In the early hours of Saturday 26 October 2024 Tel Aviv carried its long promised attack against Iran, this time directly and admittedly. This more than 3 weeks Iranian Operation True Promise 2, which itself was a retaliation to the Israeli assassinations and attacks on Iranian soil. Thought this latest Israeli attack against Iran was highly advertised as to be “crippling” and that “the Iranians would even know what hit them”, the results were less than convincing, even by the acknowledgments of the Tel Aviv regime itself. It was supposed to be a “game changer” that will cripple the Axis of Resistance and will once again bring a number of Sunni Arab states close to normalize relations with Tel Aviv. And game changer it is, but to a very different direction.
It is less clear that Tel Aviv’s failure was due to the lack of trying, or that because it met a much more serious retaliation that it was expected, but the failure is undoubtable. Which raises the question why it was even tried, if the outcome was not guaranteed, or was “not aiming” to be crippling. There has been many attempts to rationalize this point, but the what is significant that with this move Tel Aviv not only failed with a military action, but also diplomatically and at a time when it suffers rapidly growing setbacks in its war against Lebanon and even in Gaza.
The Israeli regime could not convince, either directly or through Washington, any Arab states to turn a blind eye to this operation and cooperate. Which is significant, because this move came after almost a month of intensive Iranian regional efforts to convince the regional states no joint any action against Tehran, and a week after similarly intense American diplomatic maneuvers in the region.
What exactly we know so far about the Israeli aggression on 26 October? How big is the setback for Tel Aviv? Has it reached a limit to its capabilities, a breaking point, after the first serious signs have surfaced that the war ongoing for more than a year now is soon to be over?
The Israeli attack
The Iranian Operation True Promise 2 on 1 October was a severe shock to Tel Aviv and a very telling sign of its weaknesses. The operation that came in response to a number of attacks against Iranian targets and assassinations within Iran itself was carried out by around 200 missiles, only targeting military targets and the great majority of them hit their targets with precision. The three most important Israeli air bases and the Mossad headquarters in Galilot close to Tel Aviv were hit. Dozens of video footage and later satellite images all document how well Tehran managed to strike the Israeli military.
Despite all the attempts to downplay the significance of this event, it was clear to see that Tehran can carry out major and crippling strikes against the Israeli regime and the most famed segment of the Israeli military, its air defenses totally failed, despite the very significant help it received from American, British and French military to repel this attack. Though the Irani operation was not even a carried out in total surprise.
Immediately after Netanyahu’s government announced that a retaliation will surely come, and with passing time the statements got ever bolder saying that “the Iranians will not even know what hit them”. It soon obtained a narrative by those close to Tel Aviv that now there is a “justification” for a crippling attack that will paralyze Iran proving that is has no serious power, and thus Tel Aviv making “favor” to those Sunni states that are concerned about Iran will once again turn and get back to the path of normalization.
Though later negotiations with the Americans – and without their help no serious military action can be taken by Tel Aviv at this point – showed that there is real enthusiasm by Washington for igniting a regional war with Iran, the statements of Netanyahu and his sycophants never got any humbler.
There are many reasons why Washington did not want to risk an operation on the scale Netanyahu wanted from them. Striking the Iranian nuclear facilities is first of all a very doubtful venture. These are the most protected, most of them are deep within mountains, which takes a lot of effort and a prolong bombardment to reach even a limited success, and the outcome is very doubtful. But in relation Tehran will surely strike a much larger retaliation to Tel Aviv than the previous strike, and that was largely impossible to stop. So, that was out of the question. Striking key oil and gas production facilities was also not supported by the Americans, as it would skyrocket energy prices once again, right before the presidential elections. Even crippling the Iranian energy grid was a major concern, as Iran provides massive amounts of electricity to neighboring countries. All these concerns and the fear of an overall regional war made most regional states, especially the Gulf countries to persuade Washington not to commit to an exaggerated attack.
Nonetheless, after weeks of promises, and after Israeli Defense Minister Gallant had announced on 15 October that Tel Aviv will “soon” hit back in a “precise and deadly fashion”, the attack only came on 26 October early dawn.
