It was in the year of 751 AD that the Arab and the Chinese world first moved the course for global history together. The armies of the freshly founded Abbasid Empire and the Chinese Tang Dynasty met on the battlefield of the Talas River. Both empires meant the zeniths of their respective civilization’s medieval era, and both were at their peak when their spheres of influence crossed in modern-day Kyrgyzstan. The battle was won by the Arabs, but no there were no real winners. Soon the area they fought for and won by the Arabs got lost by both, as both emirates fell into decay, and never again did the paths of Arabs and the Chinese have crossed on a grand scale in globally significant ways. Until the last week.
It is therefore somewhat ironic that almost twelve centuries after this first violent encounter the two sides find the best partners in each other to reshape the global equation.
Though it brought very little attention in the West, between 7-9 December Saudi capital Riyadh hosted three major forums, all held and co-chaired with Chinese President Xi Jinping. During these meetings some 30 agreements were signed, setting up an investment project with some $29 billion. Yet this is only a thin icing a much bigger cake.
Behind the customary diplomatic slogans and the huge and truly incredible business deals what is really significant is the prospect. Saudi Arabia, even recently the most dedicated and self-sacrificing ally of Washington in the Middle East is not only distancing itself from the U.S., not only cutting hefty deals with Beijing but transforming itself into a nexus of Arab-Chinese partnership.
This is very much about the future. The three summits held last week in Riyadh have significance that probably won’t be fully understood for years. But comparing Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia in July and what he had achieved, it shows that something has changed.
Gesture for gesture
In a symbolic, but a very serious step, both sides made historic statements to please the other. Or at least had this intention.
On the one hand, Algerian Prime Minister Aymān ibn ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān confirmed that the Arab world support Beijing’s One China policy. Meaning that the Arab states would not recognize a separate Taiwan in case it decided to claim full independence, and politically would be on PRC’s side. This might have been a unilateral Algerian initiative to assume a leading Arab position during the negotiations or take a further gesture and Chinese mediator in the Arab world as the ties between Beijing and Algiers have warmed up significantly in recent months, it is noticeable that this stance got to the final document of the Arab-Chinese Summit. It has become in a way a formal policy.
On the other hand, even more shockingly China generally avoids controversial matters with no direct implications for its own security or immediate interest, the Chinese President gave support to the Palestinian cause. On 9 December during the opening ceremony of the Arab-Chinese Summit, he said: “The injustice the Palestinians are suffering from cannot continue!” Following this Xi also stated that China fully supports the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and also its full U.N. membership. Thus Beijing is very clearly taking sides not only along with the Arab general public – unsurprisingly in an Arab country in an Arab-Chinese forum -, but more importantly against Israel, which so far was not seen in a negative light by China.
Of course, these are more statements than actual programs. The Arab states would, or even could do very little if Taiwan chose to declare independence and invited the U.S. to protect it. Or if war broke out in, with, or about the island. After decades of unshakable determination in political statements supporting Palestine, the Arab world as a whole could actually achieve surprisingly little. Nor could it sort out its internal conflicts, as Arab states are usually most directly undermined by fellow Arab states. So it is very questionable how much they could actually help China in case of a conflict.
It is equally questionable what would China really do to achieve the establishment of a Palestinian state, as it would surely not send troops to create it, nor would pour massive sums, or arms to just support the Palestinian insurgency.
Nonetheless, beyond the slogans, there is significance, and there is a trade-off for both sides. What China really wins is the vote of 18 Arab U.N. member states, and possibly another 5-15 other Muslim states for its position on Taiwan in the U.N. Also these states individually, collectively and through their international organizations like the Arab League can form an international opinion in favor for China. So, China wins votes and a massive PR campaign, all for a political stance in a matter completely insignificant either way for it. Yet that does not mean that the Palestinian side does not win with it, as it finally could aspire to gain a voice and constant supporter in the U.N. Security Council. Of course, it does not mean passed resolutions in favor of the Arab side, but at least Arab interests are kept on the agenda. At least whenever it is convenient for China.
This might not be a strong or very direct alliance but shows that new trajectory that relations are not about money and investments anymore. Way beyond that, it has become a matter of politics and even hard power.
Towards a military alliance?
Of course, China is primarily an economic global power, and not militarily. At least not in the traditional sense of having the capacity, or showing interest in building up a military presence abroad. However, in the last two decades, Beijing started to appear as a dominant power in the Middle East in fields previously held exclusively by the U.S., the Europeans, and Russia. That is weapons sales.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Institute, arms sales in the period between 2016 to 2020 went up exponentially compared to what it was between 2011 and 2015. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the growth was 386%, while with the Emirates around 169%. These numbers are somewhat misleading, as China is a relative newcomer in this market, which was almost exclusively held by the Americans. Though still impressive, as the first arms deals between Riyadh and Beijing only date back to the mid-90s.
At that time Saudi Arabia purchased a limited amount of midrange missiles. Now it buys Chinese drones, especially reconnaissance ones much needed in Yemen, but not really provided by the U.S. anymore, nor their services. Riyadh has also tried to buy a large number of Turkish drones since the great rapprochement with Ankara, but as they are much needed in Azerbaijan and in Ukraine, or for whatever other reason, they have not arrived in large numbers. So China has become the alternative and in big numbers. And since the U.S. is now reluctant to sell the most modern airplanes, like the F-35, thus Saudi Arabia has no fifth-generation plane, and Riyadh also turned towards Beijing for more.
