The B-Team is clearly losing ground in the last few weeks. The fall of Bolton was just one sign of it, and as expected that is so far the least remarkable. The campaign against Iran, which was at the maximum during the summer and served as the background for the “deal of the century”. Which is running out of steam, as the most prominent members of the anti-Iran block, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are facing ever growing problems.
The Emirates realizing how exposed they are, which triggered inner problems, started to distance itself from the confrontation. Not only started to move out of Yemen, but at the end of the summer also signed a security protocol with Iran about the maritime safety fo the Gulf. Israel, witnessing the second snap-elections since December 2018, still has now government even though almost a month passed by the last attempt in 17 September 2019. In that Netanyahu finally lost his majority, meaning his last attempt vicious campaign on all fronts had no effect. What is more, it met a humiliating response from Ḥizb Allah at Avivim. But the ground shook the most under another B, Muḥammad ibn Salmān, since Riyadh was practically cornered by the al-Ḥūtīs’ strike on Aramco. After which, though there was fierce reactions and confidence from Saudi that they would strike back in Yemen, they covertly signaled readiness to finally negotiate with the Anṣār Allah. News came out recently that Muḥammad ibn Salmān even reached out to Pakistan to help ease the tensions with Iran. While that attempt failed to bring anything tangible the Saudis tried once again to resort to force in Yemen, which caused one of their most bitter defeat, as Yemeni forces on 28 September eliminated three entire brigades.
These losses in the anti-Iran camp left one wonder, what the response shall be, considering all these forces are known for not taking defeat. And than, on 2 October, one of Iran’s most celebrated and feared general, Major-General Qāsem Soleymānī appeared in a long interview in Lebanon’s al-Mayadeen channel. This was most curious, since the man is usually held as a secretive person, one generally refraining from the limelight of the media, more active on the ground. And since the interview was not particularly important, mostly revolving around the details of the Lebanese war in 2006, the interview left many questions. Why now? What was the point? Why a man, who rarely talks to the media, suddenly gives a long interview on a topic not specifically urgent? What is the massage here? That came only a week after a picture was revealed with Supreme Leader ‘Alī Hāmeneī and Ḥizb Allah’s chairman, Ḥasan Naṣr Allah and Qāsem Soleymānī, which is claimed to fairly recent. Soon all these questions were, at least that seems to be the case, became answered, as a huge web of assassination attempts were revealed against all the main figures of the Axis of Resistance. All at the time, when long not seen protests shook the scene in Iraq, threatening with the fall of ‘Ādil ‘Abd al-Mahdī.
All these attempts point to the same explanation: the Empire tried to strike back. So far, it failed miserably.
They went after Soleymānī.
The aired interview with Soleymānī came as a surprise. Both because he rarely gives interviews, though sometimes holds viral speeches, and because it was not announced before. As high the anticipation was before, the interview came almost as a disappointment, as it solely revolved around the events of the July war in 2006 between Israel and Ḥizb Allah. But nothing highly relevant to the current tension in the Gulf, nor about any other sensitive segments of the Axis of the Resistance. Nonetheless, it had many revelations, which before was only rumored, but now for the first time, it became acknowledged officially.
The general vividly explained how he went to Lebanon through Syria in the early days of the war, only to meet the top Ḥizb Allah leadership. By his account, he was personally escorted through the border by ‘Imād Muġniyya, one of Ḥizb Allah’s most revered military leaders. Muġniyya was a legend in the resistance and the hero of the July war, until he was assassinated in Damascus in February 2008 in a CIA-Mosad joint operation. Soleymānī explained how closely he worked with both Muġniyya and Ḥasan Naṣr Allah, until he saw the situation desperate and returned hastily to Iran, where in Mashhad he was debriefed by the Iranian leadership. He soon returned to Lebanon with a personal message from the Supreme Leader to Ḥasan Naṣr Allah to hold out. By Soleymānī’s account the situation was many times desperate and in a number of occasions only managed to escape death by miracle. The Iranian, just like the Syrian assistance that time was quite known, but this is the first account how frequently Iranian operatives crossed over to Lebanon. And especially that Soleymānī was personally leading this effort, who was at that time far from being famous, even regionally, as he is now.
