The war that had started in October 2023 around Gaza and eventually spread into a limited regional conflict seems to have reached its end. On January 15 both the Palestinian factions and the Tel Aviv regime agreed to a ceasefire starting on 19 January, which would lead to conditions returning to how they were before 8 October 2023. Meaning the Israeli forces would leave the whole of the Gaza Strip, a new authority by the Palestinian factions would be formed to run the administration and a massive international reconstruction project would be launched. And thus the longest Israeli aggression would end, given all sides hold on to their commitments.
This war, however, eventually spilled over to much of the surrounding area attracting involvement even from Yemen, and the conditions have changed dramatically, thought for the better, or the worse for Tel Aviv is yet to be seen. The state as it was in Syria collapsed, leaving behind a very questionable future. Iran, which for long seemed to be winning a war of attrition and eventually coming out as the most potential actor in the anti-Tel Aviv camp lost its most trusted ally, the Syrian government. The Palestinian landscape has also changed deeply, though regardless of the biggest losses the smallest change is expected to occur here.
The biggest change has happened in Lebanon. Here the strongest Shia group Ḥizb Allah, an essential component of the Axis of Resistance joined the “support front for Gaza”, losing almost all senior leaders, a part of its military forces, and eventually its support corridor from Syria, yet scoring significant achievements against Tel Aviv, eventually ending this part of the conflict with a ceasefire on 27 November. And this 60-day ceasefire is about to end in little more than a week.
But now that the war has come to an end, if the ceasefires will last both in Lebanon and Gaza, what has really changed in the overall sense in the region?
The regional setup until October 2023
Seeing the conditions right now after the war many have summed up the situation, as the Axis of Resistance was defeated, or even ceased to exist in its former form. Iran lost the support of Syria, its oldest and most trusted ally, and its vital corridor to Tehran’s most crucial ideological partner Ḥizb Allah in Lebanon. Therefore its access to the most important scene of the regional struggle, Palestine is greatly reduced. The upcoming period might see the gradual, or even sudden collapse of Ḥizb Allah, which would mean Iran would be pushed back from this conflict area and lose almost all of its influence on the Middle Eastern equation. At least compared to what it had until 2023, and especially compared to what it almost gained by the end of 2024.
This view, while not at all unfounded, is somewhat misleading and exaggerated. And to have a better idea, it should be assessed what really took place.
So far there have been three regional power blocks in the Middle East, which had the potential of forming the events. These blocks are the ones, which had the economic and military power, the will, and most importantly the ideological content to present an offer to the region. One of these was the Axis of Resistance based on the alliance between Syria and Iran, but joined by ideological allies of Tehran, as Ḥizb Allah in Lebanon, several factions with a huge influence over the government in Iraq, and the al-Ḥūtī Movement in Yemen. And while its Shia overtone was increasing in recent years, its core doctrinal message was not religious, but self-reliance, the rejection of the Western influence and presence in the Middle East. The importance of states respecting and supporting each other, but not determining policy for each other.
The second major block is based on Qatar and Türkiye, with its Muslim Brotherhood core ideology, which also had its allies in the region, mostly in the form of Qatari-supported political or militant factions from Tunisia to Syria and Sudan. This block has no antagonistic conflict with the West, it can largely cooperate with it but strives to gain influence over the region by promoting its own form of political, and even more crucially religious concepts. A sense of belonging above all else, secondly aimed against secular or Shia ideologies.
The third block is based on Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, with its regular, but casual and not core ally of Egypt. An opportunistic ally that only gets involved when it suits it, and only to the most necessary degree for its own interest, but still an ally, as would not support any other block against this one. Much like the role of Russia with the Axis of Resistance. This block as well has no conflict with the West, even embraces a symbiosis with it, but locked in a mostly ideological and pragmatic conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood.
No other group, or state in the Middle East, no matter how significant they are, like Egypt on its own, Algeria, or Morocco has the will, the influence, the resources, and ideology to offer to make them driving forces in regional matters.
All three groups, either collectively, or individually strive to be the dominant caretakers of the Palestinian question, as it is being the most significant matter that can always gain the interest of the general opinion. Because whoever “solves” this conflict, putting an end to the longest most essential struggle deserves to lead the region. And it is important to note that the goal is not always necessarily to “solve” the Palestinian crisis, in the sense of ending the occupation or liberating all of Palestine, but to become the “general caretaker” of the matter. To offer the most suitable solution, to gain the allegiance of the key Palestinian factions – by now practically Ḥamās – and to “show a convincing way out”. Which can accept alternatives to a military liberation, like a viable two-state model.