The initial Israeli reports and those close to Tel Aviv talked about hundred Israeli planes taking part in the attack, even supported by fuel carriers, entering Iranian airspace and targeting key facilities a many waves of the attack. Allegedly key missile launching launching facilities, military positions, drone and missile production facilities were hit within Tehran and close to it, and also in Īlām and Huzestān Provinces. At one point even attacking Tehran’s two airports were picked up, though that was soon refuted. That was the narrative that was boosted by the Western media, as if it was an overwhelming and crushing attack. This version, however, soon changed to a “limited precise” strike focusing more on the causes and the possible consequences rather than the events themselves. The Israeli-Western version eventually changed into hitting “some” military bases – though not even these sources claim hitting the Revolutionary Guards – and air defense radars. And as evidence satellite pictures were shown about two Iranian military bases, Parčīn and Hoğīr claiming them to be key nuclear and missiles facilities, though the images are anything but convincing. The lack of visible damages and that the fact that these images are shown as the only proof is rather supporting the idea the attack failed. And the case by now came down to the conclusion that is was more of a warning strike that crippled Iran radars and air defenses, leaving the door wide open to a later major strike, in case Iran chose to hit back once again.
Understandably Iran showed a very different interpretation of what happened saying that the attack was almost completely repelled and most of the missiles were shot down, though very few might got through. Iran practically said that it Tel Aviv tried, but failed. And the very few videos that were aired largely support this version. Though the Iranian sources admitted that two Iranian soldiers died in the strikes, which number later grew to four.
Between two versions the truth usually lies somewhere in the middle. Yet in this case the lack of video evidence about military facilities being hit – except some distant and unverifiable images – and the very doubtful satellite images shown as evidence gives much more credit to the Iranian version. Especially compared to the footages about Operation True Promise 2, which was largely described by the Western media as “largely failed”, “repelled” and “insignificant”. The idea that 100 Israeli planes kept bombarding Iran for hours being refueled in the air, even entering Iranian airspace and eventually taking out a few radars, or military facilities – even if they were significant – while none of these planes were even shot at is clearly not adding up, especially not the the lack of evidence. Thought something did indeed happen, as the death of the four Iranian soldiers prove that.
The actual range of the attack is hard to know, but it is very clear that Tel Aviv was very far from the strike it vowed to carry out, and the results are far from crippling. Was it a really devastating attack, as it was promised for weeks that would turn the region once again towards normalizing with Tel Aviv and being convinced that Iran is weak, or crippled the video and satellite images would be overwhelming by now. Instead there are statements and evaluations, but very few actual proof. Even if all the facilities Tel Aviv claim were hit and even severely damaged that is a fraction of Iran’s capabilities. Iran will surely hit back and not less significantly that it did with True Promise 2. The real matter, Iran’s power to strike at the Israeli military and significantly is unaffected. However, the attack has regional and diplomatic implications that are clearly not favorable for Tel Aviv. And it that sense, much more than militarily, the strike failed.
How it was carried out?
One very important aspect of the Israeli attack is how it was conducted. Not necessarily in the military sense, but because it shows the power balance shifting in the region. That very question, from where the Israeli planes carried out their bombardment was raised immediately after the attack was announced. By Saturday night it became completely clear. Iran announced the attack being conducted from above Iraq, that version was presented in the Western media evaluations as fact, and the Iraqi government presented an official complaint to the U.N. about the Israeli military violating its airspace, stating that Baghdad gave no permission to any sides to use its airspace against any country. Which suggest that most of the operation was carried out above Iraqi Kurdistan. But how did the Israeli planes get there? There are two possible ways. Either above Jordan crossing over the central regions of Iraq, or above Syria rapidly reaching the at-Tanaf and from there Eastern Syria, where the airspace is controlled by the American forces. Jordan denied all involvement and even condemned the attack. Though that does not make it impossible that a blind eye was turned on the move given the fact that Amman is on very bad terms with Tehran as well.
The idea that the Israeli planes crossed over Syria is further corroborated by reports that at the very same night, in the early stages of the attack Israeli strikes were carried out against the surroundings of Damascus and position around as-Suwaydā’ in Southern Syria. That seems to be a fitting idea, as the Israeli military regularly carries out aggressions against Syrian positions. However, these are always done from beyond the Syrian airspace, since Syria shot down one Israeli F-16 plane in 2018 entering its airspace, and there has been numerous similar reports around the same time. The Syrian air defense though significantly weakened by the war since 2011 is far from being ineffective, so it is doubtful how much such a massive operation could have been down without risking Syrian shooting down some of the planes, at least on the way back. Especially the significantly slower and bigger support planes, after allegedly spending three hours in Iraqi, or Iranian airspace. So the picture is way more complex that it seems and was surely not a rapid flyover, as it is presented now. It could have been a strike against Syria and than moving to Iraqi airspace, eventually flying back by the same route leaving the support planes in the American bases in Iraq. It could have been conducted over Jordan very close to the border, or might have been a more complex operation.
