A week ago another open wound in the Middle East, the Iraqi governmental crisis blew up again. Two weeks after supporters of two rival political camps stormed the hearth of the Iraqi capital, supporters of one of the most influential Shia clerics Muqtadā aṣ-Ṣadr once again ran over the infamous Green Zone in Baghdad.
The event erupted in fierce armed clashes and total chaos for two days, so much so that aṣ-Ṣadr himself had to use the harshest possible methods to call supporters back from the street. Which worked to dissipate the storm as fast as it erupted, only the leave behind once again a number of victims, burned facilities, and the souring question: When will Iraq will finally have a stable government?
The current governmental crisis started almost a year ago when after the last elections in October 2021 the political boards got fundamentally reshuffled. But no clear majority was achieved by any side and therefore the painstaking process of endless bargaining and government deals kept on going fruitless, until a month ago. When this ordeal seemed to reach an end, it only blew up even worse than before.
This goes, however, even deeper, as the wounds of the 2014 collapse in the face of Dā‘iš never got healed and it is still haunting the political landscape. Just like the eternal power struggle between Iran, its Arab Gulf neighbors, and the U.S.
Ironically, this ongoing crisis since 2018 produced the most capable Prime Minister Muṣṭafā al-Kāẓimī, who has had the weakest administration behind him since 2014. But this almost comically absurd drama is not a local concern anymore, as in the middle of a global energy crisis it is not at all circumstantial what will happen to one of the oil reserves in the world, and how will neighboring Iran react to any outcome. At a time when on the one hand Tehran is successful in its rapprochement with its Gulf neighbors, while on the other reviving the nuclear deal and thus returning to be a major global player once again.
The long drama of forming an Iraqi government
Drawing a clear picture of Iraqi party politics is anything but easy. That is while the main protagonists hardly changed in the last two decades, only their luck and influence, the parties they represent kept changing, and parties kept uniting in different alliances and splitting after various major decisions, or after elections. However, while party representations might mean little, the trends can nonetheless be drawn. In that sense, the 2021 elections largely continued what started in 2018, but still brought an overall surprise.
First of all out of the 33 parliamentary represented parties, or alliances 21 are new formations. The 34th parliamentary group was the loose term of the independent representatives, whose number dropped from 54 to 43. But in many cases, those parties which were present in the 2018 parliament changed allegiances either joining a larger alliance or leaving one running alone. Only 16 lists won more than one seat in the parliament, and as result, there is a huge middle ground of 45 independent MPs and 17 lists with only one MP. Together they make up 62 MPs out of the 329 seats, roughly 20%.
The other important feature is that no parties achieved a clear majority. Not even close, as the biggest winner also only won 73 seats (22%), while the majority – and therefore stable government support – needs 165 seats. The result, by now following the traditional lines after 2003, is that government can only come from a relatively broad coalition of parties. This once again requires a power-sharing deal between the political heavy-weight personalities, who by now grown to distrust and largely dislike each other. The other consequence of this setup, which cursed all governments between 2018 and 2021 finally causing a very problematic early election, is that while forming a government is hard, forming a broad campaign to dislodge it s quite easy. And since the leading political figures constantly compete with each other, undermining a government is a frequently appearing theme.
As for the trends it should be understood that in the 2018 elections the forces fighting against Dā‘īš, or having a strong Shia paramilitary wing championing the war against terrorism dominated the scene. These were the Sā’irūn Alliance (The Alliance Marching for Reform) dominated by the personally led formation of Shia cleric Muqtadā aṣ-Ṣadr; the Fatḥ Alliance, practically the political wing of the Popular Mobilization (al-Ḥašd aš-Ša‘abī) led by Hādī al-Āmirī; and the an-Naṣr Alliance led by the anti-Dā‘īš war Ḥaydar al-Abādī. They together made up almost half of the parliament, while the Kurds also made progress and the former dominant groups fell back significantly. Yet despite their relatively similar background, the new winners were – and still are – the biggest rivals, so they were competing against each other to bring about the fall of any government which they did not support. The end of this ordeal was the election of Prime Minister Muṣṭafā al-Kāẓimī in 2020, the former head of the internal intelligence. He is the most capable head of government since 2003 but was also largely understood as Muqtadā aṣ-Ṣadr’s candidate. Even though al-Kāẓimī is a non-partisan.
