On the night of 13 April Iran responded to the Israeli attack against its embassy and consulate in Damascus on 1 April that killed seven Iranian Revolutionary Guards advisors and commanders, including senior commander General Zāhedī. Tehran launched at least 300 drones and missiles directly against Israeli military targets, by its assessment based on the principle international law of legitimate self defense. The barrage, though was limited, but joined by non-state sides in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.
What followed was the usual and expected battle of interpretations and explanations over the level of success, and own its own about which side really won the debacle. On the one hand Iran and is allies state that they responded and reached what they wanted, giving a firm statement and promising more, in case any Israeli follow up should come. On the other hand Tel Aviv and most on its side pointed out that the overwhelming majority of the Iranian fired rockets were neutralized and practically no damages fallen.
By now this debate is getting consumed by even bigger deliberations, whether Tel Aviv should, or could respond, in which way, as both positions are solidified on a semi-final verdict vindicating victory.
While many point out that much more was expected from Iran and something is not right in Tehran’s position, the details, as usual are more puzzling.
On the way to response
Last week in Panorama we had discussed the destructive Israeli attack on the Iranian embassy and consulate in Damascus on 1 April. We presumed that Iran will definitely respond to this unprecedented atrocity, as it has hardly any choice, in case it wants to preserve it positions in the region. However, we suggested this response will come in several rounds, a first demonstrative hit on some Israeli interests in the region stating Iran hit back, and a later less public, but much more painful attack, which will be more significant.
The actual answer so far came somewhere between in one package, with a demonstrative direct strike against the Israeli positions in Palestine, but with also stating the matter is settled so far.
However, the way up to this response was equally intriguing and looked at carefully might explain much of what eventually happened.
Almost immediately after the Israeli attack in 1 April Tehran launched a diplomatic offensive, which yielded the foreseeable results. Lack of unified condemnation in the UN, blaming Iran for what the escalation, doubting the details of the attack, or that it would have linked to Tel Aviv. And even thought Tehran stated fairly soon that a military response will come, unless a firm diplomatic punishment condemns Tel Aviv, which as expected did not not happen, the question lingered on when and how this response will come.
To see this clear, Tehran had hard choices to think through. The lack of any significant military action would show it weak, and thus encourage the Israelis to go even further. This would undermine Iran’s position in the region and give incentives to regional sides once again to turn against it, or gradually turn towards Tel Aviv once again. Most Arab states that had been deliberating a possible normalization with Tel Aviv before October 2023 had to freeze, or significantly downscale this path by the outrage following the Israeli massacres in Gaza. But that path would have taken yet another incentive, in case Iran proves to be weak and thus not meaning any alternative. An overall foolhardy attack against the Israeli state and military system would either prove successful, or largely fail. If failed the result would be like not doing anything, possible even worse and would only encourage Tel Aviv to a large attack. Yet even if the attack succeeds, international opinion now – at least in words – firmly against the Israeli military actions would once against shift, pose Tel Aviv as an innocent victim, invoke economic and political sanctions and might even a large scale multilateral military action.
Anything between the two absolutes, however, would be up to deliberations and interpretations, most likely failing to reach the desired outcome, but possibly invoking severe Western and regional repercussions.
What followed was rhetoric war, in which – by now it is more visible – Tehran assessed what is the maximum level of response the West, most notably the US is willing to accept after the truly unprecedented Israeli violation of all international norms. More interesting by now that beyond some harsh statements, it was not really Tehran, nor Tel Aviv, which kept emphasizing that an Iranian military response is imminent, but Washington, almost encouraging it.
It is very significant that on 10 April, when the reports poured in the soon enough Tehran would respond the White House emphasized that it informed Iran that Washington had nothing to do with the Israeli attack against its consulate in Damascus, nor has any knowledge about it. And even though Washington is dedicated to help Tel Aviv, it appeared the White House is pressuring Netanyahu to deescalate the situation. Washington clearly started to dissociate itself from Netanyahu, or from the attack in Damascus. However, Iran kept suspense what is about to come, or even if an operation is coming or not.
On 12 April the American Axios – a noticeably well-informed website on military and strategic matters – cited American officials about message sent by Tehran through Arab states. It was mentioned which were these, but most likely Gulf states and Iraq. The allegedly written message directly addressed to the White House held that the US should step aside once the attack is coming, and thus the American positions will not be targeted. This Axios article also held that despite the message to the US, to other Western sides Iran was already signaling a limited response that would not drag the whole region into war.