These accounts are interesting and revealing, might even be encouraging ahead of an expected Israeli revenge, but not particularly significant at this time. Not that the story is not important, but the timing is rather curious. All was left wondering as the interview was aired on 2 October late night, but the answer came the following day. On 3 October news came out in Iran that a major attempt on the life of Qāsem Soleymānī was foiled. On the the 23rd Congress of the Pāsdārān, the head of its intelligence bureau, Ḥussayn Ṭā’eb revealed that a three men group infiltrated Iran some 7-8 moths before, bought an apartment in the vicinity of the target and accumulated explosives. The plan was put some 500 kg of explosive in a tunnel underneath the ḥussayniya[1] of Soleymānī’s late father, and blow it up while the general is present, with the aim to cause mass confusion and possibly even stir up internal tensions. The apprehended operatives confessed that they were working on an Arabic-Israeli plan, which seemed so certain that in the election campaign Netanyahu hinted a huge surprise soon. Only now it became clear that he was pointing to this plan. The notion that the plan was an Israeli-Arab, or as the Iranians put it, an Arab-Hebrew one left space for speculations, which exact forces should be understood as the “Arabs”. No Iranian source reflected on that officially, but the wide range of commentators clearly pointed a finger on Riyadh, and Riyadh only. And it is for certain that if that is the case, than Pāsdārān is full aware of it. The fact that there were many attempts on Soleymānī’s life before, but never any was detailed so broadly underline the gravity of the case.
If this scenario is to be true that would mean that the Israelis and the Saudis planned a major retaliation long before. In one hand that is understandable from Netanyahu, for him the hit would have made a certain reelection, possibility even in April. However, even for the Saudis it mean that they were planning to hit Iran deep even before the major escalation in the summer, which retrospectively puts all assessments in a different angle. Since Riyadh might have hoped a game changer event in every second, and further underlines that it was not Iran, who was pushing for escalation.
So the mystery is solved just that easily. Soleymānī appeared in TV, with encouraging details of the resistance and some fresh notions to prove that he is still very much alive. Also hinting that he is still head of operations on the field, which was underlined by two subtle details. The accounts how easily he was moving between borders even in 2006, and that the set for the interview was suspiciously not Iranian. Meaning that it was either made in Iraq, or Syria. But why was so important to prove himself alive now, and why is that so significant? Only a day later it turned out that Soleymānī was not the only high priority target in these days.
And Iraq flares up again.
On 4 October a number of news outlets quoted Lu’ay al-Yāsirī, major of the city of an-Nağaf in Iraq that a terrorist cell taking advantage of the recent protests in Iraq infiltrated the old city and tried to assassinate the highest Shia authority in the Iraq, Grand Ayatollah ‘Alī as-Sīstānī. Strangely enough, very few news channels covered this event and almost all of them are pro-Iranian sources. Eventually the major clarified that the main attempt was to attack the Grand Ayatollah’s office, while the the assassination attempt is yet to be confirmed. If that comes to be true, however, we are facing a major operation in a number of fronts against the most iconic figures of the Axis of Resistance.
But even if the attempt was not directly against the Grand Ayatollah himself, which cannot be excluded, given there were a number of plots against him in recent years, there is something more telling going in Iraq, and on a much more grand scale. On 1 October major protests started in practically all major Iraqi cities, but specifically in the capital and the south against the government of ‘Ādil ‘Abd al-Mahdī. The reasons were allegations of corruption, misuse of property and power, and the complete inefficiency of the government, which now tears the country apart between Washington and Tehran. Noticeably the majority of the claims were citing economic and social matters and much less sectarian or major political trends, which were the more usual political topics in the country in the recent years, and even that of the election campaign last year. Which, should we remember, was practically inconclusive, and ‘Abd al-Mahdī was only put in office as a compromise between the biggest contenders, who were obviously not satisfied. By now the protests gained significant momentum, left more then 100 dead protesters, some two thousand wounded, and another roughly 20 security personnel lost their lives. Since a number of political heavyweights, like Grand Ayatollah as-Sīstānī, but even the Iraqi President, acknowledged the governmental problems and refrained from accusations against the protesters the government started to buckle. On 11 October the Iraqi PM announced the replacement of five ministers, which might only be the first step, and may end with his eventual dismissal.
The background of the event is rather complex, however. We should not forget that the Iraqi people have rarely seen peace and progress since the early ‘80s, therefore it is not surprising to see the situation and the patience of the Iraqi people at the end. Even the last major effort, the fight against Dā‘iš ended some two years ago, and since then nor the security did not improve significantly, nor the general conditions of the ordinary people. And their frustration understandably grew with some scandalous examples of government mismanagement. Therefore it is only logical that anyone not in power right now would give some level of understanding for the demands, since the situation is indeed very hard to defend. Also, this government is not that of any major political force, but rather a compromise, therefore it is easy for anyone to put all blame on ‘Abd al-Mahdī now.
