Only this week, the most conflicting indications came from Riyadh. It has become clear that the Saudi leadership is ready to make significant changes in its foreign policy and permanently settle problems about which it was never willing to make compromises.
On the one hand, a number of reports and indications suggested that Saudi Arabia is closer to joining the normalization camp with Israel than any time before and Biden can celebrate his triumph where Trump ultimately failed. And apart from the political considerations, there are talks of major investments, by which most of the Gulf countries would form a fundamental economic partnership with Tel Aviv either with, or without any political gestures.
On the other hand, just as these themes were circulating in the headlines Riyadh received the first Iranian Foreign Minister for more than ten years in an official visit. And it was the symbolic fulfillment of the agreement signed in February, as recently the embassies and the consulates on both sides started operating once again, and Tehran finally delegated its new ambassador to Saudi Arabia.
Whichever way Riyadh is truly hoping to normalize relations and form a long-lasting regional balance based on cooperation rather than confrontation, the change cannot be overstated. The indications about a possible Saudi-Israeli normalization would mean that not only one of the most influential Arab states would recognize Israel, even without settling the Palestinian case, but also the very same state is the home of the most sacred Muslim sites. Thus the psychological effect on the Muslim world about Israel and the Palestinian resistance would change fundamentally. However, ending the four decades-long distrust and animosity with Iran would also open paths for cooperation not only with a formal mortal enemy but also with an adversary of the U.S.
Yet it is also clear that both policies cannot go hand in hand. One cannot formulate a new regional equation with Israel and Iran at the same time. Coincidentally, one cannot grant the biggest diplomatic favor to Washington by appeasing Israel, while at the same time creating a regional setup in partnership with Iran, which is a huge slap to the Americans.
What are the options? And which way the rulers of Riyadh are planning their future?
Is a settlement with Israel imminent?
Only this week this question was raised a number of times, mostly in the Western press, time and again advocating that it is only a matter of time. Thus a Saudi-Israeli normalization is imminent.
Before looking into the most recent details, first, it should be assessed why would Riyadh opt for taking this step. Under Trump enormous pressure was used on Saudi Arabia to join the process the Emirates had started, and normalize relations with Israel. Thus the most symbolically important Muslim state would practically turn the page on the Palestinian matter and open diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv without solving the question of the occupation. Yet at that time, it was felt that whatever the incentives are, the time is not right and Riyadh cannot commit to such change.
Since then there were minor gestures to ease the pressure, like opening the kingdom’s airspace to Israeli commercial flights, or not reacting to the suggestions that economic deals are already ongoing between Israel and the Saudi state. And in this regard time proved the Saudis right, as Tel Aviv descended into the broadest political division and the security grip on the occupied Palestinian lands was shaken time and again.
The opportunity passed and with the circumstances changing, especially since the Biden administration was way less resolute to push forward the normalization process than its predecessor and the overall Saudi-American relations also hit an all-time low, there was no real need for Riyadh to deal with the matter. Nor to commit to it, nor to categorically renounce it.
Under Trump, the main rationale for Saudi Arabia joining the normalization camp was to gain more favor with the United States, gain more support in Yemen, and with the overall anti-Iran policy. This was further sweetened by investment opportunities for the kingdom, which was already turning towards fundamentally restructuring its economy and vitalizing its business model deeply lagging behind its Gulf neighbors. Along with these political gestures and economic benefits Washington would have delivered the most state-of-the-art weaponry possible and finally green light the Saudi nuclear program. Yet with Biden taking office, the weapons deals were severely cut back, the political support diminished and even a very accord anti-Saudi posture was taken by Biden. This led to a dead end in this path forcing Riyadh to rethink its strategy and contemplate other options.
This week, however, first it was reported that Saudi Arabia for the first time tasked its ambassador in Jordan to represent the kingdom in Palestine as well. Meaning that with shifting the former policy the Saudi ambassador in Amman would be a non-resident ambassador to Palestine and a consul to Jerusalem as well. On 12 August Ambassador Nāyif ibn Bandar as-Sudayrī, a member of the very influential as-Sudayrī branch of the Saudi royal family to which the king himself also belongs, presented his credentials to Palestinian Presidential Advisor Muğdī al-Hālidī.
While this raised many questions about the true intentions of the Saudis with the obviously symbolic gesture, Tel Aviv almost immediately vehemently condemned it and stated that it will not allow the opening of a Saudi consulate in Jerusalem.