Finally on 13 April – so only hours before the Iranian retaliation – Biden answering to questions in a press conference about when the Iranian operation is expected states “sooner rather than later”.
Several things is significant here. These signals well before the Iranian strike prove that some sort of communication was ongoing between Washington and Tehran, both through intermediaries and through some more direct channels. Which, in case Biden’s other statements are true that he wanted to deter Iran is rather strange. Why was Washington negotiating with Tehran, while usually the general position is threats with economic sanctions and military action? Why was the White House negotiating, especially on behalf of the Israelis, or possible in their interest, but without them?
Also, why was Iran negotiating? Why did it warn the US, and through them the Israelis about an imminent attack, if it wanted to be severe? That would indicate that they knew beforehand that the operation would not be a surprise, and thus repulsed. Why the gesture?
Also here we can see that Iran was signaling that a limited operation will be carried out, not an overall one. That is significant because after the barrage that is exactly what Tehran stated, and which is now assessed and justification for a “failed attack”.
And last, hours before the attack Biden clearly talked as if he was without a doubt about the Iranian attack. Yet, no preemptive strike was launched, nor even suggested. His statements – especially retrospectively – came out as if he hastening the strike in a sense of “Let’s get over it!”
All this point to some sort of premeditated bargaining between the US, Iran, an set of Arab and other regional states, and possibly even Tel Aviv.
Conflicting versions
Whatever truly took place before 13 April, on that night around 23:30 local time Iran launched operation True Promise. A direct attack by Iran against the Israeli military infrastructure in Palestine. That involved similar attacks by Ḥizb Allah in Lebanon, the Anṣār Allah in Yemen and the Iraqi resistance in Iraq. Noticeable, however, these were all targeting the Israeli forces. Nothing was targeting the Americans, even though since October such strikes against the American bases in Iraq and Syria are constant, and Yemen is practically in war with the U.S. and its allies.
Shortly after the first salvo of strikes was launched Iran announced the strike, stating that this is just the first response and more will shortly be in the way. The next phases lasted five hours, during which some 120 ballistic missiles, 170 drones and 30 cruise missiles were launched. Which compared to the Irani arsenal, or production capabilities is not a specifically big number. The announced targets were an Israeli intelligence headquarters on Mount Hermon – Ğabal aš-Šayh in Arabic – and the Nevatim air base, from which the attack was launched against the Iranian embassy in Damascus. By most sources these weapons were mostly not from the most modern ones, but rather the more known Šāhed-136 drones – allegedly sold in large quantities to Russia and used in Ukraine – and Šahāb-3 missiles. Interestingly nor the Iranians, nor the Israelis discuss which weapons were really used.
Following the launch Netanyahu announced that all scenarios are studied, the attack will be repelled, the air space was closed, the population was warned to take shelter and the government retired to bunkers. The Israeli air defense was activated and along with the American, British and French air and air defense forces the missiles were confronted. Jordan also activated its air force and with the help of the Americans shot down some of the missiles and drones, by which the debris caused civilian injuries. A portion of the Irani weapons reached targets, while a larger position did not. No major casualties, or death were reported. By 7 a.m. local time the air space of Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan were opened and the attack was completely over.
That is the extent was was confirmed by all sides. Yet his very loose outline left space to fundamentally different interpretations. The versions about what really took place are very different. Which led many Arab sources in social media calling this “a large fireworks”.
According to the Americans and most Western sides, 90-95% of the Iranian drones were shot down. Only a few reached the Nevatim air base, causing only minor damages and the base remained perfectly operational. Some Israeli claims went even further saying that around half of the Iranian drones fell down on their own, or failed to launch completely.
According to Tehran the first wave was launched, but shortly before the regional Arab governments were informed about it, even largely about its extent, and after the launch it was announced officially. The attack was direct, precise and well planned, reached its objectives completely and destroyed the targets.
Between the lines
These mentioned versions are not only contradicting, but even inconsistent with the positions of their source, or their usual behavior.