While one can sympathize with for a number of reasons with the protesters, mostly the youth, especially since the center of frustration is in the south, so in mostly Shia dominated areas, there are a number of circumstances, which makes the event very curious. Including the allegation that as-Sīstānī was targeted. The government of ‘Abd al-Mahdī took office less than a year ago, after a very stiff elections campaign, which was the first one after the life and death struggle with Dā‘iš. Therefore, while the frustration of the ordinary men are understandable, it is rather strange while the political parties, or even the major outer forces don’t show bigger support for this government. Simply put, the answer is, that this administration tried to do the best not to lean entirely to any direction and slowly rebuild the state and its regional ties with everyone, which obviously hurt many interests. As Amaraia dealt with it before, Baghdad was desperately caught between Washington and Tehran in the last year. That is why ‘Abd al-Mahdī tried to desperately to incorporate the al-Ḥašd aš-Ša‘abī – which, as he imagined practically failed by now – and to prevent a major escalation in the region, which inevitably would make Iraq a battleground once again. That filled most of his time, which left him very little space to handle more ordinary, daily affairs. The last of these matters were the question of military installations, which were hit unknown forces. The al-Ḥašd aš-Ša‘abī and a number of parties accused America and Israel, while such a dangerous accusation would have put the government on a course ‘Abd al-Mahdī wanted to prevent. That was even more difficult for him as confirmed intel came out that the Americans were plotting for a military coup, and a number of security officers had to be dismissed by that. The Iraqi PM tried to brush the case under the rug as much as possible, but in such a case pressure was mounting on him, and something had to be done, since whatever he tried the air strikes would not stop. All these similar matters put Baghdad in a very delicate situation, and ‘Abd al-Mahdī’s careful maneuvering made most unsatisfied with him as much in Tehran as in Washington and Riyadh. That was clear as more and more outer powers started to deal with their Iraqi allies directly, as if Baghdad wasn’t even there.
And than, on 30 September, so only a day before the protests, ‘Abd al-Mahdī named Israel responsible for the air strikes. That is not the only suspicious coincidence, since the protests started the very day, on 1 October, when the al-Qā’im–al-Bū Kamāl border crossing was opened between Syria and Iraq, after more then five years. The opening ceremony was lead by none other, than ‘Abd al-Mahdī, even though he himself held up the procedures for objections by the Americans. Both the US and Israel fear this renewed crossing between Iraq and Syria, fearing that is would open space for Iranian support pouring into Lebanon and Syria. Which, probably not coincidentally, might just be the very message Qāsem Soleymānī also wanted to signal in his interview. Since if he could move around so easily in 2006, when Iraq was in American hands and even the cooperation with Syria was not on the level as today, than what else could they achieve now? What is even stranger, as if we came to see the old days of instigated insurgency under the logo “Arab Spring” in 2011 in so many Arab capitals from Damascus to Tripoli, Sana‘ā, or Cairo, unknown snipers are killing protesters, causing most of the death toll. And like in 2011 Syria, the Gulf press is sure to announce that the snipers are Iranians from the Pāsdārān. Along with this line, they are loudly venting the idea, which even many staunchly pro-Saudi Iraqi analysts as well share, that now Iran is trying to bring down the Iraqi government.
While most of these claims, like Pāsdārān snipers killing protesters, are simply ridiculous, there is some unclarity in the matter. Iran did not put the blame on foreign hands instantly, nor it moved its allies to the aid of the government. What’s more, and that is why it is so suspicious that only pro-Iranian sources claimed the assassination attempt, which might just be very true, against as-Sīstānī. Sure, the timing and the whole scenario has very suspicious American-Saudi signs all over it, since after all attempts to contain the Iraqi government, with a consensual PM, and several attempts to humble him, even with direct airstrikes, Baghdad still steadily moves towards the Axis of Resistance. That trajectory seems to be unstoppable, unless some cataclysm shifts attention again, away from strategic matters. Supposed that is correct, Tehran still has good reason not to worry and might even spin the story for its own favor. If ‘Abd al-Mahdī falls without a civil war the next likely candidate will finally come from the ranks of the al-Ḥašd aš-Ša‘abī, or once again Ḥaydar al-‘Abādī will come back. In both cases they would see a much more cooperative Iraqi government.
