If the GCC Summit held in the Saudi city of al-‘Ulā almost two months ago was the beginning of the return for Qatar as a dominant player in the region then this week was the first – and probably not the last – major victory is regained might. This week the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Turkey, and Qatar launched a new political process to solve the Syrian crisis and it was hosted in Doha. With this Qatar gained a dominant role in one of the most important and central matters of the current Middle Eastern relations. Because the fate of the Syrian crisis will determine a lot about pending issues of Lebanon and Iraq and will have huge consequences around the entire region. And by being a central player in this, Qatar practically replaced Iran, since so far Moscow favored the Astana process.
There are also major developments in the region all around. Turkey is mending face with Egypt and their relations are improving with each passing day. Amidst the imminent liberation of the city of Ma’rib in Yemen and the total collapse of the Saudi protégées there Turkey agreed to support Riyadh with diplomatic moves, drones, and even mercenaries deployed in Syria. Suddenly the Emirates reopened the matter of Syria’s return to the Arab League, and now that was met with full Saudi support. And suddenly all the Gulf states formerly sieging Damascus and trying all they could to topple its government not only expressed support, but also the wish to remove the American “Caesar Act” suffocating the Syrian economy. There is a visible American restraint and a much milder tone towards Iran. Also, there are signs of a Saudi-Irani rapprochement, which yet to be translated into an agreement in Yemen, where Tehran and Riyadh are supporting different sides. There is one common feature in all these developments: Qatari mediation.
This network of mediations goes far beyond certain matters, however, and it seems as Qatar is involved in all major developments in the region. Which is a surprising feat from such a small-looking country. But it has benefits also thought to impossible before. Indeed four years after the suffocating blockade was started against it now Qatar seems to be stronger than ever. But just how strong Qatar has become with its recent victory?
A hub of negotiations.
With all the matters considered in which Qatar is involved now in the region – used in the broadest sense possible – Doha seems to be surprising safe heaven of peace talks. Surprising, as otherwise, we hear relatively less from this small state than its Emirati neighbor, and surprising, because Qatar was itself heavily involved in many controversial maneuvers in recent years. Which would not make it an ideal neutral mediator, like Switzerland in Europe, or so far Oman was in the regime. Nonetheless, the vast network of intercrossing negotiations is indeed impressive.
For years now, and by now that has promising results, Qatar facilitated peace negotiations between the Ṭālebān in Afghanistan and the U.S. But recently it also signaled readiness to help negotiations between Washington and Iran. This has been so far hindered by attacks in Iraq and Syria by the Americans against groups close to Iran, and their successful attacks against military targets in Iraq. Regardless of that, however, there is a much healthier atmosphere between Washington and Tehran than it was five months ago, and the recent visit by the Qatari foreign staff to Tehran right after al-‘Ulā showed how deeply Doha is dedicated to helping this process.
However, Qatar is also supporting a rapprochement between Iran and the Gulf in general. Especially with Saudi Arabia, which even a year ago wanted to destroy Doha. So far that is received worse reception than the mediation with the Americans, but the trajectory is clear and the Emirates has shown signs of changing policy towards Iran. While Riyadh might not be too ready for talks with Tehran, there are several reasons while this cannot be avoided for much longer. The Americans ended all open relations with the Saudi Crown Prince, who practically runs the country. Consequently, all formal state relations between Washington and Riyadh came to a halt. That itself is harmful, but especially now, as the battle for Ma’rib, the last major Saudi stronghold in Northern Yemen is closing to its end. To avoid this humiliation Riyadh tried in vain for years to attract bigger American support. And if there were any hopes for that, not is clearly an illusion. So there are only two ways out. Either to reach a deal with Iran and in this way, Tehran would push Sana’a for a settlement, or to attract new military allies.
Though it is lightly denied, all assessments point to Qatari mediation between the government in Sana’a and Riyadh, which role was filled before by Oman. That seems plausible, as one of the accusations against Qatar in 2017 was that Doha hindered the war effort in Yemen. If that suggestion is correct, it is surely inseparable from the general dialogue between Riyadh and Tehran. However, recently the Saudi-Turkish rapprochement brought results and Ankara took the side of Riyadh after the successful Yemeni strikes against vital Saudi installations. What’s more, Ankara has already delivered developed Bayraktar drones to the Saudis in Yemen, which proved to be so successful in Azerbaijan a few months ago. Also, there are field reports in Syria saying that massive contingents of mercenaries are to be redeployed from Syria to Yemen. No doubt it was arranged by Qatar, or at the very least with its full knowledge and blessing.
The very same pattern seems to emerge around Egypt now, which on the one hand severed its relations with Saudi Arabia, but improves them with Turkey on the other. In both trajectories, Qatar is involved easing the tension for one and paving the way for the other.
Once we consider how isolated was Qatar four, but even two years ago and how indispensable it became even for its former enemies, we can start to understand the price of mediation. Thought Qatar is far from being innocent in most of these regional conflicts.
Why Syria matter?
A major meeting was scheduled for this week between Turkey, Russia, and Qatar in Doha about Syria and starting a new process for a political solution. Even though, Doha is still on very bad terms with Damascus. How important that was even before it started shows in the sudden appearance of Emirati Foreign Minister ‘Abd Allah ibn Zāyid in Moscow in an otherwise uneventful meeting with his Russian counterpart Lavrov. After that, the Emirati Minister not only expressed that it is time for Syria to return to the Arab League – thus fulfilling its victory on all the attempts to destroy it -, but also lightly criticized the American sanctions against Syria as an obstacle to helping the reconstruction. And suddenly this was met with a completely same statement by Riyadh on 10 March, when Lavrov visited Saudi Arabia on the way to Qatar.