In case it is true that Iranian strike was a punitive measure, a retaliation for the aggression on the embassy in Damascus, why was it announced in television right away? Is it normal for an army to announce such attack in the media, even before the missiles reach their targets? Even when the Americans invaded Iraq in 2003, when the Iraqi army had no chance of withstanding the bombardment media statements did come very soon, but only after they happened. Is it normal for any army to loose all element of surprise by announcing an attack not only the whole region, but even to the closest ally of the targeted enemy? If Iran really wanted to punish, why were the most sophisticated weapons not used? Why Syria did not join the attack, while it had more than enough reason, not just because the Israeli attack was in Damascus, but because it was predated by a series of Israeli atrocities? Why no footages were shown about the missiles and drones launched, when that is usually the case since October, and nothing about the results?
These are all very pressing questions, though mostly easier to answer than the ones on the other side.
If the Israeli version is true, how come video footages show Iranian missiles crossing over the Israeli Knesset and the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem? And these footages surely believed to be genuine, as Israeli envoy to the UN Gilad Erdan – former internal security minister – used these in his argument in the UN Security Council against Iran.
Is it really normal for the Israeli air defense to let enemy missiles reach Jerusalem, cross over their parliament, and eventually reach a military base? Has that ever happened in the last three decades? And we should keep in mind that this is an attack, which was known, announced even, and the air forces of the US, Great Britain, France and Jordan took part in defeating. In a country, which allegedly has the most sophisticated air defense technology, several layer of defense and even selling this technology around the world. Why did the allegedly most sophisticated air defense, the best selling one around the world need help from any other side? What would have happened if the Iranians did not announce the attack, if they could surprise the Israelis, if they launched more and more developed missiles, or if more parties were involved? Why the Israelis show no images from the Nevatim base, at least from the level of “minor damages”, it is was so laughable? Why there is no mention about the intelligence post on Mount Hermon, nor about another Israeli base bombarded by Ḥizb Allah on the occupied Syrian Golan?
If the Iranian attack was so ineffective, why Tel Aviv wants to retaliate, talking about a definite decisions to strike back? Whatever the actual level of the attack was, what has been suggested since October 2023 many times, now became proven. The Israeli air defense is pregnable, very far its fame.
Most interesting that the Americans are still talking about deescalation. Surely they condemned the Iranian operation, but there is no real effort in punishing Iran. No economic sanctions were announced, not even any chance to threatening Iran with a possible military action, like it was the norm under Bush and Trump. Even more significant that shortly after the attack Biden stated that the Israelis should inform and ask for permission before any retaliation, and asked them not to strike back. What is more significant: “the US will prevent an Israeli counterattack against Iran”. Is it really normal for Washington to defend Iran from a possible Israeli attack? Has this ever happened, in on the level of statements?
A wider scope
The Iranian Operation True Promise, especially its aftermath showed a very different reality in the Middle East than to what it was even a decade ago. Right after the strike Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov talked to his Iranian counterpart and assured him that Russia would defend Iran in the UN Security Council. Also the Washington Post has already detailed how much Russia is helping the Iranian air defenses, which are not weak on their own. The military and economic partnership between Tehran and Moscow, which largely expanded since the war in Ukraine, but also the similarly progressing Iranian-Chinese ties make Iran a much more capable force than it was alone.
The rapprochement with the Gulf, especially the one achieved with Saudi Arabia – also under Chinese oversight – make Iran also much less vulnerable. It must be pointed out that right after Operation True Promise there were no official condemnation from the Gulf. To the contrary, even mild support was expressed. While a decade ago after such a step most Gulf states would have expressed concerns and would have blamed Iran with erupting a regional war, now due to the good and mutually beneficial prospects the these Arab states almost took no notice of the incident and keep pressuring Washington for a ceasefire in Gaza. Which makes Washington uneasy about any retaliation, as such a move would further antagonize the already broken relations with these countries.
There are, however, noticeable exceptions. There were hints about Saudi Arabia blocking the Iranian missiles crossing its airspace, but nothing was confirmed about this. However, Jordan officially acknowledged that it took part in shooting down the Iranian missiles, thus effectively defending Tel Aviv. On 16 April Jordanian King ‘Abd Allah stated that the security and sovereignty of the state is imperative and Jordan will not be a battleground for any states, stating that this is the reason why Amman helped the Americans. Yet, similar concerns were not expressed during American, or Israeli military attacks against Syria.
