Late on 10 March in Beijing Saudi Arabia and Iran, responding to the initiative of the Chinese President himself signed an agreement, which can prove to be a game changer in the Middle East. The two states, which are often referred to as irreconcilable archenemies now agreed to reopen diplomatic channels between each other, which have been cut since 2016. Within this package deal they vowed to reopen their respective embassies and all former diplomatic missions in each other’s countries, relaunch the diplomatic dialogue between themselves, take steps to implement the security cooperation agreement signed in 2001. And though might seem insignificant, agreed on the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.
The agreement was in the air since 2021, which started with the Iraqi mediation, yet the final result came to the surprise of many quite sudden. Indeed, in the last two decades, or even more, few things seemed so stabile cornerstone of the Middle Eastern equation, as the distrust and animosity between Iran and its Gulf neighbors. Which on the one hand started with the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran, raising fears in the Gulf monarchies – many of them only been independent for few years then – that Tehran will export its revolutionary zeal. For which in the lifetime of Imam Homeīnī certainly there was an appetite. On the other hand these states with Saudi Arabia in the lead enthusiastically supported Iraq in its long war against Iran to foil this threat. And ever since then, whatever happened, this antagonism seemed to be constant. So much so that it is doubtful whether it can ever be reversed, regardless of this new agreement.
Since Tehran and Riyadh agreed to reconcile the regional reactions were jubilant, marking it as a sing of possible calm and moderation in an already overly complex and troubled region. Iran seems to be on diplomatic offensive making similar gestures to all over the region and is rightfully happy with the result. The reactions in the EU are only mildly optimistic, while in the U.S. and in Tel Aviv – covering their bitterness – try to downplay the significance of what happened. Which once again could suggest that this deal might be the beginning of a new era, as the Iranians put it.
But can the realities change in the region and more than four decades of hidden war be put behind? Can the two rival sides of the Gulf coexist in the region still holding on to their respective spheres of influences?
And than the ice broke…
Since it was not advertised heavily before, between 6 and 10 March the Saudi and the Iranian chief national security advisors met in Beijing by the invitation of the Chinese President, and after lengthy negotiations the by now infamous agreement was reached. In the late hours of 10 March the chief officials signed the deal, which came rather a surprise, though it was in the air for some time.
Negotiations were underway since early 2021, when that time the Iraqi government really pushed for it. And for quite some time there was real hope for its success, until in the fall of 2022 a completely new Iraqi government was formed and a wave of protests swept through Iran. For which Tehran partially blamed Riyadh. Despite the occasional positive signals the rapprochement process was loosing steam until the Omani government picked up mediation as part of its efforts to bring peace to Yemen. But the balance really started to change only since February at its was due to three main factors. The Iranian protests calmed down, the Israeli state, the other main contender for Saudi partnership started to slide into internal chaos, making it an even more unsuitable partner, and finally, the Saudis still haven’t received any sign of reconciliation from the Biden administration to mend the troubles between them. So it was an appropriate time to take a big step for change, and it was taken, though by the Iranians this option was open for at least two years by now.
It is both very significant what the agreement contains, at least what was made public, and what it does not. Diplomatic channels are reopened, and all former diplomatic missions – the embassies and the consulates – are to be reopened within two months. Which is quite fast. Direct air traffic is also to be reestablished and both states appoint full ambassadors to each other. Also, both states take serious steps to implement the security cooperation agreement they signed in 2001. So in a sense the clock is turned back in their relations, but not simply to 2016, when it was already very bad, but back to 2001, when there was a slight optimism between them.
On the other hand, the agreement steps over some of the most important previous Saudi demands. The agreement has not mention about Yemen, the Irani nuclear deal, or missile program, and all motions about who to blame for the break in 2016 were also avoided. The only eternal Saudi claim that was included in the agreement was the principle of non-interference in domestic issues, by which Riyadh is always accusing Iran, but after the last few months of protests in Iran, it is also desired piece of the deal for Tehran.