However, there are two things significant in this. First of that it could not have happened without massive American support providing cover either above Jordan, or above the illegitimate American bases in Syria and the bases in Iraq. Otherwise what would have provided cover for the Israeli planes in the Iraqi airspace and assistance from the American bases? The other interesting fact is that no assists given by the Gulf countries, not even by those which have normalized relations with Tel Aviv, like the Emirates, or those which even have military liaison officers with the Israeli army, like Bahrain. It has been alleged by the Western sources for quite some time the Saudi Arabia is in the verge of normalizing relations with Tel Aviv and its historic disputes with Iran never really cooled down. And thus Riyadh would provide assistance through its airspace. And indeed, from above the Gulf hitting Iran would have been much easier. But that did not happen. Quite the contrary, Saudi Arabia was the first Gulf country to condemn the Israeli aggression showing it had nothing to do with it. And that was swiftly followed by all Gulf states and Jordan.
Even five years ago it would not have been totally surprising to see that at least Saudi Arabia, but also most Gulf states would have passively collaborated in an Israeli strike against Iran. This time it was out of the question and was not even attempted, fearing that they would only be further alienated. More than that, Saudi Arabia recently held military drills with the Iranian navy in the Gulf of Oman.
The very nature of the Israeli strike that it had to be performed above unfriendly states under huge American cover and all regional states clearly took a stance against it shows how much Tel Aviv’s diplomatic influence has receded.
The diplomatic implications
Despite the actual level of destruction Tel Aviv managed to inflict on Iran, so beyond the direct military consequences the real significance of the Israeli strike is in the diplomatic dimension. While the Iranian operation on 1 October was seen on the region as significant and strong, at least in the sense that Iran dares to strike and can do carry out an operation with great sophistication, this attack was opposed in the region, no assistance was given and seems ineffective. It is not the convincing show of power, but a weak attempt that was largely built on the American capabilities.
Noticeably the strike was preceded by two, wide ranging diplomatic campaigns. Practically even since he took office, Iranian Foreign Minister ‘Abbās ‘Arāqčī has visited almost all states of the region staring in Lebanon and Syria, but even visiting such less than friendly states as Jordan, or Egypt and visiting all Gulf states. The message to the allies was the Tehran will stand beside them, while to those contemplating assisting Tel Aviv should not be complicit. It was hinted that Tehran would view help from the Gulf as an aggressive move that would have consequences.
On the other hand the Americans first sent 100 new troops and THAAD air defense batteries to the Israeli regime, bracing for response after the upcoming Israeli attack, which was the biggest admission that the Iranian strike on 1 October was largely successful. After all, why would the “most sophisticated air defense in the Middle East” with the famed “Iron Dome” and other systems need any help against an insignificant enemy? Than on 21 October American envoy to Lebanon Amos Hockstein, a man personally close the Israeli government arrived in Beirut to hold negotiations about a possible ceasefire between Lebanon and the Israeli regime. He dictated terms stating that U.N. resolution 1701 – which was never fully implemented – was no enough anymore and expressed what Washington expects, practically the total surrender of the Lebanese Resistance and the Lebanese state. As if Ḥizb Allah was defeated and the Israeli army marching into Lebanon. These terms were totally unacceptable reminding everyone to the behavior of Washington in 2006 with the similarly arrogant, but failed attempts. Yet his was the first time that Washington and Tel Aviv hinted they want to end this engagement, now setting the bar for negotiations.
The day after on 22 October State Secretary Blinken started his eleventh Middle East tour since ten war on Gaza has started, first arriving in Tel Aviv. And so far all his previous trips were followed by a new escalation in the conflict. From there he went to Saudi Arabia and Qatar to negotiate about ending the regional war, but by now it is deductible that he was laying grounds for the upcoming Israeli strike. To which the Gulf gave no assistance, and even condemned it.
The difference is striking that while a decade ago most countries in the region would have been very receptive to American persuasion and probably not even accept a meeting with leading Iranian officials, now even the Gulf states were reluctant to negotiate with the Americans, while the Iranian Foreign Minister toured the region. Though most of the Iranian negotiation produced very little substantial progress, the change is visible. It is not Tel Aviv that is furthering its diplomatic presence and influence in the region, but Iran manages to present itself as a strong, but restrained player.
