On the night July 30 Tel-Aviv assassinated the political leader of Ḥamās in Tehran, and a senior commander of Ḥizb Allah Fu’ād Šukr bombing the Southern Suburb of Beirut. This came soon after another Israeli massacre of the occupied Syrian Golan, for which they blamed Ḥizb Allah, a bombing campaign in Yemen, and yet another by the Americans in Iraq. The clear intention was to insight war.
Iran and Ḥizb Allah have already promised revenge, even stating that a new phase has started in the war. But what will be their reaction? How significant is the blow they have suffered recently? And is there still a way to prevent a full scale regional war?
The bar was set
As war on Gaza was slowly extending to a war of attrition at the Lebanese border and eventually to Iraqi groups and to Yemen joining the struggle the possibility of a major regional war was coming closer by the minute. The mutual operations and the Israeli provocations have already brought the region to the brink of an all-out war after the Israeli strike on the Iranian embassy in Damascus. But that time Tehran eventually chose to limit its relation and not to give in to provocations.
It became clear that Tel Aviv wants a pretext to pose itself as a victim of aggression, so to force the American administration to support its war. A war much needed for the political survival of Netanyahu. And that is not something Tehran was willing to let itself trapped into.
Yet the level of provocations reached a point when it was clear, Netanyahu is gearing up for a war, so a clear message should be sent.
On 17 July Ḥizb Allah Secretly General Ḥasan Naṣr Allah held a speech on the occasion of ‘Āšūrā’, and day of mourning for Shia Muslims remembering the martyrdom of one of the most sacred person for them, Ḥussayn ibn ‘Alī. It is the day of martyrdom. Though Naṣr Allah regularly holds speeches, usually long ones, this time despite the occasion it was limited to half an hour. But everything was in it. Underlined with long not seen mass gatherings in most major Lebanese cities. The speech pointed out that war is coming, but all is ready for it if Tel Aviv fully attacks Lebanon. One of the most important indications was regarding the relentless Israeli airstrikes in Syria, admitting that Tel Aviv wants to prevent things arriving to Ḥizb Allah. He added that “what had to arrived had arrived”. Meaning all preparations have been made, Ḥizb Allah will not blink, knows how to hit back and ready for every scenarios. And that message was not just to Tel Aviv, but all in the region that if war is to prevented, it is the last chance, the Axis of Resistance will not be intimidated.
Two days later the first Yemeni drone hit Tel Aviv, right next to the American consulate. This Yemeni drone completely surprised the Israeli defenses, giving a special weight in case the message was missed: if it comes to war, there will be heavy consequences. In a face saving effort few days later the Israelis conducted their first direct strike in Yemen against al-Ḥudayda, but with almost insignificant results.
And thus a point was reached that from that point either things will escalate very rapidly, or will start to cool down.
Diplomatic steps. The last chance to stop and the prelude to war
The week after Netanyahu finally had his visit to Washington and held a speech in the Congress. This was an opportunity he long awaited for, so to gather enough support for an open war against Lebanon, and possibly beyond. He knew that without firm American support this could be achieved.
In one of the most shocking examples political cynicism, he even dared to claim that in Gaza they have practically not killed any civilians, despite the clear evidence proving the bombing of hospitals and the death of more than 15 thousand children until June 2024, according to UNRWA. He had his standing ovation, as was expected, yet for the first time not everyone was clapping for him. Biden and VP Harris refrained from attending and allegedly on Harris met with Netanyahu behind close doors. He also met Trump, but nothing significant was stated or promised. Despite the lack of clear achievements to show for, it later became clear at at some levels of the American administration he did managed to gain support. But for the political appearance, it looked more of a setback.
Roughly at the same time in China there was another major meeting. On 23 July ten major Palestinian factions under the oversight of the Chinese Foreign Ministry signed the Beijing Declaration, pledging to end division and create Palestinian unity government acting on all Palestinian lands. Also setting up preparations for future elections. And thus, at least in theory, a united Palestinian political body was created. The significance of this event is not in its pledges, or that it buried the hatchet between the two biggest rival Palestinian groups. These are all theoretical positions almost impossible to implement until the war ends. But it was done under Chinese oversight. Signaling that Beijing is getting more and more involved in the Middle East, and the Palestinian matter is gaining a very strong supporter.
