for the hardliners.
It is also important to note that while the turnout was at its peak in the late ‘90s with 71% in 1996 and 69% in 2000, the current ratio is still not that far behind the overall average. After all in the first elections, 1980 was 51% with 20.7 million voters eligible, a number lower than those participating this year. So saying that this is the end for the Islamic Republic and the ruling elite is losing connection with the society is way too early, there are undeniable concerning signs.
Participation in the parliamentary elections is a very curious indicative in Iran. It is always less significant and less in the center of interest than the presidential elections. Also in general terms, the turnout is always lower when the actual president is in around the middle of his expected 8 years (2 times 4 years) mandate and tends to be higher if the elections are at the beginning of his term giving him a boost, or when he is closing to end his term in office, gearing up for a new leadership. In that sense, the elections this year with President Raīsī elected in 2021 fit the pattern. He is expected to stay in office for years. And thus enthusiasm is low.
However, these lowest-ever numbers of turnout, though after the second round, they can still avoid this stigma show a problem. The so far lowest numbers were four years ago, when after a participation of 59% in 2016 it dropped to just 42% in 2020. That was largely justified by the Covid pandemic keeping many people at home and with a high level of criticism against the government. So the ratio should have rebounded this year, at least to some extent. Especially since it was highly promoted by key leadership figures. And while it is true that the recent terrorist attacks, a war-like atmosphere in the region, and calls of the reform movement for boycott kept many people at home, the fact that this year the parliamentary elections again coincided with the election of the Assembly of Experts should have boosted the numbers.
The numbers themselves are far less concerning than they are shown in the West. They actually show a very solid support for the governmental structure, even in hard times like these. The problem is the trend that the share within the society is dropping and the prospect of dropping even lower in 2028. This in itself is a problem because, with the aging elite, these numbers must be boosted for a solid ground for some major changes. Supreme Leader ‘Alī Hāmeneī is becoming 85 years old in 2024 and though he is still in relatively good health, he is not expected to see many more elections. Also, the leading members of the main legislative bodies are from the revolutionary generation, making them equally old and slowly dying out. Like Chairman of the Council of Experts Aḥmad Ğannatī being 97 years old. In the next decade, the old elite in the highest echelons of power will be replaced by a newer generation and Iran will see the election of a new Supreme Leader.
For such a significant change to happen the ruling system would need to boost support to a smooth transition and that is not happening. These signs were there in 2013 when President Ḥasan Rōḥānī was elected with massive reformist support and even a breakthrough in the 2016 elections of the Council of Experts. That was the time when the best experts of the previous governments were rounded up to one administration and hopes were high after green-lighting a nuclear deal with the West. That momentum is lost. There are breakthroughs in the region, especially in the Gulf, but the economic result and the relief of the society’s burdens are slow to come, The population is rapidly growing and the newer generations are less involved in the previous generations’ ideals. The gap is growing between the mindset of the aging elite and massive numbers of the youth ever more critical with the current ways.
The end is coming?
As mentioned before, it is very overestimated to claim that the governing system of the Islamic Republic is about to crash. The results of the parliamentary elections clearly show that. Despite all the hardship, the scandalous protests, and the very tense atmosphere in the region there is still massive support for a government, which is run by the hardliners.
Also, after the collapse of the nuclear deal, which was supposed to be a game changer and the end of the economic sanctions and with the failure to revive it Tehran managed to find an alternative path. Joining the Shanghai Group and BRICS, the strategic partnership with China, the rapidly improving economic ties with Russia and Türkiye, and the unprecedented – and still somewhat surprising – rapprochement with its Gulf neighbors at a time when these Arab states are loosening their ties with Washington all indicate that Iran can significantly improve its economic situation. It can achieve relatively soon the same results that were expected by the nuclear deal. The question is the time.
Is there enough time to significantly improve the living standards and economic conditions, thus boosting inner support before the old guard leaves power? Can results be produced by the current hardline to create the necessary conditions for a safe transition? Are the foundations there for the reinvention of the Islamic Republic when soon a new Leader is chosen?
The election results this year are casting a shadow over these deliberations much more than signaling an imminent crash.