Timing is the key
Just like with Operation True Promise 2, the timing of the Israeli aggression against Iran is a key factor in understanding what is happening. Seeing how long it took for Tel Aviv to carry out this attack, which was even “limited”, the diplomatic difficulties to achieve it and even the American objections and how little it achieved the question is why Tel Aviv did it, and why now? The official Israeli narrative does not talk about why it took so long, or why it happened now, though usually Israeli military actions are swift to come and usually not publicly advertised. Mostly not even admitted. This time, however, the Israeli military above all else did its best to portray the operation as grandiose.
That is because since 1 October when the land operations were announced against Lebanon the Israeli army, despite assassinating most of Ḥizb Allah’s leaders and carrying out an unprecedentedly brutal bombardment against Lebanon’s population could not advance even into one village along the border. There are no gains. Yet at the same time its losses are growing in the fights along the border. Average 2-5 Israeli soldiers die in these fight while not gaining ground and the number of injures are rapidly growing. That is an unusual phenomenon for the Israeli side where the human is be biggest asset, given the very limited pool of recruits. And not only in Lebanon, but even in Gaza the losses are growing, after one year of total devastation of the Gaza Strip.
Clearly Ḥizb Allah survived the first shock of losing its leaders and regained its composure. The Lebanese society also not showing signs of turning against the Resistance, despite the huge civilian losses. And the level of Ḥizb Allah’s drone and missile strikes is growing. Furthermore, on 25 October the Resistance issued a statement to 25 Israeli settlements – imitating the style of the Israeli military – that these have became military targets and must be evacuated.
So despite the official goal of Netanyahu with the war against Lebanon is to make the settlers return to their homes in the north and to guarantee their safety, the range of the targeted settlements is growing, the Israeli vital military infrastructures are hit, the losses are growing and no advance has been achieved.
The aim of the strike against Iran was to cover these problems. To show force to the region, and to convince the internal front that despite the setbacks and the slow progress all is fine, Iran is crippled and its support to its allies will soon collapse. However, the harsh criticism even from within the war cabinet shows that the opposite was achieved. A weak strike, nothing on the scale that was expected, while now a new, possibly even bigger Iranian strike will come.
And the problems are only growing, as after the strike, even Minister Gallant stated that “the hostages in Gaza cannot be brought back by force” and “painful concessions have to be made”. Which is the inherent admission that despite the devastation there is no full control over Gaza even after a year.
Whose war is this?
Given the equation there is a recurring question and debate about this war in the Middle East. Which side is the real master of this war? Is it Tel Aviv fighting with some American support, but largely independently, or is it Washington using the Israeli military to reach its own gains? At the end, with every major decision, which side has the final word?
Though at every major turn of the events Washington underlines that it does not want escalation and supports a resolution, the indications are the contrary. The Israeli strike against Iran was preceded by Blinken’s visit and regional tour to find supporters for it. It was done above the Iraqi airspace, which could not have been possible without massive and active American assistance. Even the bomb used to assassinate Ḥizb Allah Secretary General Ḥasan Naṣr Allah – described in detailed by the American Naval Institute – are not only unprecedented in quantity used on one target and totally American manufactured, but Tel Aviv didn’t even have such weapons before 2023. The Israeli military was already lacking so called bunker busters in Gaza, which started to be delivered in December 2023. And the very order to carry out this assassination came when Netanyahu was in New York, directly negotiating with the Americans. The whole Israeli military is American supplied, trained and largely financed, while the Israeli military production is being hit severely.
The total dependence of the Israeli military on the American supplies is clear by the uproar whenever the U.S. suspends the delivery only for days, and by Netanyahu’s own statement in the Congress in July 2024: “Give us the weapons faster and we will do the job faster!”
This reliance, however, does even more to diminish the fame of the “invincible” Israeli military than the setbacks on the frontlines. It is hard to know where is the line between the Israeli and the American decision making, but it is becoming very clear that eventually the Israeli force relies not on its own resources, but on the American decisions. Yet, as the American interest have started to shift far away from the Middle East and Washington has less influence in the region than a decade ago, it is doubtful how long the U.S. will allow the squandering of its resources to endless wars with no achievements. Or when will it engages directly, to “finish the job”.