Seeing all this and understandably as the deal came rather sudden the question was raised by many: How serious, how significant is that deal? It should be kept in mind who signed it. By the Chinese side the Foreign Minister, but from the Saudi and the Iranian sides the national security advisors, Musā‘id al-‘Abyān and ‘Alī Šamhānī. Which indicates that it was very far from a protocol event and in fact heavy negotiations must had taken place. The fact that it took four days also suggests that. These two officials are not well known public figures, but nonetheless very influential. ‘Alī Šamhānī is officially the Secretary-General of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, which in theory dictates policy to all Iranian armed forces and security agencies. Much more than that, however, he is also a very close confidant of Supreme Leader ‘Alī Hāmeneī, probably the closest military advisor since the death of General Qāsem Soleymānī. Musā‘id al-‘Abyān, formally State Minister for Political and Security Affairs only started to became prominent in 2014, but since than has became one of the closest advisers of Crown Prince Muḥammad ibn Salmān. His father was also the very first Director of the Saudi Intelligence. So in fact both the Iranian and the Saudi leaders sent their most trusted advisers to hammer out a deal without pomp and media attention, which shows real significance here. This is not a media show.
And the domino started to fall
Almost immediately after the agreement the Iranian diplomacy went on a very impressive tour. The very same ‘Alī Šamhānī on 16 March arrived in the Emirates, where he was Ṭaḥnūn ibn Zāyid, the main security chief of the country. The main focus of their negotiations is not known, but by their economic agreement the Emirates will open more space to Iran to circumvent the Western sanctions.
Just to leave no question open about the seriousness of the Saudi deal, there were signals from both sides that the Iranian and Saudi Foreign Ministers, while Saudi King Salmān himself invited Iranian President Ra’īsīto visit the Kingdom. And since than there have been intensive negotiations between Iran and Qatar as well, also focusing of more complex economic cooperation. But the real surprise came just one day after the Saudi-Iranian agreement, when a Bahraini delegation met with an Iranian one to discuss a reconciliation and the reopening of the embassies on both sides. Given that this small island kingdom was the most devoted opponent of Iran and went the further than any other to create a security partnership with Tel Aviv, this is very impressive. It shows that the whole Gulf region is now rapidly consolidating its ties with Iran, while at the same time putting all possible Israeli partnership on the shelf.
The real message. The role of China.
One, or possibly most important aspect of this deal is that after almost two years of successful, yet inconclusive Iraqi and Omani mediation the deal was swiftly hammered out in China. In December we have already dealt with the impressive inroads China is taking in the Middle East and the growing role Beijing is taking in the region. The three major summits held in Riyadh in the beginning of December 2022 already showed how much Saudi Arabia is turning towards China, along with the most Gulf states. And not just economically, as this trend was clear for decades, but by now also politically, even taking the first steps for military cooperation.
As China signed a strategic cooperation pact with Iran for 25 years already in March 2021 – so even with the previous Iranian government -, it was a natural development that in time the major players in the Gulf already with significant economic cooperation China would either have to join this development and follow suit, or risk antagonizing their ties with Beijing. After all a continued Cold War with Iran and largely boosting their political cooperation with China replacing the U.S. downscaling it’s presence here are two irreconcilable tracks. And with the war in Ukraine, by which the U.S., the EU and Russia are all pinned downed with each other, the right opportunity just presented itself. China stepped in. In December it made a huge contribution to the economic boost of the Middle East, and now presented itself as a useful arbiter of major disputes. In this regard the political gestures by which China took a stance on the Palestinian case, while the Arab League gave theoretical support for the “one China” doctrine about Taiwan cannot be downplayed anymore.
How great is this transformation, where Riyadh is clearly distancing itself from Washington and consequently pulling closer to China – and in some regards even to Russia – is symptomatically shown by a recent interview of Saudi Prince Turkī al-Fayṣal to France 24.