At that point it seemed that despite the war the Palestinian position is gaining support, while Netanyahu struggles to secure the backing of its most crucial ally. So it seemed.
It is also significant that also at the same period, on 25 July Syrian President Baššār al-Asad visited Moscow to meet with Putin. Such direct meetings only happen, when major shifts are about to happen, and thus it has a major significance now. Almost nothing was shared about the topics of the meeting, but it was widely supposed the main question was the pending Turkish-Syrian rapprochement, on which Russia is working very hard. However, Putin has a noticeable remark, saying that the region is heading towards a major escalation and “Syria is not far from it”.
The pretext
On 27 July a missile hit a football stadium in village of Mağdal Šams on the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, killing 12 children. Tel Aviv quickly claimed that it was an intentional Ḥizb Allah strike, though publicly not sharing any evidence, and that position was surprisingly quickly became backed by “American experts”, the White House and a number of Western governments.
The town is of almost 12 thousand residents, majority of them are of the Druze denomination of Islam, with some Christian presence, ethnically all Syrian Arabs. The overwhelming majority of the residents are Syrian citizens have refused to accept any formal relation with the Israeli authorities, as they consider themselves Syrians.
Despite the heavy skirmishes, Ḥizb Allah always chose its targets very precisely and carried out targeted attacks, or massacres barrages against Israeli army bases. There are no significant targets, however, in the direct vicinity of Mağdal Šams, which makes it very unlikely Ḥizb Allah would attack this area. It never did before. The most likely scenario is that an Israeli missile, intentionally or by mistake hit the town, and after it became known that the victims were children Netanyahu saw a golden opportunity to use it as pretext for war.
It is a golden opportunity for Tel Aviv not only because the death of children always stir up emotions, but because the town and the surrounding area is mostly populated by Druze, a religious group that many times considers itself even its own ethnicity. They are present in large numbers in the southern part of Syria, in Lebanon, and in Palestine, and known for their military prowess and loyalty to their community and the state they live in. By igniting sensitives Tel Aviv hoped to create an uproar by the Druze and create divisions within Lebanon and Syria. Especially because for the last year or so Tel Aviv was actively trying to create a Druze uprising in Syria and bring international support for it. This largely failed, but now a similar opportunity presented itself. Given these details and the lack of significant military targets, it would have been extremely foolish by Ḥizb Allah even to risk striking the village. Yet not that unlikely for Tel Aviv following the examples of Gaza, as the town has not Israeli population.
A number of Israeli Ministers and Netanyahu himself went to Mağdal Šams to participate in the funerary procession, thus to get pictures with the victims families and create the image internationally, as the victims were Israelis. Regionally, however, to create the image that Tel Aviv stands with the Druze, creating a wedge between the different committees and luring the population of the Golan closer, which has never happened.
The trick failed, the local residents expelled the Ministers and Netanyahu himself had to leave the town shortly after his arrival. All major Druze leaders locally, in Syria and Lebanon refused to be used in such way and clearly blamed the Israelis for what happened.
The pretext largely failed, but was good enough internationally to be used for going to war. And thus it served as the pretext for the provocations that followed.
The strike at every front
On the night of 30 July after Israeli warplanes cruises heavily above the city all day launched missiles bombing the Southern Suburb of Beirut, the practical capital of Ḥizb Allah. The blast killed 5 civilians, senior Ḥizb Allah commander and member of the organization’s governing council Fu’ād Šukr, one of the founding members. It also killed Mīlād Bīdī, an Iranian advisor to Lebanon.
Few hours later President of the Political Bureau of Ḥamās Ismā‘īl Haniyya and one of his bodyguards were killed in Tehran in a compound of the Iranian government operated for political guests. The circumstances here the most dubious and contradicting, as the first reports talked about an airstrike, while later Western reports suggest either a pre-planted bomb, or an assassination by agents on the ground.
This came only few hours after the American forces carried out a bombing campaign in Iraq against the Popular Mobilization, but also knocking out radar and air detection systems. Which for some time seemed linked to a possible airstrike against Iran.
Within less then 12 hours Iraq, the Iranian and the Lebanese capital were hit with airstrikes and assassinations, killing the political figurehead of Ḥamās, a most senior commander of Ḥizb Allah, an Iranian advisor and number of civilians. After a bombing campaign in Yemen roughly a week before, suddenly all sides of the Axis of Resistance were hit.