It shows that the normalization camp that was supposed to guarantee the security of the Israeli statelet on the long run has established pillars. But the lack of response from the Gulf, even from the Emirates show the limits of this camp, and that it is currently receding.
A deal between Washington and Tehran?
All these small puzzle indicate that whatever unlikely it may sound, whatever unacceptable it would be by the officials on both sides, there was a semi-formal, or tacit deal between Washington and Tehran. Which held that Iran has the right to hit back, to save face and have something to show for it, but this should not be seriously harmful, no major casualties, no crippling effects, and no attack at all against the American bases. At least in this round. In exchange Tel Aviv will be prevented from a serious counterattack and the matter should be settled right here and now. The arguable point – which would have needed direct talks and bargaining – was whether the Americans – and their allies – can join the defense against the Iranian strike.
That is more of less corroborated by the American and Iranian statements before the attack, and the positions and rhetorics after it.
If this supposition is true, it explains why Iran refrained from attacking directly, or indirectly any American bases, why was the attack announced, why was it limited and why most regional states were informed. That also explains why the Americans are not only not willing to retaliate, but even dissuade Netanyahu to do so. Because both sides largely kept the deal.
This also explains why the Israelis needed the help, why they accepted it and why they are desperate to signal a will to retaliate. Because they were not involved in the deal. And they don’t want to accept a new equation that they cannot strike and do as they wish in the region unpunished, only the US can.
But why was there a deal? Because that was the best interest of both sides and a compromise could and had to be reached.
Washington can hardly deny requests from Tel Aviv, but wanted to end the war in Gaza for some time, as public opinion is severely against it. And that is in an election year. Also if there is no deal, Iran might have acted alone leading to an avalanche, leading to a war in the Middle East, leading yet another quagmire, while Ukraine is still not settled, and all that in an election year, where Biden is on very shaky grounds. Washington also acknowledged that Tel Aviv went to far in Damascus, and probably was not well informed beforehand. Also, it has little ground to build up a major campaign against Iran, as it pulls closer to Russia and the Gulf states clearly not support such a track.
Iran had to safe face, but understood that it cannot push Washington into a position where it has to go into war. It cannot cripple the Israeli military, because that would ignite new wars as the outrage forced Washington into retaliation. Also a sudden and overwhelming strike would unnerve its Gulf neighbors and make them nervous about the use of such power. And thus in made a grand gesture. Showed some of what it can do, but since the aim was not a crippling attack, it did not show its most sophisticated arsenal and kept the operations limited, controlled.
Tactical wins
Despite the almost insignificant military achievements, Iran did succeed with its operation in certain fields.
First of all, it showed its adversaries that it can do much harm if cornered and somewhat assessed the Israeli defense capabilities. It showed that as final resort in can be a devastating foe.
More important, however, that it could take a military action not losing diplomatic favor. Not because it did not violate international treaties, but because kept its neighbors informed. Did not alienate them. And thus in a move that poses a new challenge to Tel Aviv. Because Tehran says that any, even the most insignificant attack against Iranian interests will be punished with not a limited, but a full scale retaliation. Which is fairly ambiguous. Does it mean Iranian advisors and allies in Syria and Lebanon, or just Iranian objects?
Will there be round two?
Tel Aviv is in a clear dilemma here. The strike was shocking, crippling to its fame in untouchability, but far from being severe enough to justify going to war. Where it has to go alone now, as the US is clearly signaling stop.
But it cannot really let this go either. The image of invincibility is damaged, and it must be repaired, otherwise the will be no deterrence against the Palestinians, no progress on the normalization path. That dilemma is exactly where Tehran won this round.
Yes, Tel Aviv stated that it will hit back to Iran. But now a small strike would not really matter in light of Gaza and would possibly ignite a bigger Iranian response with doubtful support against it. A major strike, however, might just be beyond its reach, as the U.S. and the Gulf states are not willing to help. Going ahead with a strike under such circumstances might even end up in failure further tarnishing its reputation.
The the ball is on the Israeli side now. But with an unfinished war in Gaza, mounting internal crises, with fewer allies and growing opposition there are no real ways out. Especially that by now the interests of the Israeli society, those of the state and those of Netanyahu have become completely different.