It should be noted that in December 2018 the Emirates reopened its embassy in Damascus – a move hasn’t taken by either Riyadh or Doha – and roughly a year ago there was an Emirati statement promising support for Damascus. So that is not entirely new. But at that time that had no Saudi backing and eventually, nothing came of it. By now we can see that both Riyadh and Abū Zabī were perfectly aware of the significance of what is about to happen in Doha, and they did not wish to appear following the Qatari lead. So they to a “preemptive diplomatic strike”, knowing that they have no choice but to accept this trajectory.
Eventually in the meeting, which ended on 12 March 2021 Russia, Turkey and Qatar agreed to launch a new political process for the sake of a political solution to the Syrian crisis. In this, they agreed to guarantee the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Syria, interestingly even against separatist intentions threatening the Syrian unity. A clear reference to the American-Israeli-supported “Qasad” militia in Northeastern Syria. This new process will in a way replace, or go hand in hand with the Astana process. Meaning that Qatar will replace Iran in the talks about Syria, or at least will be an equal partner to it in a separate forum. Which is an impressive achievement. Especially that while in the Astana model Syria has two allies against Turkey, now in this format there is only Russia to be on Damascus’s side. But how is that possible?
It is probable that the details roll around Ma’rib now. For weeks now there is growing tension in Northern Syria. Turkey was rearranging certain observation posts evacuating some, but also pulling in resources. At the same time, there were suggestions that the Syrian Army might start a new offensive in Idlib soon. The Russian-Syrian strikes against the terrorist factions indeed grew and recently Syria bombed oil refineries in Aleppo smuggling Syrian oil to Turkey. There was interestingly almost no reply from Turkey. Highly connected to that matter, the biggest problem for Turkey was the mercenaries it trained and built up in Syria during the years of the crisis, as there is the question of what to do with them if the Syrian forces retake Idlib and Northern Aleppo.
One way to dispose of them was to send them to Europe with the refugee waves, but that route was blocked even before the Corona pandemic and by now came to an almost complete halt. Their deployment in Libya and Azerbaijan decreased their numbers, but not significantly and the end of both wars meant their return.
And that is where Yemen is different. Unlike Libya and Azerbaijan, the war in Yemen attracts little attention from the West, therefore causes way less trouble. On the contrary, sending them to support the Saudi war effort now helps the standing on Ankara, not harms it as before. Also, while in Libya and in Azerbaijan these mercenaries were sent to an open, or even winning war effort, in the case of Ma’rib they will be sent to battle practically over. Meaning there will be few survivors. Much of the mercenary problem can be “drained” to Yemen, where they will be disposed of, or sent in smaller quantities to Saudi Arabia.
That is a win for Saudi Arabia winning support and able mercenaries, later on, a win for Turkey reducing these highly problematic elements, a win for Russia removing these groups and doing a favor for Damascus, and in the meanwhile helping the relations between all these sides. And at the same time that makes little harm to the relations with Iran, as the fate of Ma’rib is already sealed.
The agreement about Syria also meets the needs of many parties. The indirect, but clear notions about the Qasad militia support the Turkish position but also helps Damascus now. It also signals that Saudi Arabia and the Emirates have to stop supporting Qasad, which partially had already happened, and it is the ideal time to force such policy on Riyadh. Especially that it was mostly maintaining its military support for Qasad because of the intense American pressure. But now Washington cannot really ask favors from Riyadh.
And last, but not least the launch of yet another process, which is now even supported by the
Gulf states criticizing the sanctions imposed by the previous administration gives enough space for Washington to maneuver and while showing irritation can start reducing its engagement in Syria.
The price of mediation.
Meeting all these interests at the same time granted Qatar huge advantages. Partially because of its mediation in Afghanistan Washington never supported the blockade against Doha. Which could’ve easily happened. The firm support for Turkey protected it from military occupation by its neighbors, and now building on it Doha brings new benefits for Turkey. Thus further securing this alliance.
Capitalizing on the perfect ties with Ankara, now Doha improves its ties with Riyadh and all over the region greatly regaining its positions lost since 2017. Which will soon manifest in Sudan, Tunisia, and all over the region.
Also by not joining the normalization process with Israel Qatar still appears better in the overall Arab fold, and now has a chance to influence yet another key Arab matter: Palestine. Where so far the Emirati-Israeli alliance has a huge advantage. All over the region, we can see that Qatar is improving its positions, and almost everywhere at the expense of its biggest rival and nemesis, the Emirates.
The lessons to be learned
If we compare these results with those of the Saudi Crown Prince the difference is striking. Even though Qatar is vastly overpowered by Saudi Arabia and the Emirates joined together in funds, manpower, arms, and even allies in the Arab world, it managed to survive the biggest possible pressure. And in the last four years, it enjoyed practically no support from Washington.
At the same period, the leadership in Riyadh plunged itself into a war in Yemen, which now it loses. Supported coups, and coup attempts in Qatar, Sudan, Tunisia and so many places, which have no benefit now. Lost the trust and support of its key allies in Cairo and Abū Zabī, and eventually brought upon itself the wrath of Washington. And to keep maneuvering it had to resort to asking help from its former enemies Turkey and Qatar.
The difference is striking. Surely funds and strategic positions had much to do with it, but the success of Qatar is a lesson to be learned from. Because these extensive and influential ties made it able to survive, where much bigger regional players failed. And thus even during a very active foreign policy.