Netanyahu put it as striking at the leaders of his enemies, but more likely giving a provocation, that cannot be left unanswered.
How deep is the impact?
What that strike means should be separated, just like Ḥizb Allah Secretly General Ḥasan Naṣr Allah did in his speech reacting to the events on 1 August into two different levels. What the loss of these individuals mean, and what significance the strikes themself mean and would have even meant being unsuccessful, independently from the individuals targeted.
It is especially important that while usually Tel Aviv refrains from commenting such assassinations, this time Netanyahu one the very night of these strikes on 31 July gave a speech placating the Israelis as the sole architects and achievers. While it is much more likely that the bulwark of the operation was carried out by the Americans, specifically in Tehran. Meaning this last major provocation far an all-out war, which is the main strategic objective for Netanyahu himself for his own political survival, is set in a frame of “just” retaliation, and any response it is as aggression, after which Tel Aviv “must” go to war, and Washington “must” go with it to “defend it”. This is the very scenario Netanyahu has been working on for the last ten months.
As for the person of Haniyya and Fu’ād Šukr, undoubtedly the biggest feathers of the Israelis’ cap, and even the Iranian advisor who died in Beirut, the loss is symbolic and impactful on an emotional level, strategically has little importance. Fu’ād Šukr was a senior strategist of Ḥizb Allah’s war of attrition along the Lebanese-Palestinian border, as close personal advisor to the Secretary-General and a veteran of all major engagements of the resistance organization for the last four decades. Yet the age of 62 he belonged to the first generation that is by now handing over matters to the newer cadres. Those more active on the ground, more familiar with modern tactics and warfare, who already have significant tactical expertise. Experiences of the last two decades clearly show that all of these organizations showed a very high level of resilience to the loss of leaders and rapidly fill the void whenever happened. And Ḥizb Allah is especially good at this, having by now a very capable organizational structure. The Iranian state and the Revolutionary Guards are even more resilient to such losses, as they have lost a number of senior commanders in Syria in the last decade and even legendary commander Qāsem Soleymānī, yet they operations in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon never weakened.
The loss of Haniyya is even less impactful, ironically might even help the Axis of Resistance. For some time Haniyya was a political figurehead living in Qatar with little significance on the ground in Gaza, or overall in Palestine. He was even an obstacle in the last few years for the reconciliation between a number of Palestinian factions, Iran and Syria, as he personally got involved deeply in the war against Syria urging Ḥamās to fight against the Syrian government. After the Syrian government clearly got over the worst of the war by 2018, Damascus signaled it many times that while supporting the Palestinian cause in general is core theme of its policies, cooperation with Ḥamās is not possible for the time being, specifically because the role the organization played in the war. Haniyya’s person was a key matter in this dispute. With him being out of the picture and his place taken by others, who might have played a less controversial role in Syria, the way for reconciliation between these parties could be open. By now he was more of a burden and an unreliable political tool than an effective ally.
So losing these individual figures have some impact, but nothing on the level that would even slightly paralyze any organization, or the Axis of Resistance as a whole.
However, the way they were assassinated and where they were assassinated is much more significant. Regardless of the war between Ḥizb Allah and the Israelis in the last few months there were lines that so far have not been crossed. Ḥizb Allah did not strike major urban centers and densely populated areas, none of the major cities, though it is clearly capable to do so, and Tel Aviv concentrated its strikes to the border area sporadically targeting the Biqā‘ Valley. Now, however, the Southern Suburb of Beirut was targeted, the center of Ḥizb Allah’s heartland, its unofficial capital. The very same way striking at the Iranian embassy in Damascus was blatant provocation and a clear violation of all international norms, assassinating a high level political figure, an airstrike or a clandestine operation in Tehran is a very different thing. These two provocations would have caused the same exact result, even if they failed to kill the targets. A move Netanyahu was clearly counting on. This was the real message, the real provocation that Tel Aviv wants to trigger a war.
The effect would have been the same as openly starting operations in Lebanon, as it is almost impossible to stop the avalanche that is coming. It only had a diplomatic angle to show that it was not Tel Aviv starting an open war, but to the other side after a “just” and “necessary” reaction to what happened on the Golan. And thus mitigating the international uproar, giving a chance to the media to put the blame on Iran and Ḥizb Allah, and providing some pretext for Washington to get involved. This was the ultimate provocation to which an answer is unavoidable, and that answer will serve the pretext for Netanyahu to finally prolong his war and extend it to Lebanon, and to drag the Americans with him. Practically making them to fight this war for Tel Aviv.