In this he said that America does not have the impracticality to be an effective mediator for Riyadh, unlike China, which can. Though the now 78 years old Prince holds little power now, he was the director of the Saudi Intelligence Service from 1979 to 2001, and after that he was the Saudi Ambassador to Washington between 2005 to 2007. Thus he was one of the main architects of the renewed regional partnership between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia after the troubled oil crisis years and he is still the keeper of many secrets of how intimate was this relationship. Especially against Iran. Now, when he says that Riyadh – in any matter – cannot trust America, but can trust any other superpower that is not the remorse of an old man. It shows how a total mindset is changing, as he was one of the most trusted and influential members of the pro-America camp.
This changing mindset foreshadows a changing paradigm. So far the American-Saudi partnership fostered a large scale divide-and-conquer gameplay, which amplified regional disputes and gave a somewhat superficial role to Riyadh with full American backing. Riyadh benefited from regional conflicts as a powerbroker on the one hand, and an influential arbiter to the Americans. The Chinese, however, disinterested in ideological conflicts and regional power plays focus on business and trade corporation models. Which is boosting compromises and reconciliation, mutually beneficial coexistence between regional powers under one umbrella.
The fact that China could put this deal together rather smoothly and it is followed by similar gestures by many Gulf states shows that real significance of the growing Chinese presence, which is not only economic anymore.
Many assessments since the agreement downplay this development and rightly point out that while China is still very far from being a global power in the military sense, America is and still has a large military presence in the Gulf. Furthermore, the military cooperation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, or with any other Gulf states is not touched. That is not even hinted. So the Americans will probably continue to be the biggest power in the Middle East and the Gulf region specifically, and its policy to downsize its engagement here can easily be reversed anytime. In such assessments it is rather suggested that the Saudi leadership is still probing the limits how far they can go with loosening their ties to America, now that the relationship between them and the Biden administration are in the abyss, and that they will almost instantly reconcile of the right gesture come from Washington. That might be so, but there is no sign of such step coming from the Americans any time soon. And with the current trends going on there will might not be space for that in five or ten years. Especially if the current Saudi Crown Prince becomes king and solidifies his rule.
The fall of doctrines
It is clear that Tehran is celebrating now. It is rare to see almost total consensus in the Iranian ruling circles from the Supreme Leader to the military and religious establishment down to the actual political leadership in any major foreign policy steps. But now we see jubilant comments from all sectors of the Iranian leadership, mostly marking it as a slap to the American and Israeli plans. And they are right in many ways.
This deal, given that is implemented and both sides stick to their vows, is indeed a huge gain for the Iranians. Both now specifically and in general in the long run. Right now, as it shows that after almost two years of hesitation, and right after the biggest wave of anti-government protests since 2009 in Iran, in which Riyadh played its role, Saudi Arabia finally opted for reconciliation. Thus showing that it does not trust that the protest will break the Iranian state anytime soon, nor has any hopes to gain any benefit from further animosity. Much rather comments now mark possible cooperative understandings in regional matters from Syria to Yemen. And even until then economic cooperation is in the very close horizon, as right after the agreement the Saudi Finance Minister himself hinted.
And that is achieved in a setup, as Iran wanted from the beginning, which is not even mentioning Yemen, a critical matter for both countries. The deal with Riyadh was followed by positive reactions from all over the Arab world and similar – though smaller – gestures from states like Bahrain.
That proves that the worst scenario for Tehran is successfully stopped, at least for now. That was the game plan by the Trump administration to gradually withdraw most of the military presence from Middle East and handing over Washington’s former absolute hegemony to a regional partnership between Tel Aviv and a growing number of Arab states under the Abraham Accords umbrella. What has been secured by Washington, the regional dominance of the Israeli state, could be secured by this new Abraham partnership cemented on economic syncretism and mutual animosity against Iran. The deal now between Riyadh and Tehran clearly – though so far only temporarily – reversed this trend, as the Saudis reconciled with Iran, yet unlike as it was constantly suggested, not willing to join the pro-Israeli camp. To the contrary, even states like the Emirates put that project to halt, and instead hold high level negotiations with the same Iranian Security Advisor, who signed the deal with the Saudis. So while Tel Aviv is sinking into a political crisis and a security quagmire, the worst in decades, Iran survived the recent pressure and makes a huge return to the Arab world.