Indeed this step can be understood both ways, though no doubt it is only symbolic and will not change anything on the ground, as the Saudi ambassador will surely not visit Jerusalem. That would need direct engagement with the Israeli authorities, which neither side wish for before any formal diplomatic agreement. On the one hand, the gesture can be understood as a step for the normalization of a pilot project, using the perfect pretext for indirect engagement with the Israeli side and opening investment opportunities formally only to the Palestinian side. Indeed this was suggested by many sides in the West. On the other hand, it can be also understood as completely the opposite. Since Saudi Arabia recognizes the Palestinian Authority both as a state and an Arab League member, it can hardly raise its diplomatic recognition. Yet in an indirect way now it does, in a way provoking the Israelis and signaling that Riyadh will not only refrain from normalizing but will even increase its support for the Palestinians.
It is important to add that despite the troubled relations between Washington and Riyadh in the last two years, recently there have been deep negotiations between the two sides. The Americans want the Saudis to distance themselves from Russia and stop taking economic gestures to it but also push for a normalization with Israel, which could be a major success for Biden in the upcoming elections next year. According to the insightful sources the Saudis are somewhat willing to accept these points, but in exchange, they want the continuation of the former arms deals, want security and guarantees, and substantial help in launching the kingdom’s civilian nuclear program. That latter is the biggest obstacle, as it would need Israeli acceptance and two-thirds approval by the American Congress. Which is almost impossible to gain, as the Republicans would unlikely to contribute to such a diplomatic success for Biden, but also Israel is vehemently against it.
The appointment of the Saudi ambassador to the Palestinian Authority might signal a gesture to engage more directly with Tel Aviv, but also to express dissatisfaction. However, where the explanation for this being the prelude for normalization comes short is that it contradicts the usual Gulf behavior. If there was indeed a step for normalization, it would have been masked by financial incentives, increase financial aid to the Palestinian leadership, and investments. There are rumors that Jared Kushner. Trump’s son in law massive Gulf investments are already on their way to Israel itself, these are mostly rumors in the American press and much more tied to personal connections than to formal state policies.
It is dubious what are the real intentions of these steps. Riyadh might be probing the reactions and slowly paving the way for a future normalization. But just as much can show dissatisfaction and raise the stakes with the Americans, while trying to gain more favorable treatment by Washington, exploiting the now receding influence of the U.S. in the region. Either way, looking at the broader picture with an excellent relationship with Moscow and an abysmal one with Biden, it this very unlikely that the Saudis would make any major change before the American elections. Though no doubt until then Washington will use more and more pressure.
A new setup with Iran
Also this week, on 17 August Iranian Foreign Minister Ḥosseyn Amīr ‘Abdollahiyān arrived in Riyadh on an official visit, the first one for ten years. And right away had a very cordial press conference with his Saudi counterpart Fayṣal ibn Farḥān. What is more, later on, he and the delegation accompanying him was personally received by Saudi Crown Prince Muḥammad ibn Salmān.
While that itself is remarkable, especially at a time when there are speculations about a possible Saudi-Israeli normalization, this is just the most recent step in a process that came with the breakthrough in February, when under Chinese mediation Iran and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement to normalize their relations. According to this agreement, the two sides would reopen their embassies and consulates within three months – it actually took almost seven months – and settle their disputes.
Since the agreement both Iran invited the Saudi King, and Saudi Arabia the Iranian President for a state visit. More significantly there has been a number of direct meetings and negotiations, and both sides openly talk about setting up a new regional cooperation. That would include security and even military cooperation, economic relations, and joint projects, mutual investments, and there have been indications that this could be widened to a regional level. In other words into an Iran-GCC security and economic partnership. That was once again reiterated by Amīr ‘Abdollahiyān in Riyadh and the Saudis had no objection to this.
No doubt there is little real trust between the two sides and there is a level of discomfort with the new realities. But there is an obvious political endorsement by both leaderships and a policy of small positive gestures is followed. In early June the Iranian embassy in Riyadh was reopened after seven years, while the Saudi embassy opened its gates in Tehran on 9 August. On 13 August the Saudi Consulate was also reopened in Mashhad. On 17 July Saudi Foreign Minister Fayṣal ibn Farḥān visited Tehran to pave the way for these steps.