The response
There can be no doubt that an answer both from Iran and Ḥizb Allah, and both from the Axis as a whole will come. Ḥasan Naṣr Allah made this very clear, just like Iranian Supreme Leader Hāmeneī, who said that “the vengeance is a duty to Iran, as Haniyya was killed on Iranian soil”. The experience of the Israeli strike against the Iranian embassy in Damascus clearly showed that, and indicated the most likely scenario. Iran, just like the Lebanese state has already complained in the U.N. Security Council and expressed its right to respond to such blatant aggression. The Security Council will discuss it, Algeria will support a motion to condemn, or even to punish the Israeli regime might even get passed, but even so Washington will veto. And thus diplomatically all options will be exhausted leading to a dead end. After which Tehran will point out that it tried diplomatically, will put the blame on the international community for its lack of action and will respond in some way militarily, well establishing its right to hit back. It will not even be difficult, as Netanyahu himself admitted that Tel Aviv is behind the attacks. And this will undoubtedly include a major operation, similar to the missile strikes Iran carried out few weeks ago, almost certainly hitting some military bases. But the real answer will come later.
Ḥizb Allah it self has so far always responded to the loss of all of its commanders during the last ten months, and always very painfully. This time will not be different. Ḥasan Naṣr Allah in his speech on 1 August left no doubt about this, thought this time he refrained from specifics. He said that he ordered a two days calm right after the loss of Commander Fu’ād Šukr to mourn and to regain composure, but from 2 August operations along the border will continue and this will not even be part of the response, nor the prelude to the response. And though has shared no more, he stated that a new phase has started, and that the Israelis “don’t even realize what lines they crossed”. Hinting that the response will be on a different scale than any before.
We have to keep in mind that the main question the Axis have to decide now is what the next step will likely to be. Because there are two possibilities. Either Washington has already decided to support the Israeli war after the response, as it will only be a pretext for war, or it will “tolerate” a limited Iranian-Lebanese revenge up to certain point and will try refrain from joining the Israeli forces into Lebanon. If the second is believed to be true, the Iranian-Lebanese next step will hit a symbolic target, it will be significant, but it will have its limits well enough to give way to heated diplomatic debacles, only to eventually calm down. At least to a level of not breaking. Yet if the first possibility is considered to be true and the basis of calculations, the level of the revenge is almost insignificant, as no matter what, it will lead to an all-out war. In that case the response will be designed already being part of the war and thus will be a paralyzing preemptive strike. That can include bombarding the port of Haifa further crippling the Israeli economy and leaving it will only two smaller functioning ports, after Eilat has closed down. It can also include striking the power plants and oil depots, highways leading to the north to make it more difficult for the Israeli army to move against Lebanon. Or hitting the Israeli navy, which has always been of special significance for the wars between Ḥizb Allah and Tel Aviv.
The options for the revenge are many and will come in waves, but most probably not very soon.
Where America stands
Not just in this consideration, but altogether in the equation of what has happened in the last ten months and what is coming it is crucial to understand what is the American position. Not as much as the administration itself, as this will almost certainly soon change, but the state with all of its political and military organizations. In short, is it ready to go into a major regional conflict for Tel Aviv, fighting in Lebanon and risking an all-out war in the Middle East, or it supplies the Israeli regime, but its primarily objectives are elsewhere, and thus does not want to sink into a protracted quagmire with no clear strategy to get out of it.
So far the official American position was that it will support Tel Aviv “to defend itself”, no matter what, yet at the same time does all it can to prevent the escalation of the war and to spill out to the whole region. And recently when Netanyahu visited Washington Trump meeting with him also said that he would end the war soon, just like Ukraine.
This position, the policies in the last decade to slowly move way from the Middle East concentrating more on Russia and China, and the economics of such a major regional war all indicate that Washington is genuine not to indulge Netanyahu and not let him ignite a major war for his own political survival, in which the American forces and economy will have to do the majority of the work.