And then the war begun.
Until October 2023 the equation was that the Saudi-Emirati block was clearly losing this bid. The Emirates normalized relations with Tel Aviv, Abū Zabī’s attempt to undermine Ḥamās and replace its influence with a reinvigorated PLO under the leadership of one of its protégés failed and the rumors about an upcoming Saudi-Israeli peace deals kept increasing. The Axis of Resistance had a good standing with the Palestinian matter with its full support for the resistance, but it was a troubled relations. Damascus had an irreconcilable conflict with Ḥamās for the movement’s involvement in the war against Syria. The Qatari-Turkish block was arguably more dominant, and with the beginning of the war leading the ceasefire negotiations it seemed likely that once again Qatar will be the “peacemaker”. Resembling the sequence of events in Afghanistan, where an extremist group eventually made a deal with the West via Doha, the West got rid of a problem, and Qatar gained a radical recruiting camp. Ironically here exactly the same happened, but only a year later. But in late 2023 the ceasefire talks were not leading anywhere, and the military alternative gained dominance.
The Axis of Resistance partially, but very visibly joined the war. With the battles in Lebanon weakening the Israeli forces, with the constant – and never before seen – missile and drone barrages and the unprecedented direct Iranian missile strikes of operations True Promise 1 and 2.
Tel Aviv was bogged down, with no visible way out of the conflict and no winning strategy. Despite the ever-growing American involvement – clearly saving Tel Aviv from total collapse – and the growing sacrifices, when even the ultra-orthodox thus far untouchable were forced into military service there were no gains, no victories. Most of the settlements in Northern Palestine have to be evacuated with growing dissatisfaction, tens of thousands of internal refugees, and a soaring number of those leaving the land, probably for good. Whatever the Israeli military could achieve in destruction and very limited advances in Lebanon was not giving the image that it would not happen again, even in a few very short years.
And the events in Yemen, another area under the influence of the Axis of Resistance, managed to show an even more alarming prospect. As the maritime routes on the Red Sea were practically, for the first time economic blockade was imposed effectively from the distance, to which neither Tel Aviv, nor its backers had sufficient answer.
Meaning that the Palestinian matter seemed to become dominated by the Axis of Resistances, as its members took arms to help, did deliver severe blows to Tel Aviv, and were not short on sacrifices. It showed that resistance can indeed yield achievements. On the other hand, the Saudi-Emirati block was largely absent from the matter, and the Qatari-Turkish block failed to support the Palestinians, or to achieve a ceasefire. Had the matters stayed like that, has the Syrian state not collapsed, the Axis of Resistance would have had the upper hand and come out strategically victorious.
And then on 27 November Ḥizb Allah after a series of shocking actions against Haifa and Tel Aviv itself on 24 November agreed to the ceasefire. Which was largely due to the growing pressure within Lebanon to end the destruction, which was turning political sentiment against the party. By this agreement, Ḥizb Allah agreed to evacuate the area to the south of the Litani River and the sole military presence of the Lebanese Army here but achieved that there would be no buffer zone and all Lebanese areas have to evacuate the Israeli troops. It was an arguable draw between the Resistance and Tel Aviv. But morally it was a massive victory for Ḥizb Allah, which was well exploited.
But than Syria
What really turned the tide against the Resistance was the rapid collapse of the Syrian state, and thus a pillar of the Axis ceased to exist. It is very early to see what the final outcome of this change will be. The very limited number of the militants taking over Syria, their clearly terrorist affiliation, their so far incompetence to rule and the fact that their “victory” was due to internal treachery much more than their military might all give the prospect that the current setup may soon collapse, or simply hand power over in a Western-dominated political process. And whatever comes after them is ever less clear. Though it might just as well happen that with big enough Turkish and Qatari economic and military investments Syria will be pushed into the vassalage of the Muslim Brotherhood block for quite some time. Either way, losing Syria is a loss for the Axis very hard to overestimate.
Gaining control over Syria, though so far with very limited success and a fragile grip on it, and the fact that the ceasefire deal in Gaza was achieved by Qatar the Muslim Brotherhood turned the table around.