The magnitude of this change in Saudi foreign policy cannot be overstated, as now the two sides are not simply turning the clock back to 2016 when relations were cut, but even back to an era in early 2000, when cautious initiatives were taken to create sustainable coexistence in the region. Tehran and Riyadh are not returning to a state of cold war between themselves, but actually moving forward overcoming the legacy of the last four decades. Though it is less vocally expressed there is an understanding between the sides now that Iran is ready to permanently give up the “export of revolution” policy followed after the Islamic Revolution in 1979 – and tacitly abandoned by the late ‘90s -, and in exchange, Saudi Arabia is giving up its aggressive stance against Iran inviting ever more foreign support for that. What is more, both sides are talking about economic partnership and joint investments, so to some extent the Saudis are willing to circumvent the American sanctions against Iran and contribute to its development. Even more impressive that both sides openly talk about security and military cooperation, though the limits of this understanding are still very vague. Equally surprising that Riyadh is willing to extend this cooperation to a regional level to the GCC at a time when practically all GCC member states – apart from Bahrain – are also rapidly improving their ties with Tehran.
While that seems very promising for the stability of the region, there is a logical question here: Why? What would the respective parties gain from this? In fact, a lot on both sides.
From Iran’s point of view, while there is distrust about the GCC neighbors for them hosting American military bases easily usable against Iran, the former policy to undermine these governments and force the Americans to leave has been abandoned for some time. While by the 2000s it was understood that there is no sufficient power for that, now there is no need. American relations with practically all GCC member states are rapidly declining – though they are still very strong – so there is more benefit to stimulating these changes and offering a coexistence. In which there is no need for extreme military spending, but rather there is a horizon for economic cooperation. And in the same context, if there is a real possibility for Saudi Arabia to follow the example of the Emirates and Bahrain and normalizes its relations with Israel, it is clear that this cannot be halted by threats or power. That would even exacerbate the process. Iran is offering an alternative. Instead of a mutually destructive confrontation, Iran is offering access to its markets, and investment possibilities and sharing its technology with the GCC members. Overall, it is more promising for Iran to create a joint security mechanism preventing any direct threat from these states, while on the other hand offering assistance. Especially now that there is a rift between Washington and the GCC members, which from Tehran’s point of view must be exploited.
But why is it important for the Saudis? There are direct objectives and broader long-term goals. The Saudi leadership has understood that Iran by now cannot be put in the corner by military or economic means. The Americans couldn’t do it, the Israelis are not overall successful with it, and four decades of animosity brought no tangible result. The case of Yemen is a very sobering example in this context, where it was imagined that a swift military operation can set up a new, friendly government and the Iranian influence cannot be squeezed out. But the operation ended up in a dragging war that is depleting more and more resources. While on the other hand, Iran with much smaller resources spent could keep the situation under control. Indeed Yemen is the testing ground for the rapidly warming Iranian-Saudi relations. If that goes well, Iran can be a very useful mediator to reach a dignified conclusion for Riyadh and end this war of attrition. With Iran appeased by economic means it can be persuaded to respect the Saudi interests and even a very lucrative partnership can be achieved.
There are, however, long-term considerations as well. It is not at all a coincidence that the agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia was signed in China. While the United States’ role in the region is receding, China’s investment and economic power are already at the doorstep. Whatever technology and infrastructure development cannot be obtained from the West – including nuclear technology -China is happy to provide. But Iran already has an edge with its strategic partnership signed with China. So if the Gulf wants to be an active part of the Chinese economic revitalization a sustainable setup must be achieved with Iran. Russia is also a very important factor in this context, as the war in Ukraine has already shown how wide-raged the Russian-Iranian cooperation can go. And as Saudi Arabia is also pulling closer to Russia now, this is also a reason why Iran is important. So much so that after decades of threats and pressure now even the Americans are trying to persuade Tehran to lower its support for the Russian military not by newer threats and sanctions, but by tempting offers.
Which way to go?
As we can see, there are incentives for both ways. Saudi Arabia might eventually join the normalizing camp, but there is no real steam behind this current now. In the meantime, it is experimenting with policy appeasement and compromises with Iran, as there are common interests.
If that could go through, one of the main hotspots for tension in the Middle East could de-escalate and might even develop into a mutually beneficial economic partnership.
Either way, there are impressive changes in Saudi foreign policy in these weeks, while Riyadh is still slowly drifting farther from Washington.