The Israeli war machine is already exhausted in Gaza, and reached almost nothing, except the total destruction of the area. But the captives are still not retrieved, Ḥamās is not defeated, it is still depleting Israeli resources, it is more reliant on constant American resupplies than ever, its southern port in Eilat is bankrupt, and more and more of its own industries, even the most crucial military industries are moving to other countries, like its drone facilities to India, because they are paralyzed by the war. A telling sign that the military and the Israeli society as a whole is in very deep division is that on 30 July riots broke out between soldiers, the police and extremist settler groups, in which even government members took part storming two military bases. That is clearly not the state in which an even more devastating war can be fought alone in Lebanon.
The only two parts of the Israeli war machine that are still fully functioning are the air force and the special operation units. These are enough for precision strikes and assassinations, but not for an all-out war in Lebanon, especially if Iran and Syria decide to step in. That latter possibility is not at all unlikely, as there were indications in the Israeli media that the Syrian army in July started extensive drills in Dar‘ā.
This means that Tel Aviv is simply not capable to move into Lebanon now, which Netanyahu knows full well. In whatever shape, or form the Americans would need to make most of the work, in which case its bases will suffer attacks in Syria, Iraq and possibly even more in the region. And this in a position when they would have little control over the situation, as there is no winning strategy. There is no point at which “victory” could be claimed and the hostilities would end.
On the other hand right after Netanyahu’s speech in a telephone conversation with him Biden promised to send more American troops into the region and to help Israeli defenses against the upcoming retaliation. Which can be understood as already gearing up to an upcoming war. Even before the last series of provocations, after the events of Mağdal Šams on the Golan, the Lebanese Foreign Ministry stated that the American contacted the Lebanese government requesting that whatever happens in the next 48 hours it should be arranged that Ḥizb Allah would not respond.
So at the same time when during the last ten months all along the American administration held the position that the further escalation should be avoided and the conflict must not expand to the region, it did nothing to stop the war in Gaza, kept resupplying the Israeli troops and even joined some operations, started a major operation against Yemen to prevent the economic blockade from Red Sea, made huge efforts to block the Iranian missile barrage and keeps bombing positions in Iraq. Regardless of the real objectives, it is increasingly difficult to understand and predict where Washington stands. And that is not only problematic from the point of view of Tehran, Beirut and Damascus, but also for its rapidly distancing allies, like Saudi Arabia. And the problem with such unpredictable and unreliable American policy saying one thing, but doing totally the opposite is that words and diplomacy loose value and the slightest thing can ignite a war.
More serious than it looks
It is yet to be seen how the Iranians and the whole Axis of Resistance respond. It is the matter of their perception what is coming after. But apart from the Americans, the objectives and the positions are clear.
Netanyahu himself as a political leader, and the whole Israeli establishment suffered a great humiliation on 7 October 2023. Politically speaking Netanyahu is dead, the only thing that keeps him in position is the state of emergency since then, even though the emergency war cabinet and his own government by now has collapsed. The reason why the establishment goes along with this madness is that biggest its asset, the myth of invincibility was shattered and the some level of absolute dominance must be regained to keep faith in the project. Yet after ten months none of the objectives are met, there is no strategy to close the conflict, as Netanyahu’s claimed objectives are vague and unrealistic, the army is exhausted and only kept alive by the increasing levels of American supplies, the economy is buckling and the social rupture is widening. For Netanyahu and his shrinking group the only way forward is war in Lebanon, and even beyond. Not to achieve something, but to prolong his survival. And for that he has to drag in Washington, which so far avoided the most direct participation.
The Axis of Resistance is fully prepared for a war, if it only involves Tel Aviv with some American support. Yet it does not seek this for two reasons. For one, it can any time give the pretext for the Americans and possibly others to get involved and make the outcome impossible to predict, but a loss very likely. Secondly, it does not need to, as the war of attrition on all fronts is slowly, but clearly wearing the Israelis down, while at the same time amalgamating all sides critical of the American role in the region and normalization process with Tel Aviv. Meaning with holding ground it is already gaining a political victory.
The only unknown factor is how far the American are ready to let Netanyahu go, and how far they are ready to support it if he crossed the line. Will they commit to a crippling regional war, or will just save him from disaster after a failed adventure into Lebanon.
It is game of dare between Tehran, Beirut and Damascus on one side, and Tel Aviv on the other. The latter trying to trick the Americans to fight this war for it, while the other holding ground trying to evade this, but showing power.
The ball is on the American side now, and to avoid tragedy, if it still can, a clear vision and policy would be needed. With Biden and VP Harris at the top.