And with this, a new set of struggles will begin, with the very active, but not visible involvement of Tel Aviv. A struggle to turn Syria into a weak and dependent state far from posing any complication to the Tel Aviv regime. Which will eventually have to leave most of the areas – probably not all – it occupied after 8 December but will enforce great concessions from Damascus. In Lebanon, a new political struggle has already started to diminish all influence of Ḥizb Allah and make it militarily insignificant, or to even wipe it out completely. That struggle with the rapid election of a new president after a hiatus of more than two and a half years and the appointment of a new government has already become virulent, though so far the expulsion of the Israeli invaders has rule the general public.
With all this new attempts will start soon in Iraq as well to crush Tehran’s influence there and finally isolate Iran from the Arab matters. Yemen will soon witness a renewed internal struggle with the Gaza war ending, which was the biggest galvanizing force behind Sanaa. And the wind of change is visible everywhere. Sudan being locked in an internal conflict for two years suddenly started showing signs that the conflict might end, and Egypt is also making progress in the Libyan political processes, also gaining a foothold in Somalia.
The Axis of Resistance was very close to gaining a total strategic victory but eventually came to lose the most, and the struggle to keep its influence has only just started.
Where the Resistance lost
Indeed the losses of the Axis are huge. Syria fell out of the line, making it even questionable whether if it is still an axis, or should it be renamed and remodeled. It might even be turned into a state hostile to the Axis.
Ḥizb Allah in Lebanon lost almost all of its leadership with its legendary Secretary General for more than forty years Ḥasan Naṣr Allah being the shock. It had to give up its military presence along the Palestinian border and its political influence within Lebanon is challenged more than ever before in the last two decades.
And even more visible, though being in the forefront of actively supporting the Palestinian resistance, it failed to attract support from the Arab world beyond those groups, which had favored the Resistance even before.
Where the Axis won
Despite the very severe setbacks, however, the Ḥizb Allah did lose militarily and even by the ceasefire agreement can keep its weaponry. Yes, a major political challenge is ahead of it, but given the internal support it has, the outcome is far from being set. Ḥizb Allah and its ally the Amal Movement are deeply rooted in Lebanese society, which cannot be easily erased.
“Our Villages”, one of the most popular resistance songs of the war
Until the very day of the ceasefire with Tel Aviv, the outcome was arguably a draw. But Ḥizb Allah almost instantly turned it into a major victory, as on the very first day of the ceasefire tens of thousands of Lebanese, mostly Shia from the South headed in massive columns to return to their village and to rebuild them. It was a very clear sign of their trust in the Resistance, which would defend them in case the agreement would not last. However, that also shows the sense of responsibility by the popular basis of the party, to take part in the resistance in whatever way possible, to rebuild and be the foundation of the resistance in the next war. And here there is a striking difference with the settlers on the other side of the border, which after almost two months still largely avoid to return, demanding guarantees and financial compensation from Tel Aviv to return.
Waves of Lebanese returning to the South on the very first day of the ceasefire
Where Ḥizb Allah exploited this excellently was its dedication to help rebuild everything. The very first speech of Secretary General Na‘īm Qāsim largely focused on the ways of social support and how to help the people rebuilding their homes and the infrastructure. And since then it has been a crucial point of the party, far above the military achievements, the losses, or the political bickering. That shows that Ḥizb Allah being a deep-rooted social movement understands the value of this social support.
That is the lesson the Syrian state failed to understand. Damascus with its allies won the war in 2018 that was launched against it, but failed to think ahead, to rebuild and prevent the collapse of its social fabric. The economic war after 2018, the lack of sufficient response to it, and ignoring the impoverishment of the people eventually led to its collapse. Ḥizb Allah not paying attention to its supporters most essentially by the ordinary men would send the message that the party forgot them, their sacrifices were in vain, if in the end they would only lose everything. But with every rebuilding support check with the term “to the best of people,” it ensures that the bond between the party and its supporters only grows stronger, especially since the Lebanese state is slow with its rebuilding efforts.
On the grand scale, the Resistance lost a fundamental member with Syria, it is true. But a certainly weak member fell out, which in the last few years needed more support than it gave. Also, the ideological message of this block so far had to balance carefully between that a Shia theocratic state and a secular Arab one, yet from now it will be less of a problem. The Resistance will regroup and could concentrate more on those fronts, where its standings are more stable.
And the first round of consolidating its foothold has already begun, in Lebanon.