The ongoing struggles and the regional rivalry around Iraq eventually erupted in 2021 in a wave of rage in the Iraqi streets probably fueled by all major factions. This resulted in the first clear understanding since 2018 that new elections have to be held, in which all wanted to change the equation. The old figures wanted to make a comeback after their role in the 2014 collapse somewhat dissipated, the Popular Mobilization wanted to achieve a clear first place winning over the supporters of the an-Naṣr Alliance and gaining a clear political legitimacy to this highly criticized formation, and Muqtadā aṣ-Ṣadr also wanted to make his first major landslide victory to keep al-Kāẓimī in office. Also, all these trends meant completely different regional sympathies, which is a very central question in this important country being a middle ground between Iran and its allies, the Arab Gulf states, and the U.S. still has significant support. The Sunni wing of the “old guard” and mostly the Kurds rather leaned towards the Americans, but also to some extent to the Gulf states, the Popular Mobilization and its allies were clearly favoring strong cooperation with Iran, while the camp of aṣ-Ṣadr meant a fair distance not only from the Americans and from the oversight of the Gulf, but also from Iran, regardless being Shia movement.
The elections of 2021 reset the table
Before the 2021 elections, the most likely scenario was that aṣ-Ṣadr will win, the Popular Mobilization will be the second biggest camp, and eventually, they have to agree in the short run to continue with al-Kāẓimī, but giving concessions to the Mobilization and being more “understanding” towards Iran. This seemed very possible, as in the last two years – especially by al-Kāẓimī’s personal initiative and guidance – Iraq was leading a fruitful mediation between Saudi-Arabia and Iran. And since then this mediation and the negotiations in Baghdad practically reached a rapprochement, in which the Gulf ceased to be the vocal enemy of Iran.
And this is where the landslide change happened. While aṣ-Ṣadr leaving behind the Sā’irūn Coalition and finally running on its own achieved its biggest victory (73 seats), the Popular Mobilization suffered a catastrophic defeat. With losing 31 seats, it fell back to only 17 MPs and is the fifth biggest faction. This drop was so surprising that the Popular Mobilization for long disputed the results and from the beginning wanted an overall recount or even a total rerun of the elections. This is ironic, as not the very same faction is the most vocal opponent to having early elections now as a solution to the current crisis.
The second biggest faction (with 37 seats) now is the Progress Party (Ḥizb at-Taqaddum) led by Muḥammad al-Ḥalbūsī, who has been the Speaker of the Parliament since 2018, and before that, he was briefly the governor of al-Anbār Province. This 2019 founded movement was clearly formed for the 2021 elections, and while representing a more Western-oriented liberal and secular approach, has a large Sunni following with a relative newcomer, a “fresh face” as it leader.
The third biggest faction is a surprise returnee, the State of Law Coalition (now 33 seats) led by former Prime Minister Nūrī al-Mālikī, who managed to gain his biggest victory in 2014, only to be overthrown after a few weeks being primarily blamed for the total military and security collapse after Mosul fell to Dā‘iš. Despite this and his former collaboration with the American occupation he still managed to pull enough strings to make a surprise return in 2021. Though the faction behind him is not specifically large, given the skillful and experienced politician he is, he is the main figure of the Shia opposition against the aṣ-Ṣadr Movement.
The fourth biggest block in the parliament is the Kurdish Democratic Party of the Bārazānī family leading the regional government of Iraqi-Kurdistan. This is also somewhat surprising, since the other major Kurdish party also did well, and recently there were heavy clashes between the Kurdish region and the central governments about the oil revenues.
The overall picture is that while the Popular Mobilization fell back shockingly and an-Naṣr Alliance collapsed the voters mostly favored new formations, while Muqtadā aṣ-Ṣadr won a landslide victory.
The new setup is that the Shiī, but vocally national and independent-minded aṣ-Ṣadr Movement dominates the landscape, with the Kurds and the mostly Sunni and Western-oriented movements finally gaining a convincing leader also broke through. However, also at the same time the most likely coalition partners, the fellow Shia Popular Mobilization fells itself cheated, and were upset against the whole setup.
Knowing well that it will not be able to form a government alone, after several attempts the aṣ-Ṣadrī Movement on 31 March 2022 gave up and withdrew from the government negotiations. Thus letting the other parties try. By this, he was gambling on distrust between his opponents that they cannot form a government either, and eventually after bitter negotiations eventually one, or two blocks will turn to aṣ-Ṣadr for a small share in power. At that stage, time was practically on his side, since as long as there was no agreement on a new government, Muṣṭafā al-Kāẓimī could continue as a caretaker Prime Minister running the state. And thus both al-Kāẓimī and aṣ-Ṣadr focused more on foreign policy. The Prime Minister strengthened the mediation between Riyadh and Tehran, but also formed good relations with the influential Arab states, while aṣ-Ṣadr proposed legislation prohibiting any attempt for normalization with Israel. Thus also gaining favor and refuting rumors that the caretaker government endorsed by him would buckle under American and Saudi pressures for a Western-oriented policy.