There are, however, other possible parties involved. Ayatollah Muqtadā aṣ-Ṣadr, the second biggest Shia cleric in Iraq, who has a huge following and his own practical army, was also extremely frustrated with the elections results in 2018 and he was also working hard to bring this government down. Which might not just be that bad for Riyadh and Washington, since in the campaign he was suspiciously getting friendlier with the Saudis and distancing himself from Tehran. And there are also a large number of Sunni, Kurdish, Turkmen and secular forces, which for all different matters would love to see this government fall, to stir up tension, and might even get something better out of it.
At the end, ‘Abd al-Mahdī, who was one of the cleaner ones after the American invasion, might jut be the shortest serving PM. It is very likely in the regional context that there are Western and Saudi hands behind the protests, while in the current tragic state in Iraq, it is very easy to stir up absolutely legitimate anger. But for the tragedy of ‘Abd al-Mahdī, he tried so desperately not to lean entirely to any side that now no one really wants to save him, all made up their plans for the aftermath. And that is why all assessment about the culprits has a certain amount of through in it.
Just like Lebanon.
If one is to think that stirring up tension with protests and changing the political landscape with unrest in not in the toolbox of Washington and Riyadh, he should be remembered that for some time the similar thing is going against Lebanon as well.
Since late August tensions went high, and even sporadic protests were reported in Lebanon about the rights of the Palestinians. And that happens in a country, which is already full of Syrian refugees, which causes equal amount of frustration. Palestinians live in large numbers in Lebanon, according to UNRWA their numbers reached 450,000 in 2014. Most of them have certain amount of rights, but their possibilities in the labor market is very limited, causing huge poverty and extreme slums in certain areas. Which was meat with an even bigger amount of Syrians since 2011. While the Syrians might go home one day, the Palestinian question is more pressing and reached a critical peak in the light of the “deal of the century”. Since if that went on, these refugees would have never left. While their condition is a huge problem, giving them citizenship, which is a demand by many, is a similarly big one. Partially in the light of the civil war in the ‘80s, but also for significantly changing the labor market.
That might seem at first as a social problem, but it has serious political dimensions. Giving citizenship to the Palestinians would mean that Israel regards them Lebanese citizens, like it happened with Jordan, and never agree to any peace plan including their return. And their stay in Lebanon is not something the majority of the society really wants. But acting against them, especially now, with a government, in which Ḥizb Allah has serious influence, would put the Shia party in a very controversial case, since they always aired support for Palestine. The keystone of the very idea of the Axis of Resistance is Palestine, therefore Ḥizb Allah can never really turn against them. Especially, since here we are not talking about a party, but a whole social group. But Ḥizb Allah cannot support their naturalization either, since that would hurt social feelings and business interest in its own support range as well.
The case was getting out of hand in late summer, as even Ḥasan Naṣr Allah had to address the issue, and an understanding was reached that while naturalization is not an option, their working and living conditions will be priority soon. That was the second inner, social issue the chairman of Ḥizb Allah dealt with in the recent past. After a major anti-corruption campaign, since there were protests in this matter as well. Themes strangely familiar now from Iraq.
What happens in Syria. Is that a coincidence?
The reopening fo the border crossing between Syrian and Iraq is a milestone, since finally gives a signal that normal life is slowly returning to the region. But as short-lived happiness may be in Iraq, the Syrians cannot celebrate either. Which is hardly a coincidence. It is more than strange that Turkey found the opportune moment just know, to start the major military operation it promised some two months ago. Officially to drive out a terrorist organization, Qasad (Quwwāt Sūriyya Dīmūqrāṭiyya – Syrian Democratic Forces), which in the eyes of the Turks is the PKK, and to create a safe zone, where some 2-3 million Syrians living in Turkey shall be repatriated.
From that point on one can really get a good grasp of Middle Eastern complexity, and can observe, how the Western, good guy vs. bad guys mentality completely falls apart. Thought the details of the matter shall deserve a special study on its own, even in a nutshell the case is quite complex. Qasad came to exist under the Americans’ wings, who created, financed and trained its troops, even incorporating Americans special forces into it, officially to fight against Dā‘iš, but in fact to finally get a foothold in Syria, and take hold of the oil fields here. So much so that Qasad, while integrating many armed groups, even took in some former Dā‘iš cell. Thanks to the American support, they were depicted as wonderful and heroic creatures, regardless the fact that even the America’s acknowledged that Qasad is in fact PKK, which is a terrorist organization even by American designations. But since they provided the excuse for the illegal Americans intrusion in Syria, that was still acceptable, at least to establishment, which still wants to tear Syria apart. Not as much for Trump, who wanted to get out, as he should, from Syria. So the Turks do indeed fight against a terrorist organization, and where they entered so far, at least these are the news, the Americans are evacuating their camps and withdraw. Which in itself tells a lot about American morals. So that should be a good thing? Well, in one hand Turkey so far viciously bombarded Syrian towns and cities cutting services in many areas, and altogether this is and illegal aggression, which itself should be something the international community stops. As it should have been with the Americans. Even more than that, the Turks move in with their so called Syrian allies, the Syrian Free Army and its allied units. These are all clearly sectarian terrorist groups, who will contribute to the similar Turkification and ethnic cleansing as they were doing in the Turkish occupied territories at ‘Ifrīn. So one ethnic cleansing, foreign sponsored terror grouping will be exchanged for another, only this time not the Kurds will drive people away, but they will be made refugees. And all will even be worse, is the prisons with thousands of Dā‘iš and other extreme elements will open, as the Americans said they will let them go.