What is, however, less obvious that this success comes in a very steep price for Iran, or in many ways to the whole region. That is the fall of a core doctrine.
One of the main slogans of the Islamic Revolution was: Na šarqī, naġarbī, Ğumhūriyye Eslāmī! – Nor Eastern, nor Western, Islamic Republic! This was a predominantly ideological message about the new state and the new governmental model equally rejects the immoral Western liberal ideologies and the “Eastern” godless communism, and forms a path for its own by rejuvenating the Islamic principles. Of course in a Shia understanding under the leadership of Imam Homeīnī. That latter part specifically made it so unappealing, even threatening, while the general idea, rejecting other influences and remodeling the Middle East based on its own cultural heritage was generally shared. It was tested in many different forms before. That was the rallying call of the Arab Revolt in the First World War, the Saudis conquest until the end of the Second World War, but also the concept of the many pan-Arabic movements. That core idea in one form of another was shared by Islamic ideologues and Arab revolutionaries from ‘Abd an-Nāṣir in Egypt to the Ba ‘at in Syria and Iraq, and even by al-Qaddāfī in Libya and Bū Madyān in Algeria. The idea of rejecting the former colonial and later global powers to replace their hegemony with a broad regional cooperation. In other words, making the Arab/Islamic Middle East great – and independent – once again. The Islamic Revolution of Iran completely fitted into this trend and indeed Iran has been a very persistent promoter of this model.
Though it engaged in intense diplomatic relations with both the West and the East, it was always promoting the idea that the main problem in the region is caused by foreign interference. Therefore all disputes should be solved regionally, not letting any party from outside the region get in the middle. Even now, the official Iranian line celebrates the deal with Riyadh as a sign that Saudis and the other Gulf states are loosening their ties with the American. Therefore, as the Western hegemony is weakening, a new era comes built on regional understanding and cooperation. And Iran, though largely by necessity, managed to show a good example of this approach with reaching a very high level of self sufficiency successfully defending its interests.
However, the recent Saudi-Iranian reconciliation proves the overall failure of this doctrine. If the American strategy of toppling, or at least isolating Iran playing the regional players against each other or forming the new Abraham block against it failed, it did not happen because Iran managed to prove its doctrine right, or because these states ended their rivalries. It happens, if it happens, because other global powers manage to take the American’s place. The recently developing strong military partnership with Russia boosts Iran’s military power, while the same partnership politically brings it closer to Türkiye, thus making able to achieve much of its regional diplomatic goals. But this comes at the cost of being put into one basket with Russia at a time, when this is not the most promising. Its strategic partnership with China now made the Gulf states to reconcile and not to go further with their plans with Tel Aviv. And this will affect positively Iran’s relationship with Pakistan as well. This reconciliation fused together with China’s growing economic presence in the Middle East will open doors economic growth. So even if the Western sanctions are not lifted there will be more room to circumvent them. But that comes at the cost of granting China access to very sensitive positions and sectors, which’s defense was so far deemed as priority.
Overall the reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran is a very beneficial thing, especially if it is accompanied by economic partnership. This may contribute on the long run to defuse tension, ease the edge of rivalry and once again give a huge boost to economic development. Which is very important now, as the global need for most essential Gulf commodities, oil and gas are high. But the dream of an independent Middle East free of foreign influence has failed. The most clear proof of that is that what Iraq and Oman with all efforts put into it could not achieve for almost two years, finally needed China to achieve.
That is a very unsettling prospect for the region. Because instead of finally realizing the most essential objectives and putting resources together, the region still values the guidance of a global power more than its own capabilities.