On the other hand of the Shia spectrum in December 2021 five major Shia parties formed the Conciliatory Framework. The two most important components were the an-Naṣr Alliance – practically the Popular Mobilization – and the State of Law Coalition of Nūrī al-Mālikī, two former mortal enemies, who represented a most unrealistic group. The official aim of this format was to find a solution for a government, but unofficially the goal was to circumvent aṣ-Ṣadr or force him into a minority role in the new government. Which he knew perfectly well, and he categorically refused to be tricked into such a role.
This was a working strategy for aṣ-Ṣadr, gambling on the likelihood that the Conciliatory Framework will never agree on any candidate will eventually turn on each other, or eventually, some Kurdish formations and the Progressive Parts will approve him, as the de facto leader of the new government. That was until the Conciliatory Framework surprised him. And that is where the current crisis took a new turn.
A solution most tempting and unacceptable: who is Muḥammad as-Sūdānī?
Despite all disbelief, the Conciliatory Framework after a long process managed to reach a breakthrough and a deal – still largely unknown – was reached. In reaction to that on 12 June 2022, the aṣ-Ṣadrī Movement announced that its representatives resigned from the parliament and will not return to any vote. Thus practically paralyzing the legislation. A day later, on 13 June the Conciliatory Framework announced that it reached a deal and the formation of the new government is still very possible, despite the developments a day earlier.
Though it eventually took more than a month, on 25 July the Conciliatory Framework officially nominated Muḥammad Šayyā‘ as-Sūdānī, as Prime Minister, which was also tacitly backed by the Progressive Party and the Kurdish Democratic Party. This meant that despite all expectations and the careful tactics of aṣ-Ṣadr to run the government, only if it was just a caretaker one, this all eventually got defeated and an agreement was reached finally once again leaving him out of the deal. The tactic backfired, though it was seriously questioning how stable this new government would be. And at that point, chaos broke out.
But who is this new candidate? Muḥammad Šayyā‘ as-Sūdānī is a less famous and second-line politician, with a somewhat controversial past. He is from a Shiī family from Baghdad, who was part of the once huge Islamic Da‘wa Party – the biggest Shiī party before 2003 from which most Shia organizations splintered out -, who took part in the 1991 uprisings after the Gulf war, but also held government positions before 2003. He continued to hold smaller offices after the American invasion until 2009 when he was elected as governor of Maysān Province along the border with Iran. Between 2010 and 2014 he served as Minister of Human Rights in the government of Nūrī al-Mālikī until the collapse of the government. Since then he largely disappeared from the political front lines, until his name reappeared as a Prime Minister candidate. He is a less experienced, weak party member, and clearly a man of al-Mālikī, who managed to turn the situation in his favor. And thus a new government under him would mean the return of al-Mālikī with strongly favoring the Popular Mobilization and the pro-Iran policies.
However, because of his weak individual stature, this is likely to result once again in an internally weak coalition government, like those before 2021 being ripped apart between the rival currents. Thus when aṣ-Ṣadr moved to cross this development his motives are most probably selfish, but understandably resonate well with a large number of the people and the political spectrum, as as-Sūdānī is not comparable to al-Kāẓimī in any way.
And then the chaos broke out.
It was a clear picture and aṣ-Ṣadr could not allow that after almost a year of careful maneuvering to lose the race after he gained his biggest electoral victory. So he turned to the streets once again.
The first protests in Baghdad and a number of big cities broke out already on 18 July, clearly resonating with the events of the 2019 protests. That was just the beginning, however, as on 27 July a new wave started by the aṣ-Ṣadrī Movement broke out. A day later as-Sūdānī confirmed that despite the protests demanding him to withdraw from the candidacy he will not back down, but by 30 July the protestors stormed the most secure Green Zone in Baghdad and the palaces of the government and the parliament to prevent as-Sūdānī to be elected.
In response, Prime Minister al-Kāẓimī, who clearly distanced himself from the protests and tried to restore calm suspended all cabinet meetings and the parliament also halted all actions until the order is restored. And then a relative calm slowly started to return to the streets, and the supporters of the aṣ-Ṣadrī Movement withdrew. The first “battle” was done and the election of as-Sūdānī was prevented. At least for some time.