The matter is even more complex by the fact that unlike the Western maps portraying Syrian army presence non-existent to the East of the Euphrates, the Syrian Army is still there in the bigger cities, most importantly in al-Qāmišlī, and al-Ḥasaka. Which will make it very hard for the Turks to really move deep without risking all-out war. The Kurds, seeing the American treachery, already started to negotiate with Damascus, but so far no result. Iran is also very unhappy, and seems to be caught by surprise, as on 9 October started a surprise military drill all around the Turkish border. Turkey knows that with the NATO behind it Iran will not attack it for Syria, and if that is a message that Tehran can cause nasty surprises in Syria, that is usually addressed differently. So far Iran demands a return to the Sochi agreement, and Turkey reassured Tehran, that this occupation is a short termed one.
But where is the Saudi hand in this, and what it has to do with the other events, regardless of the suspicious timing? After a very long of inactivity, the very day of the Turkish invasion Dā‘iš attacked the Syrian Army. Deep in the desert at as-Suhna they killed 17 Syrians soldiers. The attack was rapidly dealt with, but knowing that once Saudi was moving Dā‘iš in Syria and so long the organization was inactive in here, it is fair to assume Riyadh wanted to stir up tension here as well. Especially that this point lays exactly on the route between Damascus and the Iraqi border crossing.
Yemen is not too far either.
And we still haven’t talked much about Yemen, which is the eye of the storm for the Saudis. Right after Aramco they started a fresh wave of airstrikes and with their usual arrogance downplayed the Yemenis as incapable to hit them. Though at the meantime secretly started negotiations for peace. To reaffirm their resolve they moved fresh troops in from the north with the latest equipment.
Against them the al-Ḥūtīs launched operation “Victory from God” in Nağrān, about which the spokesman of the Yemeni forces held a special news conference. Three complete Saudi brigades were captured and large areas taken over. But even more humiliating that the Yemenis took hold of all the modern equipment, some haven’t even been payed for, and annihilated the entire Saudi task force.
After the interview for the CBS, the biggest Zionist, pseudo-Christian channel in US, this front would have been the most important for Muḥammad ibn Salmān. Both to prove himself a capable leader and to show that the Yemeni folder is well under control, therefore the problem is Iran. What is even more humiliating for him, is that thought the al-Ḥūtīs rejected the partial peace ceasefire from Riyadh, claiming that only a full a peace is effective, after this victory they launched a one sided ceasefire as gesture of good will. Meaning that now the Saudi frontier is at the mercy of the Yemenis. They also accepted Kuwait’s intermediation to hold peace talks, which is also an important signal that the GCC wants to see and end to the conflict.
These immense failures and the failed attempt to hit back drives the current Saudi leadership to ever more desperate maneuvers.
And it is still not over.
If indeed the Saudis, with or without the Americans and the Israelis, wanted to hit back that certainly failed. It is said that the biggest sign of weakness is aggression, and that is exactly what Riyadh proves now. On 11 October an Iranian oil tanker became a victim of terror attack at the coast of Jidda in the Red Sea. The Iranians announced that two missiles hit the tanker from Saudi Arabia. Whatever the truth behind it, it will be very for Riyadh to brush this off, since in the middle of the Red Sea only Egypt and Saudi are present, and it is very hard to imagine the Cairo would have done it. While it is not only fitting perfectly into the Saudis’ profile from Syria and Iraq to Yemen to resort to such open aggression, but it is also strangely fitting into the pattern of the last two weeks. The pattern of “empire” trying to strike back, failing and sinking ever deeper into trouble.
[1] Shia religious gathering place, mostly for remembering the death of Ḥussayn ibn Abī Ṭālib. Most public Shia mourning are held in such places.