There are huge horizons in this field for China, as the Middle East is a constantly growing market for weapons, and the Gulf has the funds for it. The Chinese also have a very good reputation. In the late ‘60s another Muslim country famous for its massive military, Pakistan started a partnership with China. That was so successful that by around 2014 Pakistan itself was taking 47% of the Chinese arms export. The cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad, however, also included joint development, mostly warplanes, reconnaissance crafts, and naval vessels. And since Pakistan also has good cooperation with most Gulf countries where it provided assistance in a number of missions, the logic is clear: What was good enough for Pakistan, it will be good enough for us too! And of that line, there are counties, like Algeria, that have been purchasing Chinese military equipment in the last two decades on a progressing scale and the partnership here grows as well. So, there are good references. And if the Americans don’t wish to sell what is needed, then either Russia, either China can fill in. And as Russian military prowess is being humiliated in Ukraine, China has a huge military-economic gap to fill.
In a time of course, just like with Pakistan, the partnership can expand to joint projects and jointly run bases, mostly naval ones. Especially in areas of common interest, like Somalia, Yemen, and the Indian Ocean. There have been warning signs for that already, as the scandal of the Emirates showed. In November 2021 the Americans raised concerns about a Chinese building project in Abū Zabī, which they claimed was a secret naval base in the process, right next to an American one. The project was canceled and the Emiratis claimed they had no idea of such intentions. This is very hard to believe, or might just be a fabricated warning by Washington against the growing bond between China and the GCC states. What is significant, however, is that only one year following this scandal now we have such a major triple summit, which clear intentions of expanding military cooperation. And once again, today there were American warnings against the Riyadh summits. But unlike a year ago, these ones are now largely ignored.
So would that mean that the Arab or the GCC states would turn away from America and substitute it with China? That is absolutely not the case, at least not in the next decade, far from it.
But first of all, there is a clear difference here between states that have been American allies in the last few decades and those beyond the American orbit with considerable military prowess. Among the latter states like Syria, Algeria, and to a large extent Iraq never really bought American weapons, therefore there is no substitution. And for a number of reasons, there is no real market gap here for China, except in Algeria to some extent.
The real question is whether the former strong American allies, like the GCC states, Jordan, Morocco, or Egypt would become major Chinese military partners. Especially the Gulf with its huge resources and strategic position. Because once the economic and military partnerships both shift toward China the American alliance can start to decay fast.
But there are still around 50 thousand American troops in 14-16 bases around the Persian Gulf and one complete American naval fleet with its headquarters in Bahrain. And these are just the official numbers. Added to that the high level of institutionalized cooperation between these states and the Americans, and the very intimate intelligence partnership the picture is clear. Even if some sudden political will in all of these states wanted to expel the Americans to call in China into its place that cannot be done. The message is the trend. Will these bases be there in 15-20 years? Fifty years ago China was not on the Saudi horizon economically, diplomatically, and especially not militarily. Now China is the biggest economic partner, a massively important diplomatic countermeasure even overweighting the Russians, and an interest had arisen for military cooperation.
The real significance
The three summits in Riyadh last week with the Chinese President had two distinct goals. First, cut deals and make massive amounts of profit, while China secures energy supplies and progress for its production in the long run. The energy export of the Gulf has been shifting toward East Asia for more than two decades now, and it has become the primary market with China, India, Japan, and Korea at the lead. This is not new, however, this partnership can be built upon, especially in the middle of an energy crisis. What the Western, especially the European partners avoid doing, is signing long-term, 15-20 years of energy supply contracts with the Arab states, betting on eventually lowering prices. The East Asia countries, however, have no such problems, thus guaranteeing stable incomes without possible complications in times of plummeting global market prices. As a result, now that the EU countries are rushing to expand the energy supplies from the Arab world, these states are not that fast responding to these demands, as they have their expanding Asian markets to rely on.
It is also not new, that most Arab states hungry for investments and technological support in infrastructural development are happy to get involved in China’s Road and Belt Initiative. Which is paving a massive trade express highway to Europe. What is a bigger development that now the GCC is not only opening gates for that but in fact eager to be the nexus of it. This means that the Chinese trade highway is edging on Europe very fast.
What is really new, however, is the growing partnership and the ways it develops now between China and the Gulf. An interesting idea is that Saudi Arabia accepted a deal to set up Chinese factories within Saudi Arabia, thus diversifying its economy. But also, Chinese factories take advantage of the low cheap energy in the Gulf, and the much shorter transport to the European markets.
Second, it sent a clear message that China is a really great power partner that finally let into the Gulf, and through it the Arab world. There are no limitations anymore, and the U.S. has a competitor.
One compares how Biden was accepted in July in Saudi Arabia in his grand Middle East tour, and what reception Xi Jinping got this week, the intention to send a message is clear.
The former absolute American dominance in the Gulf and over Egypt and Iraq, thus having control over much of the Arab world is shaken. It can be repaired and no doubt the Americans will work on it. But so far there is no real indication of that by the current administration, which is rather bogged down fighting ideological wars. And if they don’t want to appease the Arab world soon enough, they will have China to rely on.