Yet by 12 August the protests renewed, clearly concurrent and rivaling each other in various provinces and the capital. On the one hand, the aṣ-Ṣadrī Movement demanded new elections and the amendment of the electoral law – winning additional months to the current caretaker government – while on the other the Conciliatory Framework pressed on for a unity government to end the crisis. And clashes became even more frequent between the rival groups.
The ground shook once again on 28 August, when Muqtadā aṣ-Ṣadr himself in a curious move announced that he withdraws from political work and closes down all his movement’s institutions, except some strictly religious ones. Sending a clear message that he refuses the whole establishment and wants fundamental changes, which the streets also want, yet this he does not do for his personal benefit. Which has a great appearance in a notoriously corrupt political environment.
As result the thus far biggest protests broke out in Baghdad protestors storming the Green Zone once again, while the supporters of the Conciliatory Framework also protested against the aṣ-Ṣadrī Movement. The situation by night transformed into armed clashes and occasional shelling of institutions. The events clearly got out of hand, but eventually, Muqtadā aṣ-Ṣadr managed to turn the events in his favor.
The next day, on 29 August he held a televised speech in which he demanded his followers withdraw and stop the protests, otherwise, he would distance himself from the movement. This has a special significance here, as Muqtadā aṣ-Ṣadr is not only a political party leader but also the second most prominent Shiī cleric in the country. Therefore his movement is also a somewhat religious movement strongly tied to him and his family, a link not easily broken. If he were to renounce the movement and its actions, he would deprive the whole movement of its very spiritual substance. But he did something even more impressive, as he openly apologized to the Iraqi people for all that happened taking personal responsibility for it. Again a behavior long not seen in a county where political infighting and mutual blames are constant.
The result. Is there any?
After Prime Minister al-Kāẓimī also threatened to leave office immediately in case violence and mutual agitation is not stopped some level of normality returned. By his invitation, on 5 September the Second National Dialogue gathered with all political parties represented, except the aṣ-Ṣadrī Movement still boycotting the parliament. Nonetheless, the Speaker of the Parliament the President, and the Prime Minister all push for the success of this dialogue, which is only to agree on the date of the new parliamentary elections, the date of new provincial elections, the way to elect the new president and in some minor amendments of the electoral law. Basically, all forces apart from the Conciliatory Framework accepted the new early elections for a fact and agreed on complete reelection of the whole establishment on all its levels.
The Conciliatory Framework lost, as it could no longer hold on to the protest only losing face with it, nor could do anything to push for the new government. Aṣ-Ṣadr proved to be the more tactical player and that there is no government without him. But does that mean victory for him? Most likely within 3, or 6 months, there will be new elections in Iraq, which is to be followed by long disputes to form a government, and then all state officials will be re-elected. Practically reforming the whole establishment. But so far none of these steps brought clear results, at least not since 2014. Which indicates the high possibility of a prolonged crisis. Though aṣ-Ṣadr is clearly gaining an upper hand, by which if it goes through Iraq may come out as a more independent actor in the region. Much less attached to Iran than before, yet not its enemy, and clearly not a friend – possibly an unwilling ally – of Washington.
Is this just a Middle Eastern concern?
Many times the Middle East, and some countries like Iraq, Libya, and Sudan in particular all seem to be in a constant and incomprehensible and therefore unimportant turmoil. Iraq’s current case, however, is special. That is because the regional dispute around seriously calmed down.
It was very significant since the 2021 elections that both Iran and the Arab Gulf states refrained from seriously commenting, or intervening in the crisis. Iran let the electoral defeat of its local allies happen and expressed no concern. But nor did Washington, or Riyadh. That is because while Iraq was a battleground in the last two decades between these parties, there is a development that for the very same reason eases the tension, not exacerbates it.
Iran has reached a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and with almost all of its Gulf neighbors. That is far more important than the daily political shifts in Iraq, which is already heavily tied economically to Tehran. Also at the same time, Iran arrived to just one step away from reviving the nuclear deal and lifting the international sanctions. So that is not an ideal time to stir up tensions with Washington now over Iraq. And with the return of Iran to the international trade networks and to the supply of the global energy markets is a very important matter.
That is why a stable Iraq can be a helpful factor to the region, and to the global economy now, while blowing up would probably relaunch struggles at least between Washington and Tehran, pushing Iran even more towards Russia. That is why what happens in Baghdad these days may seem chaotic, but in fact, really matter.